Gas flaring in an ExxonMobil facility in Guyana. Photo: Victor Moriyama/InfoAmazonia.
By Misión Verdad – Jul 23, 2025
July 18, 2025, marked the conclusion of one of the most complex and controversial corporate disputes in the energy sector.
Chevron was able to complete the acquisition of Hess for over $50 billion after a prolonged international arbitration, lasting 20 months. This acquisition was against ExxonMobil, which had tried to block the deal on the grounds of preferential contractual rights.
The case once again highlights ExxonMobil’s willingness to attribute to itself prerogatives that exceed those established in legal and contractual frameworks. This occurs within a complex scenario due to the area’s location on the Atlantic front of the Venezuelan Essequibo.
In fact, ExxonMobil’s attempt to block the merger between Chevron and Hess arises from a logic of monopolistic control that has historically defined ExxonMobil’s behavior since its beginning. This continues to guide its projection onto strategic energy markets without regard to the law or existing territorial disputes.
The core of this battle was the Stabroek oil block. This area is part of the maritime zone arbitrarily administered by ExxonMobil within the illegality of the Guyanese enclave, which is undelimited due to the Esequibo dispute.
Hess’ stake in the area was 30%, while ExxonMobil had 45% and sought to block the transaction, arguing that its right of first refusal was triggered by the merger.
The arbitration settled by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), based in Paris, concluded that the disputed contractual clause was not applicable to corporate mergers, but only to direct asset sales. Thus, ExxonMobil’s attempt to halt the operation proved unsuccessful.
The ruling of the arbitration panel in favor of Chevron not only allowed it to finalize the purchase of Hess but also set a crucial precedent in the oil industry. The court made it clear that a merger between companies cannot be blocked simply because one of them has shared assets with other companies, unless that is expressly written in the contract.
ExxonMobil argued that it had a “right of first refusal” over Hess’ stake in the controversial Stabroek block, under a clause that stated that if a partner sold its stake, it had to offer the stake first to the others.
However, Chevron was not buying a specific stake but rather acquiring the entire Hess company through a corporate merger.
Therefore, in strictly legal terms, it was not an “asset sale” but rather a change in the company’s total ownership.
Chevron’s lawyers argued, and the court agreed with them, that this type of merger did not activate ExxonMobil’s preferential right because the contract did not clearly state so. In international commercial law, especially in English law, as was the case here, what is important is not the intention a party claims to have, but what is expressly stated in the signed document.
The precedent set by this case is key in the field of mergers and acquisitions for energy sector companies, as privileges cannot be invoked out of custom or convenience; rather, they must be clearly defined in the agreements.
Venezuela Wins the Fight Against ExxonMobil in the Stabroek Block
ExxonMobil’s never-ending hunger
ExxonMobil’s actions in the Stabroek block are not simply a commercial dispute but are part of a historical and perennial pattern of aggressive corporate expansion in which political pressure, contractual manipulation, and the violation of international standards have become common tools for the company to secure reserves and neutralize competition.
Since its origins as Standard Oil, a key player in the oil plundering in Venezuela during the Juan Vicente Gómez regime, ExxonMobil has operated under the premise that the crude oil fields where it operates belong to it.
This vision of ownership and dominance over energy resources explains its current logic: expansion at all costs, especially in disputed territories, and systematically excluding competitors through institutional pressure, litigious arbitration, and political lobbying where necessary.
One of the most illustrative cases of this behavior occurred in Venezuela during the nationalization of the Orinoco Oil Belt, carried out by President Hugo Chávez’s administration in 2007. At the time, ExxonMobil refused to accept a subordinate position as a minority partner to the Venezuelan state company PDVSA, and responded not only with technical resistance but also with a coordinated attack of legal pressure, financial tricks, and diplomatic maneuvers.
While engaged in negotiations with the Venezuelan state, ExxonMobil was simultaneously preparing legal schemes to freeze the country’s assets abroad after receiving previously agreed-upon payments. This two-track strategy was described by Venezuelan defense counsel as an act of “unclean hands,” demonstrating that the company was seeking both compensation and punishment of Venezuela’s sovereignty, while also discouraging other countries from following the same path.
ExxonMobil remains trapped in its old, unresolved resentment and continues to wage a silent crusade against Venezuela.
In fact, a more recent example was revealed by Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. She decried that ExxonMobil pressured the US Treasury Department to indefinitely halt Chevron’s operations in Venezuela under the unilateral sanctions scheme.
The existence of the document entitled “Sanctions on Venezuelan Oil: Less Money Means Less Power,” signed by senior executives of ExxonMobil, including Peter Williams, demonstrates that the transnational is not only seeking expansion but also actively preventing other companies from accessing substantial reserves, such as those possessed by Venezuela.
This behavior is part of a structural motivation. Grappling with the erosion of its traditional assets and increasing global competition, ExxonMobil has opted for a strategy of aggressive reserve accumulation.
This explains its merger with Pioneer Natural Resources for over $64 billion, as well as its attempt to block Chevron’s acquisition of Hess. The arbitration against Chevron-Hess before the ICC was not a simple contractual claim; it was a corporate maneuver to consolidate a monopoly in the Stabroek block.
Had it been successful, ExxonMobil would have directly acquired at least 75% of that asset.
Its defeat in the arbitration process not only temporarily halted that ambition but also revealed the true nature of its business model, which consists of expansion through litigation, conditioning market forces with sanctions, and the use of complex regional circumstances to justify its presence in disputed areas.
Ultimately, ExxonMobil’s modus operandi is a business strategy aimed at maximizing its control over energy assets, including through methods that blur the boundaries of law and fair competition.
Its track record in Latin America, especially in Venezuela, confirms that when ExxonMobil cannot dominate, and especially if it is humiliated, it chooses to go to war.
In this sense, instead of acting as a company, ExxonMobil acts as a geopolitical entity with interests that transcend the market.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/SC/SF
