The Netherlands Colonizes the Antilles for Venezuelan Oil

By Marjolein van Pagee – Nov 15, 2025

“The Dutch neutrality claim is a farce,” argues Marjolein van Pagee, “together with the US, the Netherlands is posing a threat to Venezuelan sovereignty.”

Last week, Dutch outgoing Prime Minister Dick Schoof visited the Antilles. The old Lago refinery on Aruba will be permanently closed, and the Netherlands will help to dismantle it.[1] On this location, until 1985, the American oil company Exxon refined Venezuelan oil. The Dutch Shell company did the same on Curaçao. Schoof emphasized that the Netherlands is not involved in the current US intimidation of neighboring Venezuela. Dutch media also give the impression that the recent show of force in the Caribbean is an initiative of Trump.[2] This is misleading. The Hague also wants President Nicolás Maduro to be replaced. The Dutch claim of neutrality is a farce. Both now and in the past, the Antilles were an important stepping stone for the Netherlands to Venezuelan oil. At the end of the nineteenth century, when the black gold was first discovered, Shell was one of the first Western oil companies to invest in it. The Dutch government provided the necessary support at all times. Venezuelan leaders who refused to accept unfair oil deals were thwarted and intimidated. In 1908, not very different from Trump’s actions now, The Hague also sent warships to intimidate Venezuela.

In our time, oil does not have a very positive image anymore. Nowadays, the Netherlands wants to look “green” and “sustainable”. On his visit to Aruba, Prime Minister Dick Schoof said that the dismantling of the old Lago refinery was an important step towards “a sustainable economy.”[3] Subsequently, on November 9 and 10, he attended the fourth CELAC-EU summit in Colombia where the word “sustainability” was frequently mentioned as well. The participating countries pledged their allegiance to the UN’s “2030 Agenda.”[4] One of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reads that the use of fossil fuels needs to be reduced.[5]

How do these noble promises relate to the current aggression against Venezuela, which is about oil?

In fact, Trump’s unlawful attacks on fishing boats were discussed during the summit. Colombian President Gustavo Petro had previously expressed the hope that the meeting would produce a joint statement that would condemn the US actions in the Caribbean. Unfortunately, the final statement only included some vague remarks about the right to self-defense within the margins of international law. It did not explicitly mention the unlawful acts carried out by the Trump administration. Not surprisingly, important parts of the declaration were not signed by Venezuela and Nicaragua.[6]

‘Good cop’ and ‘bad cop’ both want oil
Although EU countries, including the Netherlands, are generally more diplomatic than Washington under Trump, the EU is equally responsible for both the economic sanctions against Venezuela as well as the demonization of Maduro’s government. It seems that the EU is playing ‘good cop’, maintaining contacts in the region, while the Trump administration plays ‘bad cop’, threatening with open war.

How noble the UN’s sustainable development goals may sound, if the US war fleet in the Caribbean demonstrates anything, it is the importance of Venezuelan oil to imperialist interests. The US war fleet now includes: 8 destroyers, 2 missile cruisers, 1 amphibious transport ship, a coastal combat ship, a nuclear submarine, B-1 bombers, several fighter jets, helicopters and drones, and the largest US aircraft carrier the USS Gerald R. Ford.[7]

Regional Support
At the end of October, one of the first ships arrived at the port of Trinidad, about ten kilometers off the northeast coast of Venezuela[8], for a so-called “military training.”[9] Regional support centers like Trinidad are essential for the success of imperialist wars and regime changes.[10] The US colony of Puerto Rico[11] is another strategic port where US warships can always rely on.[12]

US and Dutch bases in the Antilles
Less known is that the US has military bases at the airports of the Antillean islands of Curaçao and Aruba as well, just dozens of kilometers from the Venezuelan coast. On April 12, 1999, the Dutch government signed an agreement with the US for the establishment of what they called a “Forward Operating Location” (FOL).[13] Officially, it was presented as a counter-drug operation, yet in 2019, the location was used for an infiltration attempt when the North Americans attempted to invade Venezuela under the guise of providing “humanitarian aid.”[14] In the Antilles, the US Southern Command works closely with NATO partner the Netherlands. The latter has a permanent force of thousand defense personnel stationed on the islands.[15] Last spring, together with their North American counterparts, the Royal Dutch Navy conducted an operation near the Venezuelan port of Puerto Cabello.[16]

The Antillean people bear the risks
Of course, the population of the Antilles was never asked about the desirability of Dutch and US military bases on their territory, while they bear the risks of the provocative actions that the imperialist countries together undertake. Even though Curaçao formally has an independent status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands since 2010, in effect it is still a Dutch colony.[17] The Hague decides on all foreign policy or defense matters.[18] Because of their direct link to the Netherlands, the Caribbean islands are also associated with the European Union and the EU-sanctions.[19]

Last August, when the US announced that their warships were planning to refuel in Willemstad, the population reacted with concern. In the Dutch parliament, the D66 party submitted parliamentary questions about the matter.[20] But then-Minister of Defense Ruben Brekelmans (VVD) emphasized that the US deployment was nationally driven and that the Netherlands had nothing to do with it. As if insignificant, he added that the Dutch Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries were in close contact with the US.[21]

