Venezuela: Tactical and Strategic Aspects of July 27 Municipal Elections

By Misión Verdad  –  Jul 25, 2025

Venezuelans will elect 335 mayors and the same number of municipal councils on Sunday, July 27.

This election is preceded by the presidential election of July 28, 2024 and parliamentary and state governor elections on May 25 this year.

Thus, with the July 27 elections, the cycle of elections of all positions in the executive and legislative branches of the state will be completed.

Like any electoral event, this one has particular characteristics and significance, some of which will be analyzed here.

1. Electoral trends
When the last municipal elections were held in November 2021, Chavismo won 212 mayoralties, 63% of the national total. At that time, the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) secured 61 positions (18%), the Democratic Alliance coalition (AD) obtained 39 mayoralties (11%), and the Fuerza Vecinal (FV) party won in 10 municipalities.

This political composition has changed considerably by this year, as the PUD coalition is not participating in the election. The organization has de facto dissolved, and some parties that were part of it or have originated from it, such as Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) and the Movimiento por Venezuela (MPV), are participating independently on July 27.

AD and FV remain in the electoral arena, but they are competing against multiple independent candidates and new coalitions, such as Alianza Lápiz.

Chavismo remains united in a single coalition of parties, the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP), and has presented 335 candidacies. Meanwhile, the various opposition forces have presented 705 candidates, which means that in many municipalities, there are at least two anti-Chavista candidates for the mayoral position.

2. A new cycle
On June 27, a complete renewal of elected offices in the country will be completed. This means that, for the next four years, there will be no new elections for regional and municipal offices.

This is relevant for political actors throughout the country, as the local and state governance will be defined for the next four years.

Similarly, the government hopes that, by achieving a municipal majority, it can consolidate and strengthen its political and institutional governance.

Over the past few years, since the 2020 parliamentary elections, Venezuela has achieved a state of harmonized powers and stability. These components have been central to the economic recovery strategy implemented by the government.

3. Local dynamics
Local dynamics, local daily life, and municipal administration will be decisive in defining the results of these elections.

In municipal elections, voters punish or reward their mayors and councilors as a way of evaluating their performance. Pragmatism usually prevails, as these positions directly impact the lives of the population.

4. Opposition’s organizational weakness
This new election will demonstrate once again the existence of diverse electoral oppositions competing among themselves and against Chavismo.

Moreover, in most municipalities, a significant organizational collapse of the opposition is noticeable both within and outside of the July 27 elections, producing a general inertia at the territorial and sectoral levels.

Opposition organizations lack credible agitation, mobilization, and organizational mechanisms capable of achieving a majority in many municipalities across the country.

This is a consequence of years of strategic fragmentation, divisions among leaders, a lack of cohesion among political organizations, and the lack of organizational muscle of smaller parties.

It is also a result of the usual abstentionist tendencies among opposition forces. By withdrawing from the electoral arena, parties have lost ties with voters, and their ability to build solid support bases for their leaders has weakened.

Step by Step: How to Vote in Venezuela’s July 27 Elections and Popular Consultation

5. Abstentionist tendencies
As is well known, the extremist opposition sector represented by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, along with some leaders of the now-defunct PUD, is betting on electoral abstentionism and boycott.

Their only strategy is delegitimizating the electoral process and inciting an institutional breakdown in the country. However, it also has other aims, such as hijacking the leadership of the entire opposition.

Machado is banking on the failure of other opposition factions in order to prevent the formation of other leaderships outside of “her line.” She deploys a strategy of stigmatizing and disrupting the entire opposition ecosystem outside of her fold to impose an artificial hegemony, highly digital, but with great power to shape public opinion. It is based on “leadership” absent from the real political arena, as she calls her leadership “underground,” while Edmundo González remains in Madrid, the capital of Spain.

This situation paralyzes some segments of anti-Chavismo, as uncertainty, a sense of failure, and a political vacuum are repositioned as a broader problem that discourages a large portion of the opposition electorate.

The situation is particularly serious considering that some municipalities that have been historically strongholds of the opposition could fall into the hands of the PSUV and related parties this year, creating unprecedented events in national politics, but with a particularly shocking impact on the broader sector that rejects Chavismo.

6. Impact of the work of the municipal administrations
In recent years, municipalities have become territorial bodies that have experimented with new methods of government and co-governance.

One of the major developments has been the emergence of Popular Consultations to decide on the use of resources at the level of communal circuits. The people themselves are prioritizing and deciding on the allocation of public administration funds.

This year, Self-Government Chambers have emerged, impacting public policies at the municipal level. They are bodies for planning, implementing, and evaluating various public policies and are made up of representatives from Communes and Communal Councils.

These methods are contributing to a significant change in municipal governments. Now, mayors must adapt to these methods, assuming roles as facilitators and supporters of these strategies.

Chavismo plans to achieve an overwhelming majority in municipal offices. The imperative of municipal governance, coupled with the national strategy, would undoubtedly pave the way for the consolidation of new forms of consultation and self-governance.

Thus, municipal power could change considerably with the cycle that is about to begin.

7. Levels of political cohesion
For President Nicolás Maduro’s government, there is a clear aspiration to maintain and strengthen political cohesion among government bodies at every level.

During the remainder of this year, or in 2026, the country could experience new political scenarios, such as a transformation of the state, a possible constitutional reform, or the emergence of laws that enable comprehensive and profound changes in government administration.

Furthermore, in a context of external aggression and the intensification of illegal sanctions against Venezuela, the government’s political leadership is developing strategies to strengthen coordination in the exercise of power and governance.

Thus, we can conclude that the July 27 elections and a possible new Chavista majority in municipalities will be components of an agenda of multi-level and multi-factor alignment among political power bodies in various scenarios.

 

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/SC/SF