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Ibrahim Al-Amin — Aug 14, 2023
On Friday dawn, July 14, 2006, dozens of Israeli aircraft attacked 44 targets in Lebanon. In 34 minutes, the air force completed a mission that the enemy had been working on for more than seven consecutive years. The airstrikes translated into action the “Qualitative Weight” operation, targeting what the enemy claimed constituted 75 percent of Hezbollah’s missile strength, especially the “Fajr-3,” “Fajr-5,” and “Zelzal” rockets armed with large warheads, reaching beyond Haifa.
The enemy’s government approved this operation in the context of responding to the abduction operation that occurred near Ayta ash-Sha’b on the morning of July 12. The enemy’s leaders listened to explanations before approval, including a massive intelligence effort to gather sensitive and precise security data. This led Chief of the General Staff Dan Halutz and other senior military leaders to treat this plan as a “wild card.”
At zero hour, the military leaders were in command centers, with some receiving information directly. After about 40 minutes, the commander of the air force reported the success of the operation to his superiors. Halutz relaxed in his chair at the air force command, leaned back slightly, and said, “We have won”! The next day, when the enemy’s prime minister Ehud Olmert considered stopping the war, Halutz repeated the same phrase and asked, “Do we stop while being victorious?” The enemy’s leaders couldn’t hide their happiness at the “success” of the massive security operation. One of the army’s staff members even said, “What happened reflects our intelligence capabilities and shows how much we have penetrated Hezbollah”!
On the other side of the border, the resistance leadership had begun taking measures of high alertness and wartime readiness. These measures were familiar to the resistance fighters over many years, including ensuring that everyone is present at their designated positions, a rapid and comprehensive evacuation of all positions where the resistance operates during peacetime, including command centers, operation rooms, and homes. This also involved the evacuation of families of known leaders from their homes and repurposing certain civilian locations into military workplaces.
All these measures were taken after it became evident to the resistance leadership that the enemy had decided to launch a major strike that would open the door to a widespread war. However, among the resistance leaders, there were those who were anticipating a particular event.
As the Israeli aircraft swarmed into Lebanese airspace, anticipation was at its peak among the top leaders of the resistance. When the airstrikes began, careful scrutiny of the targets that came under attack commenced. Martyr Imad Mughniyeh was in the alternate operations room, receiving real-time updates. After confirming that the enemy had targeted the points related to the missile force, he smiled and said to those around him, “Good. They took the bait!”
Hajj Radwan al-Saada exhaled with relief, along with all the elements of the leadership system who were aware of the elaborate “deception” operation that had lasted for over seven years. This effort encompassed massive security, military, and human efforts, allowing the resistance to establish an independent system that the enemy hadn’t reached throughout the war. The enemy was unable to strike a single platform before it released its payload of missiles, not only of the “Fajr-3,” “Fajr-5,” and “Zelzal” types but also of new types the enemy wasn’t aware of, including “Raad” and “Khyber.”
The Great Deception
“Al-Akhbar” interviewed two Hezbollah military commanders who were responsible for the missile force during the 2006 aggression. They discussed the details of the “grand deception” that dates back to years before the war. This deception involved the resistance’s activities in the field of missile strength and provided a narrative that doesn’t encompass all the intricate details of the largest deception operation in the history of the conflict with the Israeli enemy.
The story dates back to July 1993, when the enemy discovered that the resistance had a special plan to build a missile force. Its intelligence agencies became active in gathering whatever information they could about this activity. After the April 1996 war, the enemy initiated a complex and highly professional intelligence operation, utilizing all its intelligence techniques: human agents on the ground, drones conducting daily surveys and verifications, tracking devices for vehicles and individuals, and a specialized phone tapping program for all types of phones. With technological advancements, the enemy developed tracking methods, turning to drones that monitor the movement of individuals, cars, or trucks suspected of carrying missiles. They also developed a tracking system as mobile phones became more widespread and some resistance members resorted to using them before their subsequent prohibition. Moreover, they created programs to capture the voiceprint of specific individuals. If any of these individuals were detected speaking on monitored communication channels, the tracking and monitoring units would be automatically activated. At certain stages, the resistance did not realize that the enemy had succeeded in developing a mechanism for technical penetration of every device connected to the internet.
The human element played a significant intelligence role in favor of the enemy, extending beyond Lebanese territory to include Syria, Iran, and Palestinian areas. A team was dedicated to sorting and linking the collected data to create the desired picture. At some point, the resistance confirmed the enemy’s success in identifying the identities of members of the human cadre working on the missile force dossier and pinpointing storage or “nesting” points for a large quantity of specialized missiles (“Fajr”) at that time.
In 1999, Martyr Imad Mughniyeh assumed leadership of the Jihad Council within the resistance and worked to reorganize the leadership structure. His security-oriented personality often marked whatever he undertook or requested to be executed. It’s known that Hajj Radwan wasn’t the type to share everyone with his observations or information. After taking on his responsibilities, he requested drastic changes in the rocket force’s operations without explaining the background of his decision. He only informed a select few about the data he had accumulated, indicating that the enemy was aware of the rocket force’s operational program, particularly concerning the transfer and storage of “Fajr-3” and “Fajr-5” rockets, among others with long ranges.
Hajj Radwan ordered the personnel of the unit, which he considered “burned out security-wise,” to continue their work as usual without supplying them with new rockets. He directed them to treat the established sites the same way, as if no changes had occurred, and to adhere to routine procedures involving inspecting the rockets and ensuring the readiness of the vehicles carrying the platforms.