The fact that the brand new Dutch supply ship HNLMS Den Helder arrived in Willemstad on October 20, was also totally disconnected from the situation in Venezuela, according to Dutch Captain Stefjan Veenstra.[22] But was it really a complete coincidence that a large Dutch naval vessel docked in the Caribbean for “warm water exercises” just as Trump was increasing the pressure on Venezuela?[23] After all, also a “military exercise” is not neutral in a context of war. It is unlikely that the Dutch would not assist their American friends if they needed help. Captain Veenstra: “The HNLMS Den Helder has arrived at the right time. The [Dutch] navy has gained a warship.”[24]

Curaçaoan Prime Minister Gilmar Pisas expressed the hope that the treaty between the Netherlands and the US will be extended next year. According to him, there had been intensive discussions about the risks: “That is why an additional Dutch military ship has arrived here. There are no tensions with us as a country, but we could become involved.”[25] He emphasized that the logistical visit of US warships to Willemstad was “no reason to panic.”[26]

Yet, the Dutch intelligence service AIVD thinks otherwise. In a 2024 report, they warn that the situation in Venezuela could potentially have major consequences for “the economy, politics, and security of Aruba, Curaçao, and Bonaire.” Of course, the authors do not see any link with the provocative actions of Western countries themselves. The Antillean population are only at risk because Venezuela is building up its armed forces with the help of Russia, Iran, and China.[27] Not surprisingly, the AIVD fails to mention that Venezuela is forced to build up its defenses because of Western intimidation.

On their part, Caracas equally distrusts the Dutch-European presence in the Antilles. In January 2018, the Maduro government imposed a trade embargo on the Antilles, after which food prices skyrocketed. Naturally, the relationship between the Caribbean islands and the Venezuelan mainland would be much better without Dutch colonialism and threats. After 2015, when the US and the EU increased their pressure on Venezuela, the Venezuelan-Antillean trade has only deteriorated.[28] In a way, the Antillean islanders, like the Venezuelans, are victims of the US and European sanctions too.

Dutch neutrality claim is a farce
Given the close historical ties with the US, the Dutch claim of neutrality is not very convincing, even if The Hague currently does not play an active role in the escalation right now. In the war of aggression against Venezuela, Dutch politicians and media follow the line set by Washington and Brussels, which continuously accuses Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro of undemocratic and authoritarian actions, human rights violations, and recently even of involvement in illegal drug trafficking. Last August, the Dutch embassy in Caracas provided shelter to pro-Western opposition leader Edmundo González who claimed that he, instead of Maduro, had won the election.[29] According to the human rights report of 2023, Venezuela is also one of the twenty countries that the Dutch government labeled a priority.[30]

In fact, The Netherlands is not just facilitating the US. The Dutch has its own (oil) interests in Venezuela too. History shows how central the Antilles are to the close collaboration between the two imperialist powers in the colonial exploitation of Venezuelan resources. For over a century and a half, the Dutch occupation of the islands caused reoccurring troubles in the bilateral relation with Venezuela.

The Antilles: A Stepping Stone to Venezuela
A 1971 article, published in the magazine of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) refers to the Netherlands Antilles as a “stepping stone to South America.”[31] In practice, the islands were primarily a stepping stone to Venezuela, which had attracted European attention long before the discovery of the black gold.

The Spanish colonization of Venezuela began in 1522 and lasted until 1811. After independence, under the leadership of Simón Bolívar (the present-day Venezuelan Republic is named after him) the country became part of Gran Colombia. This new nation, which united Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, collapsed in 1830 with Bolívar’s death.

Subsequentely, the Venezuelan cocoa and coffee industries, which had been established by the Spanish before, were further intensified and expanded. This was done by Dutch, British, German, and Italian entrepreneurs and the large profits flowed primarily to Europe. Money creates money and the capital generated was obviously not intended to develop Venezuela.

The Dutch financed the exploitation of Latin-America
Uruguayan Eduardo Galeano writes in his book The Open Veins of Latin-America (1971) that Venezuela remained an agricultural country “condemned to the cyclical rise and fall of coffee and cacao prices; the two products created the capital that enabled landlords, merchants, and moneylenders to live as wasteful parasites.”[32] The profits also created a local oligarchy in Caracas, who served as intermediaries and accomplices of the Western imperialists.

Interestingly, in Galeano’s book, the Dutch appear not only as (slave) traders or colonists, but especially as bankers and moneylenders who controlled no less than one third of the Spanish trade at the end of the seventeenth century.[33] Besides the physical occupation of land (colonization) and the appropriation of bodies for unpaid labor (slave trade), the true goal of Western imperialists was to control the vast flows of money. Raw materials, whether petroleum, coffee, or cocoa, were the means by which this end could be achieved.

Even though the financial center shifted from Amsterdam to London and New York respectively, this did not mean the end for the Netherlands as an important player on the capitalist market.

