Compilation image. Photo: The Cradle.
By Mawadda Iskandar – Dec 4, 2025
On the axis from Port Sudan to the Empty Quarter, Hadhramaut has become the test ground for shifting Saudi–Emirati power. Their Yemeni proxies are redrawing the province through force, negotiation, and economic leverage – turning it into a barometer of a broader contest over ports, oil, and Yemen’s future.
At a tense moment of military escalation and repeated attacks around Hadhramaut’s eastern oil fields, the Hadhramaut Tribes Alliance (HTA) and the local authority announced the signing of a formal de-escalation agreement on 3 December in Mukalla. The deal came under the auspices of a senior Saudi delegation and a mediation committee of prominent sheikhs and local leaders.
The agreement calls for an immediate halt to all military, security, and media escalation, and stipulates the repositioning of tribal alliance forces one kilometer away from the state-owned Petro Masila oil company, while elite units withdraw three kilometers. It further mandates integrating the Hadhramaut Protection Forces with the Oil Companies Protection Force under a single command to secure installations and safeguard “national wealth.” The accord stresses the return of employees to their posts and the uninterrupted continuation of oil production.
The declaration followed a week of heavy tension across Seiyun, Gil Ben Yamin, and the surrounding plateau, where tribal fighters pushed back repeated attempts by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) to impose control.
Despite the formal truce, the calm is brittle. Several armed formations – each tied to its own patrons and agendas – still operate across the province. The future of the plateau, and the oil beneath it, remains uncertain.
A military source in the HTA tells The Cradle that STC deputy chief Maj. Gen. Faraj al-Bahsani intends to undermine the agreement through new attacks on positions held by the Hadhramaut Protection Forces. Renewed fighting is expected, particularly around Al-Qabaa and the approaches to Wadi Mullin.
A manufactured pretext – and a familiar enemy
As de-escalation efforts began, a parallel stream of political and military statements attempted to justify the latest operations in Hadhramaut and cast the withdrawn units as a security threat. Colonel Mohammed al-Naqib, spokesperson for the southern forces, described the “Bright Future” operation as an effort to secure the valley and desert and remove “terrorist” elements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood via the First Military Region.
Brigadier General Saleh bin Sheikh Abu Bakr, commander of the Hadhrami Elite, said the forces that were removed had been “breathing space for the Houthis, the Brotherhood, and extremist organizations” for years, and that the decision to enter Seiyun came after exhausting all other options to restore security and stability.
The STC’s statement described Seiyun and the districts of the valley and desert as strategic areas used as smuggling routes and staging points for attacks against southern and Saudi forces, describing the operation as the beginning of a new chapter for Hadhramaut.
In contrast, media outlets aligned with the Brotherhood-affiliated Islah Party accused pro-Emirati formations of looting and retaliatory targeting, and accused Riyadh of abandoning Islah forces and striking a deal with Abu Dhabi over the plateau.
Journalist and human rights activist Maher al-Shami tells The Cradle: “What is happening today in Hadhramaut governorate is not a transient local conflict or tribal dispute, but a direct extension of the Saudi–Emirati conflict over Yemeni land and resources.”
The military and security movements of the coalition-linked factions and militias “aim to impose control over oil and maritime wealth, and turn the province into a base of influence that allows Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to consolidate their control in the south and east,” he says. The aim of these foreign projects, Shami explains, is to “impose the partition project to dismantle Yemen and weaken its ability to resist.”
Struggle for the plateau – a snowball gathering speed
Fighting around the Hadhramaut plateau intensified sharply in recent hours. The STC, alongside fighters from Yafa and Al-Dhalea, pushed to seize key sites – including Hawk, a subsidiary of Total’s local branch. Sheikh Amr bin Habrish led the battles of the “Hadhrami resistance,” calling on local tribes and fighters to stand firm and defend the land.
The HTA and Hadhramaut Protection Forces were able to repel the attack, recording deaths, injuries, and loot. On the other hand, the STC quickly took control of Seiyun and the cities of Wadi Hadhramaut, without any real resistance from the First Military Region Brigades.
Sporadic clashes broke out in areas such as Jathma and Wadi al-Ain, and the oil fields witnessed explosions caused by aerial bombardment by the STC forces of the positions of Hadhramaut Protection Forces and tribal alliance units.
In light of these developments, Saudi Arabia has begun extensive moves to contain the tension, as a high-level security and military delegation arrived at Al-Rayyan Airport in Mukalla to hold a meeting with all Hadhrami components and the local authority, headed by the governor.
Riyadh’s proposals included the withdrawal of the tribal alliance forces from the oil sites and their replacement with the National Shield forces, and their deployment in the plateau to control security, while keeping the First Military Region in its current positions and operationally commanding the National Shield Forces.
According to a source involved in the negotiations, these movements were not spontaneous. They followed quiet Saudi–Emirati consultations on dividing influence in Hadhramaut – including allocating zones of control and repositioning loyal units.
Under this arrangement, the National Shield would secure areas central to Riyadh’s long-term interests, while the STC would expand further south. The tribal alliance would be left with limited, secondary territory so that no independent local force could challenge either regional power.