Simultaneously, Hajj Radwan’s first action was to select a group of individuals from the program, as well as a number of security personnel, and tasked them with forming an independent covert unit separate from the existing rocket unit. He issued strict orders to prevent any communication between the members of the new unit and the rest of the Jihad body. For many years, only a select few within the resistance leadership were aware of the existence of this new unit. The stringent orders given were not only intended to keep the enemy from knowing their activities but also to withhold such knowledge from Hezbollah itself.
His primary decision was to transfer responsibility for the “Fajr-5” missile program and the new types to the new covert unit, not limiting their distribution to areas north of the Litani. After the liberation in 2000, Hajj Radwan oversaw a new resistance program titled “The Israel Removal Program,” with the rocket force being essential to its execution. He adopted several separate tracks to achieve this goal, keeping them completely distinct. At times, no one knew about the nature of the others’ work. Neither within the Jihad body of the party nor in various locations was there knowledge of the existence of the new rocket force unit operating north of the Litani.
During that period, “Fajr-5” was the latest rocket for the resistance. However, with Hajj Qassem Soleimani assuming command of the Quds Force within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and cooperation with the Syrian army in the field of rocket industries beginning, after 2003 Hajj Radwan launched a new trajectory related to a new type of missiles, such as “Fateh 110,” which was the first guided missile obtained by the resistance. The name “Zelzal” came from the missile’s weight and the explosive power of its warhead.
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The work of the new covert unit progressed rapidly, including training, maneuvers, missile procurement, and storage. The concept of “track separation” was even adopted within the unit itself. There was a specialized team unaware of what the others were doing. One team handled transportation, another storage, a third positioning, and a fourth loading the platforms, and so on.
During one of the meetings between unit leaders and Hajj Radwan, he was asked about his security concerns and the reason behind the security measures, as well as the fate of the “burned program” they had been working on for years south of the Litani. He insisted on maintaining the routine work at the “burned sites,” continuing daily patrols and regular inspections, and keeping human elements in their designated roles. However, he initiated a discussion about the idea of vacating these sites, as everyone was convinced that the enemy was aware of them and their contents.
Deception and Evacuation
Up until that time, the resistance had prepared 44 locations for storing “Fajr-3” and “Fajr-5” missiles, in open areas, unused warehouses, and sites previously used by civilians who were requested to evacuate at the start of the war. After discussions, Hajj Radwan agreed to a plan for evacuating the “Fajr-5” missiles, seeking its execution with a precise, meticulous, and extended strategy that wouldn’t arouse suspicion from the enemy that evacuation had occurred. He requested the following:
Firstly, the evacuation task should be limited to a specific number of members from the new covert unit, not involving all those who were part of it. Those responsible for transferring the packed missiles to new locations, the source of the missiles, should remain unknown even to the members themselves. Instead, they should be “misled” into believing that these are new missiles imported from outside Lebanon.
Secondly, the members responsible for the “burned sites” shouldn’t be aware of the evacuation process and should continue their work as usual.
Thirdly, resistance factories were tasked with producing non-functional mock-up models of the missiles to be placed in the spots from which the real ones were being withdrawn. On that day, the leaders heard from him, for the first time, doubts about the existence of human involvement in the enemy’s project. However, he wasn’t certain whether it was a breach within the resistance’s ranks or direct intelligence presence from the enemy. Consequently, he believed that placing fake missiles in place of the real ones would dispel any doubts from the enemy’s side about any changes taking place. He instructed those involved in the operation to “evacuate as much as you can, but leave some to distract the Israelis, and let’s work on building a new and mobile missile system.”
Within a relatively short period of time, the majority of the locations were emptied of actual missiles, and most of the “Fajr-5” missiles were withdrawn without raising any suspicions.
The Enemy Inspects the Points
Indeed, what the martyr Mughniyeh anticipated happened. At one of the points where the resistance was confident that the enemy knew its location and what was present there, unidentified individuals reached the vicinity of the facility and created an opening in a wall adjacent to the missile emplacement to verify their presence. That day, the enemy confirmed the existence of missiles and launch platforms.
On Friday, July 14, when Israel began implementing the “Qualitative Weight” operation, it became evident that the enemy possessed crucial coordinates for 44 points, complete with precise details including angles of missile and platform placement within each point. After the aggression ended, it became clear that the enemy possessed astonishingly detailed information. “In reality, we were surprised by what happened. We couldn’t imagine the level of breach and the accuracy of the enemy’s information. At that moment, we understood Hajj Radwan’s insistence on neglecting the previous missile infrastructure.” The leaders of the rocket unit realized why he rejected establishing fixed military areas, favoring mobile platforms that could move out of storage or temporary positions to carry out their missions. He responded to inquiries with: “I have reasons related to these burned sites that are sufficient not to rely on anything.”
Practically, those involved in the rocket unit were expecting a significant Israeli operation. However, there was an extremely large number of individuals within the jihadist organization who were unaware of what was happening. When the first strike hit, field commanders, who had no knowledge of the alternative rocket force, were shocked as they believed the resistance’s capabilities had suffered a major blow.
Shortly after the immense satisfaction that swept over Israeli military circles following the “successful” operation by the air force, which they believed had eliminated the resistance’s rocket capabilities, specifically on July 16, the resistance launched a salvo of high-quality rockets targeting the train station in Haifa. Eight Israelis were killed in the attack, and a sense of panic spread among the enemy’s leadership. Meanwhile, Hajj Radwan leaned back in his seat, saying, “For me, the enemy was defeated.”
Translated by Resistance Channel Ali
OT/JRE/DZ
Ibrahim Al-Amin
Ibrahim Al-Amin is a Lebanese journalist, and the editor-in-chief of the Lebanese publication Al Akhbar.