Historically Bad Relations with Venezuela
The relationship between independent Venezuela and the colonial Dutch in the Antilles was never smooth. One moment there was a disagreement over import duties, the next, frustrations arose after Willemstad granted asylum to a Venezuelan opposition leader who was planning a coup. There were also recurring conflicts over islands over which both countries claimed jurisdiction. But everything changed when oil was discovered in Venezuela.

The enormous oil reserves, which are now being protected by Maduro’s socialist government against the bargain prices that the imperialists demand, are therefore a major reason why the Netherlands will not leave the Caribbean islands. Although the Dutch government publicly claims neutrality regarding Trump’s military actions, The Hague would love to see Maduro replaced too. If the “Eldorado” of Venezuelan oil could flow back to the Netherlands via the Antilles, this would be very beneficial for Dutch businesses as well. At least, this is what Shell did between 1918 and 1985, until Venezuelan leaders began demanding higher oil prices, something Shell’s top brass found unacceptable, prompting them to quit and leave the island.

Debts are not meant to be repaid
Venezuelan oil reserves, now known to be among the largest in the world, were discovered in the late nineteenth century. Sometimes, the local oligarchy in Caracas was willing to accommodate the imperialists, sometimes not. Venezuelan General Cipriano Castro – who came to power in a coup in 1899 – proved to be someone unwilling to do the bidding of the West. Like the current Venezuelan government, he was inspired by Simón Bolívar’s struggle for independence. After Castro took office, soon disagreements arose over Venezuela’s government debts to the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Italy. In 1902, a number of British, German, and Italian gunboats blockaded Venezuelan ports. This form of military intimidation was intended to force Castro to resign, in the hope that his successor would accept the debts.[34]

Like in our time, politicians in The Hague initially claimed neutrality, even though they were heavily involved and wanted Castro to pay back as well. On December 16, 1902, the governor of Curaçao received the instruction that, should war break out, he had to issue a statement of neutrality. Dutch historian Hans van der Jagt, in his book Engelen uit Europa (Angels from Europe, 2022), concludes that remaining neutral proved very difficult with “German, British, and Italian warships around and in the Curaçaoan port of Schottegat.”[35]

This time, the US played the role of “good cop” and took a more diplomatic approach as mediator. Naturally, this was not because they wanted peace. The goal was to force Caracas to resume debt repayments at all costs.[36] Endless negotiations resulted in the Washington Agreement. On May 7, 1903, the Netherlands and Venezuela also agreed on a payment arrangement.[37] It was decided that the countries would join the Court of Arbitration in The Hague, the predecessor of the international court that settles disputes between states.

In his book The Debt System (2019), Belgian author Eric Toussaint explains that the creation of foreign debt was a way to subjugate the Spanish-colonized countries in Latin America all over again. Freedom fighter Bolívar already understood why Britan was willing to finance the independence struggles against Spain. In a sense, the debts were not even expected to be repaid entirely. The unfair conditions created a relationship of dependency that, above all, had to continue indefinitely.[38] Extremely high debt levels make a country tied to their creditors forever. As a consequence, a country has no leverage when the imperialists demand unrestricted access to valuable raw materials.[39] It seems that Castro understood this mechanism very well.

Castro a bone in the imperialists’ wheel
Dutch colonizers in the Caribbean were also very much annoyed by Venezuela’s 30% import tariff, which was levied on all European and US products imported through the Dutch Antilles. The Venezuelan coast guard regularly checked on Dutch ships in an attempt to control the smuggling trade. This was unacceptable according to the Dutch, and in some cases they went so far as to fire at the Venezuelan coast guard.[40]

Historically, 2024 was not the first time that the Netherlands gave shelter to a Venezuelan opposition leader. In 1902, rebel general Manuel Antonio Matos was also granted political asylum in Curaçao after losing a battle against Castro, after which he fled the country. This decision further increased bilateral tensions.[41]

Dutch and other European businesses who continued to do business with Caracas were considered suspicious and threatened with sanctions. In 1904, a Dutch diplomat bluffed that if Venezuela would continue its border controls at sea, the Netherlands would seize Venezuelan coast guard ships. At the end of that year, the cabinet meeting in The Hague discussed the possibility of sending warships. However, as the Russo-Japanese War reached its peak in 1905, there were no ships available to put their words into action.[42]

The conflict dragged on and finally reached a conclusion in December 1908. Three Dutch warships left for the Caribbean. Once again, the US played “the good cop” and advised the Netherlands against military intervention. Eventually no shot was fired: just before Christmas, Castro fell ill and left for Europe for treatment.[43] The imperialist countries were relieved.

