First Measure of “Parallel Government”: Building Apartheid in Venezuela

The anti-Chavista strategy, rooted in an escalation of threats and multiform aggressions, has been seasoned by the injected reaction of its followers: the promotion of hatred. As in 2012 with the “arrechera” (hatred) and in 2014 and 2017 with the guarimbas, acts disguised as protest bring destruction, death and instability that are not a consequence or effect of any political disagreement, but are a constituent part of what is wanted to be impose.

The truth is that once again the media scenario is taken, legal bases are forced, false positives are procured while the mercenary elements are present.

Violent actions, which already reveal the plan, are added to the combination of subordinate statements by Juan Guaidó and the support expressed by the Trump Administration in violation of any diplomatic form. This unveils, without constraints, to which interests, plans and values the anti-chavismo responds.

The incitements (looking for a treason or a switch of sides) to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) by high-ranking US officials such as Mike Pompeo, Mike Pence and John Bolton (but also for most opposition political speakers in Venezuela and the media they control) allow us to deduce that the setback of the sector that opposes Chavismo is also multiform, so much that it has reached disarticulation scales which are serious for any country in which dialogue and debate must prevail before the war.

All this acceleration of events is part of a state of emergency by remote control. On Monday, January 21, there was a prelude through cacerolazos that led to street actions that were purely vandalism. The most symbolic case has been the burning of the cultural house Robert Serra, in honor of who was killed in 2014 on behalf of anti-Chavismo elites (in an assassination operation) whose investigations show the participation of sectors close to Álvaro Uribe Vélez, one of the godfathers of paramilitarism colombiano.

Anti-Chavismo has chosen to attack directly the symbols and territories in which Chavismo has developed as a political force to corner popular initiative and seek total confrontation. In upper middle class sectors such as San Antonio de los Altos or El Cafetal there were no riots as strong as in popular sectors, where these events have been, at least, strange in previous years.

Again, as in the guarimbas of 2014 and 2017, the aim is to promote a hate policy against people identified with the Chavismo to provoke a confrontation, and establish territories where the physical integrity of the Chavistas is at risk due to their political identity. This repetition of patterns is preceded by the guarimbas of 2017 during which more than 30 hate crimes against people identified with Chavismo were counted.

Among these cases, highlights that of Orlando Figueroa, who was burned alive in the Plaza Altamira, a place where, at least, two more people were attacked for this same reason (looking chavista, black or indifenous). Thus, ending the guarimbas of 2017, the hooded groups, known as “guarimberos”, were formed as true extermination groups, which in many cases even turned against the opposition’s own followers by not letting them leave their own houses, or move freely through the streets of their neighborhoods.

These days, in areas such as Antímano, the Caracas-La Guaira highway, Carapita, Catia, Pinto Salinas or San Agustín, again, we witnessed agitation operations in which small groups, equipped with gasoline cans, rubbers and other “logistics”, dedicated themselves to burning and destroying public spaces that have been recovered by the popular organized actors of the Bolivarian Revolution, in the same way as they did in the 2014 and 2017 guarimbas to begin with the promotion of hate against Chavistas with burning and attack on symbols identified with the last 20 years of the Bolivarian process.

While in the purely mediatic, it is about a montage in which “the people” destroy their own environment and the peace that is so difficult to maintain because “is fed up”, meanwhile an accounting of “places with protests” is exercised via NGOs that does not reflect but the amount of money spent by these sectors in generating foci.[And they present death tools out of context making any pass byers believe that the government repressive apparatus is killing protestors when in reality this criminal bands are armed and are particularly more violent this time and are responsible of most of the deaths so far].

These events correspond to an old plan in which parties such as Voluntad Popular have been, on the one hand, recruiting new activists, and on the other, recycling the remanants of their “cadres” to reactivate the violence. The novelty in the popular sectors is that in these areas a softening has been tried (nomenclature in the analysis of color revolutions) by combining failures in public services such as gas, water, telephony, transportation, among others, to try to take them towards this social dynamic more typical o the east than on the west of Caracas, where, in general, people of both political tendencies coexist without any type of problem.

In the midst of a long-standing blockade that has been gradually configured against the Venezuelan economy, it has sought to collapse everyday life, a conflictive graft operation whose motivations are alien to the popular aspirations of improvements in services. In the popular zones it is not required to persecute chavistas but, on the contrary, that they are confronted and overcome the problems caused by the sabotage induced from infiltrated sectors in public companies and the programmed indulgence, in addition to the effects accumulated by five years of an induced economic crisis as a product of the blockade.

As usual, in these violent escalations their protagonists await the action of the security forces to sharpen the conflict, thus activating and justifying the persecution of Chavistas from the communities themselves as a way to blame the other for their own violence. The attempt to maintain public order, certainly necessary in economics, is called “repression” and the legitimate right to protest is confused with a self-proclaimed right to threat and political aggression, as it has been during every violent escalation with footprints of the Department of State.

The need to generate deaths “from side to side” is part of the media scenario in the making; it could become more predictable given that insertion in slums and popular urbanizations (tonwork with the communities to fain their support) does not seem to be an objective in itself (for the opposition). Part of the plan seems to be (again) generate outrage in these sectors to achieve their mobilization against the State, just like a reserve army at the table of pawns, and the sectors identified with the Chavismo.

The antecedent of the guarimbas of 2017 speaks for itself, because when, after the opposition plebiscite in favor of establishing a parallel government, areas of the upper middle class were taken over by hooded people. Violently, these groups clashed with law enforcement agencies to prevent them from entering these areas, and established nighttime curfews where no one could leave or enter.

In the memories of those days the day of the elections to the National Constituent Assembly is recorded, when in those wealthy areas everyone who went to vote was attacked to stop these true states of siege, and in the case of the Chavista population, apartheid due to the impossibility of moving freely for fear of being attacked by their political identity.

In this direction, the first street policy of the “parallel government” of Juan Guaidó seems to be, again, to try to build an apartheid regime against the Chavista population. This time promoting, and seeking, to extend this logic of hatred and confrontation to the popular sectors of Caracas, today, in its great majority, opposed to confrontation for political reasons.


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