Who truly commands Hadhramaut?
Hadhramaut’s strategic value is undeniable as it is Yemen’s largest province, home to much of its oil, and host to key ports. This has made it a battleground for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – uneasy allies whose rivalry has shaped Yemen’s political map.
The north – the “valley and desert” – and the southern coast have long been divided in military terms. In 2013, the former ousted Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi established the First Military Region in the north, dominated by Islah-aligned units. The Second Military Region, formed in the south, consisted of local forces rooted in the coastal communities.
As Emirati–Saudi competition deepened, Abu Dhabi created the Hadhrami Elite Forces in 2016 to secure the coast and ports. The following year, the UAE backed the establishment of the STC under Aidarous al-Zubaidi, which demanded secession and clashed repeatedly with the pro-Riyadh Aden government – most violently in 2018.
UAE-Backed Militia Seizes Major Yemeni City After Clashes in Hadhramaut
To counterbalance this growing Emirati-aligned structure, Riyadh supported the creation in 2023 of the Southern Majority Homeland Shield Forces under the Presidential Leadership Council’s head, Rashad al-Alimi. These units were deployed across northern Hadhramaut and other strategic sites to curb the STC’s reach.
Recently, the HTA led by Sheikh Amr bin Habrish emerged, asserting that Hadhramaut belongs to its people, and taking military and political steps to declare autonomy. Today, the STC controls Seiyun and the valley cities, and the Homeland Shield controls the camps of the First Military Region after its withdrawal, while the HTA maintains vital oil sites, stressing its rejection of any outside influence.
A spark becomes a fire: Riyadh turns on Abu Dhabi
The latest escalation took shape at the end of November following the appointment of Salem al-Khanbashi as governor, replacing Mabkhout bin Madi – who was openly aligned with the Emiratis. The move signalled Riyadh’s intention to reset the balance inside the governorate.
The timing was telling; the appointment came days after STC forces intensified their deployments in Seiyun, and after STC commander Abu Ali al-Hadrami demanded control over the plateau and threatened the tribal alliance against any further expansion.
The alliance responded quickly, convening emergency meetings and declaring full mobilization. Its forces massed around the plateau and oil fields – Messila, Al-Alaib, Gil Bin Yamin – signaling readiness for confrontation.
The UAE countered by pushing major reinforcements from Aden, Abyan, Dhale, Lahj, and Shabwah, including Security Belt and Security Support units alongside the Hadhrami Elite. Far beyond a local conflict, it had become an extension of a broader regional competition that now stretches from Sudan’s coast to eastern Yemen.
Riyadh has been pressuring Washington to curtail Abu Dhabi’s role in the Sudan war, even calling for the US to designate the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF)as a terrorist organization. Abu Dhabi’s reply came through the STC’s mobilization toward Hadhramaut – a province of enormous significance to Saudi Arabia.
Speaking to The Cradle, Adnan Bawazir, head of the Southern Rescue Council in Hadhramaut, says that the UAE’s posture may be retaliatory. Yet he also notes the possibility of Saudi coordination in handing the province to the National Shield – because the STC cannot move without Riyadh’s approval.
Bawazir believes that Saudi Arabia took advantage of the opportunity to weaken the Brotherhood and overthrow their last stronghold in the south, represented by the First Military Region in Seiyun, and push them towards Marib, laying the groundwork for any future partition plans.
On the ground, he describes the situation as foggy:
“The statements of the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance show a sense of bitterness and a sense that Saudi Arabia may have abandoned them, while they are aware of their military inability to confront pro-Emirati forces coming from inside and outside the governorate.”
According to Bawazir, the First Military Region responds directly to commanders in Riyadh and will surrender positions when ordered. He believes the tribal alliance issue will be resolved through a tribal settlement – a scenario he warns would be disastrous for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty. All outcomes remain possible.
For his part, Shami believes these developments coincide with Sanaa’s growing deterrence capabilities, and are part of Saudi-Emirati efforts to impose a new reality ahead of anticipated regional shifts. He sees the hands of a US-Israeli project intent on weakening Yemen and taking hold of its strategic corridors.
The escalation in Hadhramaut “further complicates any political path for peace and opens the way for the exacerbation of internal conflicts, while the ongoing Yemeni deterrence from Sanaa confirms that the national will will not retreat in the face of aggression,” he says.
A province caught between patrons
Hadhramis who spoke to The Cradle express deep frustration over a conflict they see as entirely external to their interests. Local factions have become tools for regional agendas, and the province’s wealth (its oil, ports, and geography) has turned it into a bargaining chip in a struggle far larger than Yemen.
The UAE has emerged from this round with expanded territorial control for its militias across new strategic terrain. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has used the situation to weaken the Brotherhood and restack the deck in favor of its own clients, particularly the Homeland Shield.
But the wider game remains one of “dancing on the heads of snakes.” And as always, the greatest losers are the people of Hadhramaut – standing on land coveted by allies who increasingly behave like rivals.
Mawadda Iskandar
Mawadda Iskandar is a journalist and a researcher specializing in Gulf affairs; she has produced several documentaries and published research.