1914: Shell claims Venezuelan oil
The bilateral relationship improved under Castro’s successor, Juan Vicente Gómez, who granted several oil concessions in the following years. Around 1913, the Caribbean Petroleum Company commissioned a team of geographers to investigate the quality of the oil. The results were so promising that Shell paid $1 million for a majority stake in the company.[44] In his book De Aprilmoorden (The April Murders, 2012), Surinamese author Nizaar Makdoembaks writes about the reason why Curaçao was chosen as the location for the oil refinery:

“The connection between Lake Maracaibo and the open sea made it obvious to transport the oil by tanker, yet the depth of the water was insufficient for large vessels. This is why they had to use the smallest ships possible. However, with such small ships, sailing across the ocean was both economically and nautically irresponsible. Consequently, they began searching for locations where the oil from these small ships could be transferred to larger tankers. Curaçao, located 216 nautical miles from Maracaibo, was their destination. Its natural, deep, and developed port made it a perfect location for transshipment.”[45]

Besides practical reasons, there was also a political reason why the Dutch oil company did not establish itself in the country where the oil had been discovered. After all, Curaçao was considered “property” of the Netherlands and the Dutch did not plan to leave there for a long time to come. The political climate in independent Venezuela was too unpredictable for costly investments. There was always the possibility that another independent leader would stand up, who, like Castro, would defend Venezuelan self-interests. This is why Shell built the Isla oil refinery in Willemstad between 1914 and 1918, just a few dozen kilometers from the Venezuelan mainland.

The Hague enthusiastically offered the Shell Group several tax advantages. Whenever a new regulation led to a more serious tax assessment, the oilmen, through their political connections, managed to secure exemptions. The money shuffling through subsidiaries began here and would later result in Curaçao becoming a tax haven.[46]

Shell refuses Venezuela more profit and leaves
The highly polluting Isla refinery still gives Willemstad quite an industrial look. In the early years, Shell also processed Mexican oil, but from 1938, after Mexico nationalized its oil industry, Isla only processed Venezuelan oil. Business was booming. By 1929, the refinery was employing more than ten thousand people.[47]

Meanwhile, Venezuelans saw how their oil was made into a very profitable product, only 70 kilometers away. It was the same old model: the impoverished colony could supply raw materials at rock-bottom prices, and the colonizers changed it into gold. After Castro’s successor, Goméz, died in 1935, Venezuelans began lobbying for a refinery on their own soil. In 1943, a new law was passed prohibiting the Isla refinery from processing oil from new concessions. Belgian author Michel Collon writes in his book De 7 zonden van Chavez (The Seven Sins of Chavez, 2013):

“In 1943, the Venezuelan government of Isaias Medina proposed a progressive ‘Petroleum Control Law.’ He subsequently implemented land reform to save small farmers. He was immediately deposed. The US would not tolerate such reforms. For the same reasons, President Gallegos was also deposed in 1948. The same was true for General Perez Jimenez in 1958, when he too began to show signs of independence.”[48]

According to Collon, the Venezuelans did actually attempt to pursue a policy that served their own interests rather than foreign interests: “But the US refused to accept it and forced them to remain dependent on their market, to the benefit of the large American corporations.”

Nevertheless, the new law was adopted. Shell was forced to invest in a new refinery in Venezuela itself. But the Dutch multinational was unwilling to do so. The oil from the old concession continued to be processed in Curaçao until the late 1960s. Not long after which Shell left the Caribbean.[49]

In 1976, Venezuela nationalized the oil industry. Oil prices went up. Shell’s attempts to negotiate a lower price failed. This led to Shell selling the Isla-refinery in 1985. The government of Curaçao became the new owner, and from then on, day-to-day operations were managed by the Venezuelan company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). To this day, the PdVSA logo can be seen at the oil tanks in Willemstad.[50]

The Hague continues to interfere
Yet, this did not mean the end of Dutch interest in Venezuelan oil. It is unthinkable in the current situation, but in 2013 the Dutch royal couple paid an official state visit to Venezuela, where Maduro had just taken over the presidency from Hugo Chávez. Despite the fact that the refinery had not been owned by a Dutch company since 1985, the NOS stated that the South American country was still very important to the Netherlands as an oil supplier.[51]

The lease contract with the Venezuelan company PdVSA expired in 2019. Due to the American and European (economic) war against Venezuela, it was no surprise that the contract was not renewed. Since then, the production process has been almost completely halted, affecting 3,000 to 4,000 families.[52] Since then, the government in Willemstad has been actively searching for candidates who want to takeover the refinery.[53] The Hague is intensively involved in the takeover issue. A bid by the Chinese state-owned company Guangdong Zhenrong was rejected for “geopolitical reasons.”[54]

In June 2022, the NOS reported that a new consortium had registered in the Curaçao trade register under the name Caribbean Petroleum Refinery. Almost all directors involved were Venezuelan opposition members who had fled to the US.[55] Were they anticipating to the possible success of an American regime change attempt?

