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Venezuelan Acting President Delcy RodrĂguez (center), accompanied by National Assembly President Jorge RodrĂguez (left) and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello (right), holds a press conference, Caracas, Venezuela, January 14, 2026. Photo: Ding Hongfa/Xinhua News.
By William Serafino – Jan 15, 2026
Following the overwhelming and patently illegal US military aggression against Venezuela on January 3, which culminated in the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, National Assembly Deputy Cilia Flores, and left a catastrophic toll of 100 dead (so far), US President Donald Trump has been investing a great deal of narrative resources to claim that he is in charge of Venezuela.
Trump’s explicitly colonial language has also included the use of bullying as a tactic of provocation, as he recently proclaimed himself “interim president” of Venezuela in a post on Truth Social.
In parallel, his contrasting comments about Delcy RodrĂguez, Venezuela’s acting president, and far-right leader MarĂa Corina Machado complement the framing of his narrative. Regarding RodrĂguez, he highlights her “cooperation” and how well they have been working together. Meanwhile, he continues to pour cold water on Machado, arguing that she lacks respect in her country.
Based on these two premises, Trump is constructing the artifice of what he seeks to sell as a US colonial regency or protectorate in Venezuela, grounded in his supposed “selection” of RodrĂguez.
This approach cannot be sustained by facts. Despite cover-up efforts by the hegemonic media, its fragile seams are plain for all to see.
A calculation with a counterproductive outcome
Let us go back to the bitter early morning of January 3. Evaluating the US calculations dispassionately, it would be very naive to consider that the ultimate objective of the aggression was merely to abduct President Maduro. Similarly, it would be naive to think that removing a country’s top political authority from the game is not part of a broader strategic effort to dismantle and destabilize the state that the person governs.
The psychological, social, and political shock caused by the bombings in Caracas and other Venezuelan cities was the concrete measure of that aspiration, which was not formally declared as part of “Operation Absolute Resolve.” Most likely, the powers in Washington—intellectually colonized for years by recycled narratives about internal divisions within Chavismo—expected a rapid, house-of-cards collapse in Venezuela.
Following the projected collapse—first political and then institutional—the US would play at managing the chaos, following the model of the looting of Iraq after the 2003 military invasion. A weak and fragmented government, unable to control the territory and maintain the cohesion of the country, would create an optimal scenario for an occupation focused on seizing oil fields, while simultaneously arbitrating the internal conflict between military and political forces in favor of the most pro-US factions.
One could try to refute this approach by arguing that Venezuela is not Iraq, and that Trump, unlike Bush Jr.’s neoconservative approach, leans toward limited military operations to mitigate reputational and electoral costs.
Although this is partly true, it does not fill the explanatory gaps after the bombing.
Trump has not achieved any positive outcomes that are equivalent in impact and benefit to the risk of militarily attacking a South American country and kidnapping its head of state. US public opinion condemns his decision, he has not seen a significant boost in the polls, frictions within isolationist factions of the MAGA world have intensified, and the recent meeting with executives of major Western oil companies—at which he had hoped to secure a major domestic economic victory—concluded without any investment commitments.
Considering the projected returns after the aggression, the continuity of the Venezuelan government under Delcy RodrĂguez does not fit within the triumphant position in which Trump had hoped to be nearly two weeks after the riskiest geopolitical move of his entire political career.
It is evident that the rise of Maduro’s vice president in extraordinary conditions was not part of the operation’s design, nor was it the product of supposed behind-the-scenes negotiations or an election, but rather an unforeseen consequence that Trump has had to ride out on the fly.
With RodrĂguez at the helm of Venezuela, Trump faces the complex task of reconciling politically explosive variables: the electoral frenzy of the midterms, the risks stemming from a new escalation, and the time and resources he must invest in negotiations to secure political and economic gains on which to draw in the domestic elections.
In short, Trump’s supposed “choice” of RodrĂguez does not seem to make sense if the outcome of that decision is facing the same obstacles he had faced with Maduro: securing a greater oil presence through negotiations with Marco Rubio’s enemies. The amount of risk taken for a “Pyrrhic victory,” as Argentinian historian Lautaro Rivara points out, is solid evidence that the current acting president of Venezuela was never part of Trump’s plans, nor was Machado.
Dismantling Trump’s “we are in charge”
Despite Trump’s declarative insistence on his fictitious government in Venezuela, colonial mandates, protectorates, or tutelages are implemented through practical legal and institutional actions. It is precisely this condition that makes it unnecessary to constantly reaffirm that one is in charge of a country. In this logic, Trump’s reaffirmations do not bring him closer to his goal; they take him further away.
In the broad US imperial-colonial tradition, these forms of external control have been embodied in formulas such as the 1901 Platt Amendment for Cuba and the 1902 Philippine Organic Act applied to the Philippines. These two formalized US control over these island nations once the US war with the Spanish Empire concluded. These countries had been part of the Spanish Empire until the US military victory.
Nothing like these mechanisms is being applied to Venezuela, no matter how hard one tries to force historical logic by presenting the ongoing US energy and geopolitical blackmail against Venezuela as a sui generis variant of a US protectorate or tutelage.
Since national sovereignty is an indivisible concept, the implementation of intermediate protectorates is not possible. The current pressure exerted by Trump against Venezuela, amplified by a military aggression that has undoubtedly strengthened the United States’ advantages in imposing its will, is not automatically an unequivocal sign of tutelage.
Proof that there is no such thing as a Trump government in Venezuela recently came from ExxonMobil, whose CEO, Darren Woods, refused to invest in Venezuela during a meeting between Big Oil executives and the US president. Subsequently, Trump stated that he was considering excluding ExxonMobil from his energy strategy in Venezuela, acknowledging that he could not fulfilll the oil company’s request during the meeting: a structural change to Venezuela’s legal framework.
What would be the difficulty in achieving it if he is indeed governing Venezuela, and a protectorate has already been established?
Paraphrasing the Brazilian essayist Antônio Cândido, who stated that “literature is the daydreaming of civilizations,” the notion of a protectorate is the daydreaming of the US empire in Venezuela.
The declaration of intent in this regard is a dangerous sign that the neocons, led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, salivating for an Iraq in the Caribbean, are not entirely satisfied with the current post-Maduro scenario and are plotting a new offensive, because the ultimate prize of the Bolivarian Republic’s collapse has once again slipped through their fingers.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/SC/SF
William Serafino in a Venezuelan political scientist, graduate of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV). Researcher, writer, and analyst specializing in geopolitics. Winner of Venezuela's SimĂłn BolĂvar National Journalism Prize, Research category (2019).
