By The Cradle’s Palestine Correspondent – Mar 25, 2025
Under Ahmad al-Sharaa’s direction, Syria’s new Islamist leaders are systematically sidelining Palestinian factions, favoring the US-backed PA, dismantling Iran-linked groups, and reshaping refugee dynamics in alignment with a broader US-backed strategy to neutralize the Palestinian resistance.
Since the fall of the Syrian government on 8 December, the direction of the new interim administration, headed by Ahmad al-Sharaa, has become increasingly clear. Politically, militarily, and legally, Damascus now appears aligned with Washington’s long-standing vision of dismantling the Palestinian cause.
This alignment is taking shape on three key fronts: first is the Palestinian Authority (PA), resistance factions such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other factions splintered from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Second, is the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) tasked specifically to aid Palestinian refugees in the region, and third, are the camps housing Palestinian refugees and displaced Syrians.
Two developments underscore this shift. First, both Turkiye and Lebanon have blocked Palestinians holding Syrian documents from returning to Syria on the same basis as Syrian nationals. Second, US media has revealed ongoing talks between Washington and Damascus over the possibility of Syria absorbing tens of thousands of displaced Gazans, in exchange for sanctions relief or a broader political arrangement, particularly in the aftermath of the Coastal Massacres earlier this year.
Front 1: The PA and the resistance factions
More than four months into the transition to new governance, one thing is clear: former Al-Qaeda affiliate leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, now Syria’s president, is keeping Hamas at arm’s length. Despite repeated requests by Khaled Meshaal – head of Hamas’s political bureau abroad – to visit Damascus, the interim authorities have stalled, aiming to avoid direct confrontation with Israel or the US.
This new Syrian posture takes place in the midst of an ongoing genocide against the Palestinian people and the occupation state’s aim to eliminate their Islamic resistance.
The Cradle has learned that communication between Hamas and the new authorities is largely being channelled through Turkish intermediaries. Ankara is reportedly facilitating the relocation of several Hamas military officials to Idlib, the stronghold of Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militants.
In contrast, Sharaa – who met with Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa in January – has formally opened channels with the PA’s diplomatic mission in Damascus, recognizing it as the official representative of the Palestinian people.
The visiting delegation included senior officials from Fatah and the PLO, most notably Mahmoud Abbas’s son, who arrived to reclaim properties previously held by anti-Fatah factions under former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government.
On the night the Assad government collapsed, Popular Front–General Command (PFLP-GC) Secretary-General Talal Naji and Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) Chief-of-Staff Akram al-Rifai sought refuge at the PA embassy. Palestinian ambassador Samir al-Rifai reportedly received a sharp rebuke from Abbas for granting them shelter. As for the rest of the faction leaders, each of them remained at home.
The day after HTS forces entered Damascus, they launched a wave of closures targeting Palestinian faction offices. Those belonging to Fatah al-Intifada, the Baath-aligned Al-Sa’iqa movement, and the PFLP-GC were shuttered, with their weapons, vehicles, and real estate seized.
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which had maintained a lower profile during the Syrian war, was allowed to continue operating – though under observation.
On 11 and 12 December, several faction leaders convened at the Palestinian embassy in the presence of PLA leader Rifai to discuss their future. They attempted to arrange a formal meeting with Sharaa via Syria’s Foreign Ministry. Instead, a messenger from HTS – identified as Basil Ayoub – arrived at the embassy and demanded full disclosure of all faction-owned assets, including real estate, bank deposits, vehicles, and weapons. No political engagement would be possible, he said, until a comprehensive inventory had been submitted.
The factions complied by drafting a letter declaring that their holdings were lawfully acquired and that they were prepared to limit their activity to political and media outreach, in full alignment with Syria’s new posture. The fate of the letter to Sharaa and its response are unknown.
Decapitation campaign: arrests, confiscations, and settlements
What followed was a systematic decapitation of the Palestinian factional structure in Syria.
In early February, Fatah al-Intifada’s Secretary-General Abu Hazem Ziad al-Saghir was arrested at his home. After hours of interrogation and a raid on his office – where documents reportedly linked him to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – he was released.
A week later, he was re-arrested and held at a newly established detention site behind the Abbasid Stadium. A financial settlement was reached: $500,000 in exchange for his release and deportation to Lebanon. At the request of the committee, the movement’s Central Committee issued a statement terminating Saghir’s duties and dismissing him from the movement. However, Saghir issued a counterstatement from Lebanon, transferring the movement’s General Secretariat there and dismissing those who had made the decision to remove him.
The Palestinian Baathist faction, Al-Sa’iqa, fared no better. Its Secretary-General Muhammad Qais was interrogated and stripped of the group’s assets. Though he was not in command during the Battle of Yarmouk and thus escaped harsher punishment, HTS ordered the removal of the term “Baath” from all official materials. A statement soon emerged from within the occupied territories denouncing Qais as a “regime remnant,” suggesting a growing internal split.
HTS also clamped down hard on the PFLP-GC, whose Secretary-General, Talal Naji, was placed under house arrest and interrogated multiple times. All the group’s offices, vehicles, and weapons were confiscated, their headquarters shuttered, and its members beaten and humiliated. Their radio station, Al-Quds Radio, was seized, and their Umayyah Hospital is reportedly next in line.