What Is Really Happening in Venezuela? US Attacks and Economic Situation Explained

The Netherlands is not neutral
In summary, there is considerable overlap between the past and the present. The Netherlands feigns naive innocence, but is in reality deeply involved. Not only politicians but also the media are buying into the narrative that Trump is acting completely independent and that the Netherlands has nothing to do with it. For example, the Dutch radio program Bureau Buitenland (VPRO) asked what Trump’s true goal might be. “Oil,” said one of the guests, journalist Edwin Koopman. He argued that Maduro obstructs the US because he is a dictator: “an ideological opponent.” The fact that the Netherlands itself is an imperialist country with its own (oil) interests was not discussed. EU sanctions were also not mentioned.[56]

This denial of Dutch involvement supports the false image of the Netherlands as a democratic and freedom-loving nation. It also reduces imperialism to an act of Trump. Yet, not he, but Democrat Joe Biden was president when the Dutch embassy sheltered Venezuelan opposition leader González in 2024. Also in 1902, the Netherlands was not neutral at all when Castro’s opponent Matos received political asylum on Curaçao. The claim of neutrality was equally implausible when British, German, and Italian gunboats sailed from Willemstad to Venezuela in that same year. The situation is no different now. While all eyes are on the USS Gerald R. Ford, the newest Dutch naval vessel, HNLMS Den Helder, is also in Caribbean water, less than seventy kilometers from Venezuela.

Eventually, truth will out, as in 1908 when the Dutch government decided to send warships. It is just a matter of time before the Netherlands is going to reveal its actual interest in Venezuelan oil. Outgoing Prime Minister Dick Schoof may announce the closure of an old (unused) refinery in Aruba under the guise of sustainability, but this doesn’t mean the end of the Antilles as a strategic location for Dutch imperialists.

Footnotes
[1] ‘Raffinaderij op Aruba gaat definitief dicht, Nederland helpt bij ontmanteling’, NOS, (9 November 2025), see (in Dutch): https://nos.nl/artikel/2589762-raffinaderij-op-aruba-gaat-definitief-dicht-nederland-helpt-bij-ontmanteling.

[2] See for example (in Dutch): ‘Wat is het ware doel van Trumps “war on drugs”?’, Bureau Buitenland VPRO, NPO Radio 1, (3 November 2025), https://youtu.be/BbmBvRITzsE.

[3] See above: ‘Raffinaderij op Aruba’, NOS. Besides, it is noteworthy that the Antilles will receive 150 million euros from the Netherlands to prepare the power grid for more wind and solar energy. ‘Curaçao krijgt 63 miljoen voor stroomnet, Aruba 54 miljoen’, Algemeen Dagblad, (8 November 2025), see: https://www.ad.nl/buitenland/curacao-krijgt-63-miljoen-voor-stroomnet-aruba-54-miljoen~aa0d1bc7/.

[4] Find the joint CELAC-EU declaration of 52 points here: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/o1wefgqk/joint_statement_celac_20251113.pdf.

[5] Read more about the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): https://sdgs.un.org/goals

[6] Jairo Gómez, ‘CELAC-EU Summit Makes Vague Gesture Against Use of Force, No Rejection of US Attacks’, Mexico Solidarity Media, (10 November 2025), see: https://mexicosolidarity.com/celac-eu-summit-makes-vague-gesture-against-use-of-force-no-rejection-of-us-attacks/.

[7] ‘Trumps pijlen op Venezuela, wat wil hij bereiken?’, NOS Nieuwsuur, (2 November 2025), see (in Dutch): https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/video/2588979-trumps-pijlen-op-venezuela-wat-wil-hij-bereiken.

[8] Gail Alexander, ‘Venezuela accuses T&T of provoking war with visit of US destroyer vessel’, Trinidad & Tobago Guardian, (27 October 2025), see: https://www.guardian.co.tt/news/venezuela-accuses-tt-of-provoking-war-with-visit-of-us-destroyer-vessel-6.2.2433621.c10cd2f1da.

[9] In Dutch media, military exercises and counter-drugs operations are usually described in neutral terms. But how would politicians in The Hague react if a Russian warship docked just off the Dutch coast for a “military exercise”? Earlier in 2006, when American warships also docked in the ports of Curaçao and Aruba for an exercise, then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez saw it as a threat. Various defense experts spoke of “a display of American muscle against Venezuela.” See (in Dutch): ‘Chávez noemt militaire oefeningen in de Cariben “bedreigingen”’, Manifest, (September 2006), https://leesmanifest.nl/archief/2006/09/vene-oef.htm.

[10] Over the past hundred years, the US has staged numerous coups and regime changes in Latin America, a part of the world they still arrogantly regard as their own “backyard.” See for example (in Dutch): Bel-REDH, ‘Na 200 jaar is de Monroe-doctrine helaas nog lang niet dood’, De Wereld Morgen, (1 December 2023), https://www.dewereldmorgen.be/artikel/2023/12/01/na-200-jaar-is-de-monroe-doctrine-helaas-nog-lang-niet-dood.

[11] Edward Hunt, ‘Kolonialisme in Puerto Rico’, Vrede.be, (15 March 2023), see (in Dutch): https://vrede.be/nl/nieuws/kolonialisme-puerto-rico.

