The VA columnist highlights the newly fabricated narrative that portrays Venezuela as a military target. Photo: Venezuelanalysis.
By Clodovaldo Hernández – Jul 10, 2025
In a geopolitical landscape marked by the US’s aggressive and desperate efforts to uphold its global dominance, Venezuela remains a key hotspot in the Western hemisphere. Its energy potential and defiant stance against imperial dictates keep it in a high-risk situation.
President Donald Trump has resumed the maximum pressure policy from his first term (2017–2021). Contrary to predictions, this approach has not involved encouraging far-right leaders to seize power or drastically escalating the economic blockade. Instead, it has entailed abuses and arbitrary actions against Venezuelans in the US, including both undocumented migrants and those under protection programs.
In the five months since Trump’s return to the White House, the most confrontational issue is not political or related to sanctions—these seem to flow by inertia—but the illegal and deliberately cruel treatment of Venezuelan migrants. This treatment has even exceeded that of the previous administration’s maximum pressure phase.
Although the anti-migration policy is not solely aimed at Venezuelans, they have been particularly targeted. The arbitrary kidnapping and deportation of 252 men to El Salvador, imprisoned in a facility intended for terrorists, sends a clear message. Efforts to separate families and place children in foster care follow the same pattern.
To justify these abuses, the US government, with some Venezuelan political figures’ support, promoted an absurd narrative. It claims many Venezuelans who entered during Biden’s presidency are gang members of Tren de Aragua, allegedly capable of threatening US security. This is completely and ridiculously false as the gang operated in a specific region of north-central Venezuela and has already been dismantled.
Deportations have also affected Venezuelans with protections like humanitarian parole, TPS, or visas, impacting a segment of migrants who are opposition supporters and causing widespread frustration and unrest.
What is Trump up to?
The first half of 2025 has been surprisingly calm for Venezuela, contrary to predictions of chaos following the return to power in the US of an old adversary, supported by officials strongly opposed to the Bolivarian process.
In January, as Maduro and Trump began new presidential terms—Maduro’s on the 10th and Trump’s on the 20th—right-wing factions in both countries were betting on “regime change” in Venezuela. Media speculated that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia would be sworn in at the National Assembly or that the government would fall within days, ushering in a new phase of Venezuelan obedience in its relations with the US.
But none of that happened. Maduro was sworn in smoothly, and Trump, contrary to some extremist hopes, did not announce a military intervention against Venezuela upon taking office.
Like many issues, Trump’s Venezuela policy has waxed and waned. Initially, he sent envoy Richard Grenell to negotiate with Maduro, which was seen as a break from the maximum pressure strategy. But that quickly changed: Trump announced new unilateral sanctions, threatened tariffs on Venezuela and secondary tariffs on any country purchasing its oil, and restricted Chevron’s operations in Venezuelan hydrocarbons.
Despite this, Chevron has been allowed to maintain limited operations in Venezuela. Meanwhile, Trump appears preoccupied with numerous other conflicts, seemingly determined to fight half the world, or perhaps the entire planet.
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The opposition’s debacle
During his previous term, Trump’s maximum pressure strategy was supported by a national political leadership that acted as co-author, accomplice, or obedient executor of imperial policies.
This leadership played a key role in stripping Venezuela of assets such as US-based CITGO Petroleum, Colombia-based Monómeros, bank accounts, gold reserves, and other assets. To legitimize these actions, the US and its allies portrayed opposition politicians as rightful country representatives, a strategy that reached its peak during Juan Guaidó’s self-proclaimed interim government.
Since the start of his new term, Trump has largely distanced himself from opposition leaders, withdrawing some of their financial support previously provided through the now-defunct US Agency for International Development (USAID).
Contrary to many predictions, he has not recognized González Urrutia or María Corina Machado as interim leaders. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has attempted to energize Machado’s faction, but it’s clear he doesn’t have much room for manoeuvre in this regard.
Without that backing, Machado has become trapped in her own clandestine strategy of calls for electoral abstention and violent solutions. Her attempt to boycott gubernatorial and legislative elections resulted in the opposition securing only one of the 24 states (Cojedes), while the Chavista majority in the unicameral National Assembly was reinforced. This grants President Maduro relatively smooth sailing on the domestic front until 2030.
Venezuela is now preparing for its second election of the year on July 27, highlighting the paradox of a country accused of being a dictatorship. This is the 33rd election in less than 27 years.
Voters are set to elect 335 mayors and 2,471 local councilors, completing the selection of officials across national, regional, and local levels. Meanwhile, some opposition factions, trapped in their tactics, are calling once again for abstention, while other anti-Chavista groups seek to prevent complete collapse.
On war, security, and defense
The current situation unfolds amidst the ongoing Zionist genocide in Palestine and the recent military conflict between Iran, on one side, and Israel and the US, on the other.
In an effort to exploit this moment, far-right media outlets and their spokespersons have promoted a new narrative, claiming Venezuela is manufacturing drones with offensive capabilities over US territory in alliance with Iran. The aim is to portray Venezuela as a potential military target for counterterrorism operations, linking it to another nation already perceived as such.
The legal groundwork was laid ten years ago when President Barack Obama issued an executive order designating Venezuela as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security.
President Maduro and other senior officials have firmly rejected these accusations, emphasizing that Venezuela’s military is defensive and prepared to respond to aggression, but not to initiate attacks. They also affirm the country’s right to forge alliances with other nations, including in military affairs.
During the civic-military-police parade on July 5, commemorating Independence Day, the Bolivarian National Armed Forces showcased their strength by displaying weapons and equipment of Russian, Chinese, Belarusian, and other origins. Notably, given the narrative mentioned earlier, drones and missiles—which have long been part of Venezuela’s arsenal—were prominently highlighted. Maduro affirmed that Venezuela will continue developing unmanned vehicles and projectiles “with its own technology and in alliance with our great friends and allies around the world.”
Clearly, Venezuela again navigates turbulent waters, threatened by a renewed version of the US maximum pressure strategy and affected by Trump-era anti-immigrant policies. It’s a complex scenario, but as the saying goes, “what else is new?”
Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).
Translated by Venezuelanalysis.