The “Nidal Front” – a breakaway faction of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), a left-wing group within the PLO – was the most controversial of its dealings. At the beginning of the events, Khaled Meshaal was able to mediate for the Front’s Secretary-General, Khaled Abdul Majeed, and protect him and his organization. However, in February, Abdul Majeed fled to the UAE.
His personal residence and vehicles – reportedly privately owned – were seized along with 50 million Syrian pounds (less than $5,000) in assets. Forced to resign by HTS, he handed over authority to a central committee operating out of Damascus and Beirut.
The DFLP has so far escaped the brunt of these purges, and its offices and vehicles remain untouched by the new administration, possibly because it had no ties to Iran or Hezbollah. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP – different from the PFLP-GC) main office in the Taliani area of Damascus remains open but inactive, while the rest of its offices have been shut down.
As of now, the PIJ, whose fighters have been on Gaza’s frontline battling Israel since 7 October 2023, remains in its Syrian offices. The faction’s representative has not been summoned for questioning, despite Israel bombing an apartment used by the group’s Secretary-General, Ziad al-Nakhala.
However, key PIJ military figures relocated to Baghdad on the night Damascus fell to HTS. Their activities inside Syria appear largely to have been reduced to conducting funerals for fighters who were killed in battle in southern Lebanon, albeit exclusively inside Palestinian refugee camps.
The Yarmouk camp in Damascus had already witnessed a series of protests in the first days of February, most notably gatherings demanding the closure of the headquarters of pro-regime organizations and the accountability of those involved in the arrest and killing of camp residents. The events escalated into an attempt to set fire to the headquarters of the PIJ’s Quds Brigades, with some youths and children throwing firecrackers at the building. Meanwhile, a demonstration erupted in protest against the decision to reopen the offices of the Al-Sa’iqa brigades in the Al-A’edin camp,
Inside the HTS-‘Israeli’ Campaign To Eliminate Syria’s Military Engineers and Scientists
Front 2: Palestinian refugee camps in Syria
The crackdown on political groups has created a leadership vacuum in Syria’s Palestinian camps. Living conditions – already dire – have deteriorated further. In early February, protests erupted in several camps over Israel’s brutal attacks on the occupied West Bank’s Jenin Camp, following the PA delegation’s visit and the Syrian government’s formal recognition of Ramallah’s authority. Many feared this shift would accelerate plans for permanent resettlement of the refugees. At the same time, residents say they were coerced into public rallies in support of Sharaa’s self-declared presidency.
On 24 February, the Community Development Committee in Deraa began collecting detailed personal data from camp residents under the pretext of improving service delivery. A similar census was launched days earlier in Jaramana, but the purpose and funders of these efforts remain unclear.
Into this vacuum stepped Hamas. Through affiliated organizations like the Palestine Development Authority, Hamas began distributing food and financial aid, often via operatives embedded within HTS. This effort came as services once offered by the PIJ – including transportation, communal kitchens, and medical support – were halted. Even the Palestinian-Iranian Friendship Association’s headquarters in Yarmouk was taken over and repurposed by HTS elements.
Other actors, such as the Jafra Foundation and the Palestinian Red Crescent, continue to operate despite significant constraints. Their efforts have been insufficient to meet demand, particularly as the local economy continues to collapse. Most refugees rely on informal work, and with much of the economy paralyzed, daily survival has become precarious.
Of particular concern is a reported settlement proposal, conveyed through Turkish mediation. It allegedly offers Palestinians in Syria three options: Syrian naturalization, integration into a new PA-affiliated “community” under embassy supervision, or consular classification with annual residency renewals. The implicit fourth option is displacement, mirroring what happened to Palestinians in post-US invasion Iraq.
Front 3: UNRWA, sidelined and undermined
Though the new Syrian authorities have not openly targeted UNRWA, their lack of cooperation speaks volumes. UNRWA no longer appears to be viewed as the primary institution responsible for Palestinian affairs in Syria.
In Khan Eshieh Camp, a local committee working with the new administration petitioned the Damascus Governorate to prepare a municipal plan for rehabilitating the camp’s infrastructure. The implication was clear: Syrian authorities are preparing to take over camp management from UNRWA, following the Jordanian model.
Meanwhile, the Immigration and Passports Department resumed issuing travel documents for Palestinian refugees in January, a bureaucratic move that revealed the new government’s intention to reassert control. Around the same time, the Palestinian Arab Refugee Association in Damascus suspended its operations following a break-in that reportedly disrupted pension payments to retired refugees.
Despite limited resources, Hamas and the PIJI remain a point of concern for the occupation state. A recent Yedioth Ahronoth report claimed that both groups are attempting to rebuild military capacity inside Syria, with the intention of targeting settlements near the occupied Golan Heights and northern Galilee. While the report acknowledged no confirmed troop movements south of Damascus, it warned that operational planning is underway.
A close examination of Sharaa’s behavior and the new regime in Damascus reveals no apparent dissolution of these two organizations’ operations, as the Israelis claim. All that is taking place are temporary measures until a “big deal” is reached with the Americans, one of whose provisions will be the official and popular status of the Palestinians. Unless the country descends into chaos, one of the expected outcomes will be a clear Israeli ground military intervention under the pretext of removing the Palestinians from the border.