[12] Colombia, which had long been the most loyal US ally in South America, has become less reliable as support base since the leftist Colombian President Gustavo Petro took office. See (in Dutch): Lode Vanoost, ‘Verkiezing links president in Colombia historisch keerpunt voor heel Latijns-Amerika,’ De Wereld Morgen, (21 juni 2022), https://www.dewereldmorgen.be/artikel/2022/06/21/verkiezing-links-president-in-colombia-historisch-keerpunt-voor-heel-latijns-amerika.

[13] In April 1999, after the US returned the Panama Canal, the US military moved to the international airports in Curaçao and Aruba. A military presence in the Caribbean was supposedly necessary for counter-narcotics operations. However, given the recent lies about Venezuela being a “narco-state” and the utterly absurd claim that President Maduro is linked to a drug cartel, the counter-drug operations appear more like a form of patrolling that could, at any moment, be transformed into military intimidation and even open warfare. The FOL treaty expires on November 2, 2026, and the current government in Curaçao hopes it will be extended. See (in Dutch): ‘FOL-verdrag hard nodig’, Antilliaans Dagblad, (18 September 2025), https://antilliaansdagblad.com/nieuws-menu/curacao/31727-fol-verdrag-hard-nodig. And also: ‘Forward Operating Location Curacao’, Global Security: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/curacao.htm. See also some contributions on the FOL treaty in the archives of Manifest, the newspaper of the Dutch Communist Party NCPN: Joris Janssen Lok, ‘Amerikaanse strijdmacht op de Nederlandse Antillen’, Manifest, (2001), https://leesmanifest.nl/archief/2001/13/fols13.htm. And: Wil van der Klift, ‘Antillen: basis voor VS-oorlog tegen het FARC’, Manifest, (2000), https://leesmanifest.nl/archief/2000/18/antillen.htm. And: ‘Militaire basis VS op Curaçao’, (2002), https://leesmanifest.nl/archief/2002/01/fol.htm.

[14] In the spring of 2019, the Netherlands and the US drafted a special treaty to make Curaçao a “humanitarian hub” and thus facilitate the transit of USAID aid supplies. Dutch national newspaper NRC reported that Washington was very pleased with the Netherlands: “‘The US praised the Netherlands for making Curaçao available as a humanitarian ‘hub’ for Venezuela. During a debate organized by students from the University of Amsterdam (UvA) on Wednesday, US Ambassador Pete Hoekstra said this showed that The Hague and Washington were ‘great friends’. ‘Venezuela is currently one of the biggest crises, and who is working together on this? The Americans and the Dutch are.’” See (in Dutch): ‘Nederland schippert tussen Venezuela en de VS’, NRC, (1 March 2019), With paywall: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/03/01/nederland-schippert-tussen-venezuela-en-de-vs-a3762477. Without paywall: https://archive.fo/LPuRo. About the US infiltration attempt via humanitarian aid, see: Paul Dobson, ‘Venezuela Breaks Relations with Colombia as Guaido Tries to Force Aid in’, Venezuelanalysis, (23 February 2019), https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14347/.

[15] ‘Antwoord op vragen van de leden Paternotte, Van Der Werf en Bamenga over de mobilisatie in Venezuela en de veiligheidsontwikkelingen nabij Curaçao, Aruba en Bonaire’, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, (28 August 2025), see (in Dutch): https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35983.

[16] On May 7, 2025 the US Southern Command posted the following message on X: “‘Drug bust in the Caribbean Sea: @USCG & @kon_marine crew members from HNLMS Groningen interdict a suspected drug smuggling vessel & seize illegal narcotics off the coast of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, April 5, 2025. The U.S. & Netherlands work together with other Allies & regional partners to strengthen Caribbean security & support #CounterDrugOps.” See: https://x.com/southcom/status/1920173209728569398?s=46.

[17] Although most of the European colonial occupations (often after fierce conflict) have now gained their independence, a number of colonies remain. These days, they play a less significant role in generating direct profits for multinationals, but are strategically important as locations for military bases. The colonial relationship between the Netherlands and the Antilles is also reflected in how local politicians who advocate for greater autonomy and independence, are being treated. For example, Curaçaoan politician Helmin Wiels spoke out against the presence of an American base in the Antilles, prompting Dutch NOS correspondent Dick Drayer to compare him to (right-wing populist) Geert Wilders. See (in Dutch): ‘Curaçaose politicus wil af van VS-basis’, Manifest (2009), https://leesmanifest.nl/archief/2009/12/curacao.htm. And: Dick Drayer, ‘Journalist Dick Drayer: Op Curaçao betekent mijn witte huid nog vaak ‘je hoort er niet bij’, Trouw, (26 May 2019). With paywall: https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/journalist-dick-drayer-op-curacao-betekent-mijn-witte-huid-nog-vaak-je-hoort-er-niet-bij~bb7ef017/. Without paywall: https://archive.fo/UdjtR.

[18] ‘Verantwoordelijkheden Nederland, Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maarten’, Rijksoverheid, see (in Dutch): https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/caribische-deel-van-het-koninkrijk/verantwoordelijkheden-nederland-aruba-curacao-en-sint-maarten.

[19] See (in Dutch): ‘Status Caribisch gebied, Europese Commissie, https://netherlands.representation.ec.europa.eu/over-ons/status-caribisch-gebied_nl.

[20] Kamervragen door Jan Paternotte, Mpanzu Bamenga en Hanneke van der Werf, ‘Schriftelijke vragen: De mobilisatie in Venezuela en de veiligheidsontwikkelingen nabij Curaçao, Aruba en Bonaire, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, (21 August 2025), see: https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35407.

[21] R.P. Brekelmans, ‘Antwoord op vragen van de leden Paternotte, Van Der Werf en Bamenga over de mobilisatie in Venezuela en de veiligheidsontwikkelingen nabij Curaçao, Aruba en Bonaire’, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, (28 August 2025), see (in Dutch): https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35983.

[22] Stijn Jaspers, ‘Marine is een schip van oorlog rijker’, Alle Hens, (14 October 2025), see (in Dutch): https://magazines.defensie.nl/allehens/2025/08/02_indienststelling-css.

[23] According to the article in Navy magazine Alle Hens, the prestigious naval ship HNLMS Den Helder won’t be fully operational until 2026. It is unarmed and can supply other ships at sea with fuel, ammunition, food, spare parts, and even medical assistance. See above: Jaspers, ‘Marine’, Alle Hens.

[24] See above, Jaspers, Alle Hens.

[25] ‘FOL-verdrag hard nodig’, Antilliaans Dagblad, (18 September 2025), see (in Dutch): https://antilliaansdagblad.com/nieuws-menu/curacao/31727-fol-verdrag-hard-nodig.

[26] Rick Hart, ‘Pisas: marineschepen VS zijn onderdeel van antidrugsoperatie’, NU.CW, (25 August 2025), see (in Dutch): https://nu.cw/2025/08/25/pisas-marineschepen-vs-zijn-onderdeel-van-antidrugsoperatie/.

[27] ‘AIVD jaarverslag 2024’, AIVD, (24 April 2025), see (in Dutch): https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2025/04/24/jaarverslag-2024.

[28] The Antilles are almost entirely dependent on Venezuela for the import of fruits and vegetables. Between 2015 and 2017, trade—including oil refining—declined by more than 50 percent. Commercial turnover dropped from 2.2 billion Antillean guilders in 2015 to just under a billion guilders in 2017. The inoperability of the Isla refinery caused a deficit of 500 million Antillean guilders. See (in Dutch): José Manuel Dias, ‘Isla raffinaderij veroorzaakt tekort van 500 miljoen gulden’, Caribisch Netwerk, (31 January 2018), https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2018/01/31/isla-raffinaderij-veroorzaakt-tekort-van-500-miljoen-gulden/. And also: José Manuel Dias, ‘Curaçao moet minder afhankelijk worden van import uit Venezuela’, Caribisch Netwerk, (17 January 2018), https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2018/01/17/curacao-moet-minder-afhankelijk-worden-van-import-uit-venezuela/.

[29] ‘Venezolaanse oppositieleider kreeg onderdak in Nederlandse ambassade’, NOS, (8 September 2024), see (in Dutch): https://nos.nl/artikel/2536364-venezolaanse-oppositieleider-kreeg-onderdak-in-nederlandse-ambassade.

[30] ‘Mensenrechtenrapportage 2023. Inzet en resultaten Nederlands buitenlands mensenrechtenbeleid’, Rijksoverheid, (6 May 2024), p. 37 and 38. See (in Dutch): https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2024/05/06/mensenrechtenrapportage-2023

[31] L. Macamba, ‘De Nederlandse Antillen, stapsteen naar Zuid-Amerika’, CPN Politiek en Cultuur jrg-31 1971, (1971), p. 415-422. See (in Dutch): https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/10222/51/CPN%20Politiek%20en%20Cultuur%20jrg-31%201971.pdf.

[32] Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent, (1997), p. 91-92.

[33] See above, Galeano, De aderlating, p. 36.

[34] There is conflicting information on whether the Netherlands also sent warships in 1902. Dutch historian Hans van der Jagt writes that the Dutch were not involved: “The matter escalated in December 1902, when the British and Germans, followed by the Italians, blockaded the Venezuelan ports of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello with a number of gunboats.” The Belgian author Eric Toussaint writes that they were involved: “when [Venezuela] was the victim of armed aggression by Germany, Britain, Italy, and Holland, with the goal of forcing the country to repay debt.” See: Hans van der Jagt, Engelen uit Europa. A.W.F. Idenburg en de moraal van het Nederlands imperialisme, (2022), p. 150-152. And: Eric Toussaint, The Debt System: A History of Sovereign Debts and their Repudiation, (2019), p. 149.

[35] See above, Van der Jagt, Engelen uit Europa, p. 150.

[36] See above, Toussaint, The Debt System, p. 149.

[37] See above, Van der Jagt, p. 151-152.

[38] See above, Toussaint, The Debt System, p. 11-15.

[39] The debt issue is a recurring theme in the history of Western colonialism. In Venezuela, public discontent over unfair IMF loans also sowed the seeds for Hugo Chavéz’s revolution. In February 1989, poorer Venezuelans revolted against an IMF-imposed “structural adjustment plan,” which led to sharp price increases for food, fuel, and public transportation, with granting privileges to foreign, wealthy capitalists. See: Andreína Chávez Alava, ‘February 4’s Revolutionary Seeds in Venezuela,’ Venezuelanalysis, (4 February, 2022), https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/15445/.

[40] Edwin Ruis, ‘De moeizame relatie tussen Nederland en Venezuela’, Historiek (13 June 2025), see (in Dutch): https://historiek.net/venezuela-een-verre-buur/38804/.

[41] A striking detail is that rebel General Matos had converted an English freighter into a gunboat and renamed it Libertador. Equipped with weapons purchased in Antwerp, he made Venezuelan coastal waters unsafe. See above: Ruis, ‘De moeizame relatie’ (2025).

[42] See above: Van der Jagt, Engelen uit Europa. (2022), p. 151-153.

[43] Ibid, p. 154

[44] See reference on Wikipedia to the book Chronology of Venezuelan Oil (1969) written by Anibal Martinez. Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Venezuelan_oil_industry, reference to the book: https://www.routledge.com/Chronology-of-Venezuelan-Oil/Martinez/p/book/9781032568744.

[45] Nizaar Makdoembaks, De aprilmoorden, (2012), p. 11.

[46] Tijn van Beurden ‘Shell op Curaçao: complexe constructies en fiscale cadeaus,’ Follow the Money (FTM), (5 August 2020), https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/shell-curacao-constructies-cadeaus.

[47] ‘21. De komst van de olie-industrie’, Canon van Curaçao, see (in Dutch): https://canoncuracao.cw/21-de-komst-van-de-olie-industrie/.

[48] Michel Collon, De 7 zonden van Chavez (2013), p. 74.

[49] See above: ‘De komst van de olie-industrie’, Canon van Curaçao.

[50] ‘33. Vertrek van Shell, komst en vertrek PdVSA’, Canon van Curaçao, see (in Dutch): https://canoncuracao.cw/33-vertrek-shell-komst-en-vertrek-pdvsa/.

[51] ‘Koningspaar bezoekt Venezuela’, NOS, 23 November 2013, see (in Dutch): https://nos.nl/artikel/578333-koningspaar-bezoekt-venezuela.

[52] Max Scriwanek and Martin van den Blink, ‘Bevrijd Curaçao uit de wurggreep van Venezuela, Nederland, help de economie niet verder om zeep’, Trouw, (10 June 2019), see (in Dutch with paywall): https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/bevrijd-curacao-uit-de-wurggreep-van-venezuela-nederland-help-de-economie-niet-verder-om-zeep~b61b7262/. Without paywall: https://archive.fo/lHSXy.

[53] In February 2019, Count emerged as a potential candidate; the Dutch trading and logistics company of Rotterdam investor Peter Goedvolk was interested in operating and managing the Isla refinery. However, the Curaçao government opted for the American-Saudi Motiva, which subsequently withdrew due to rumors of a bribery scandal. One of Goedvolk’s employees reportedly had agreed to pay bribes (to the refinery’s director) in exchange for a favorable position in the sales process. However, the talks ended because no agreement was reached on the exact amount. Peter Goedvolk is himself a multimillionaire; in 2012, Quote magazine estimated his net worth at €310 million, and in 2020, it was €185 million. See (in Dutch):Maarten Veeger, ‘Rotterdams oliebedrijf Count aast op probleemraffinaderij Curaçao’, RTL Nieuws, (28 February 2019), https://www.rtl.nl/economie/business/artikel/4626081/nederlandse-oliebedrijf-aast-op-raffinaderij-curacao. And: ‘Grondstoffenhandel Count van Quote 500-lid Peter Goedvolk genoemd in corruptiezaak Curaçao’, Quote, (11 February 2019), https://www.quotenet.nl/zakelijk/a219367/grondstoffenhandel-count-van-quote-500-lid-peter-goedvolk-genoemd-in-corruptiezaak-curacao-219367/. And also: ‘Peter Goedvolk’, Quote, (20 March 2019), https://www.quotenet.nl/quote-500/a135656/peter-goedvolk-bio/.

[54] Dick Drayer, ‘Curaçao komt met nieuwe kandidaat om oude raffinaderij te exploiteren’, NOS, (20 June 2022), see (in Dutch): https://nos.nl/artikel/2433436-curacao-komt-met-nieuwe-kandidaat-om-oude-raffinaderij-te-exploiteren.

[55] See above: Drayer, ‘Curaçao komt met nieuwe kandidaat’.

[56] Wat is het ware doel van Trumps “war on drugs”?’, Bureau Buitenland VPRO, NPO Radio 1, (3 November 2025), https://youtu.be/BbmBvRITzsE.

(Venezuelanalysis)