
A multiple exposure photograph of former Brazilian President Luiz InĂĄcio Lula da Silva during a speech in SĂŁo Paulo on Sept. 21, 2017. Photo: Suamy Beydoun/AGIF via AP.
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A multiple exposure photograph of former Brazilian President Luiz InĂĄcio Lula da Silva during a speech in SĂŁo Paulo on Sept. 21, 2017. Photo: Suamy Beydoun/AGIF via AP.
By Quantum Bird – Oct 24, 2024
We have repeatedly pointed out our growing discomfort with the direction that Brazilâs foreign and domestic policies have taken under Lulaâs third administration. A representative collection of our complaints can be found in the article âSo thatâs the cost of Lulaâs freedom?â, and articles referenced there. As indicated recently, this is a continuous flight into an increasingly implausible future, in a game of expectations fostered by a track record of success â the first two terms â and promises that are constantly renewed, but never actually kept when the opportunity presents itself. In short, a frustration of continental dimensions.
The news that President Lula would not be attending the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, due to a domestic accident â the most diffuse version reports a fall in the shower â came across to the most attentive observers as a bad omen. In fact, the presence of Celso Amorim, the presidentâs special advisor for foreign policy, in the local media, reporting on the accident and assuring Lula of his good health, could never be associated with anything positive. The diplomat has been less and less discreet about his âpreferenceâ for the G20 as opposed to the BRICS as a platform for multilateral relations.
The bad omen was confirmed today with the news of the Brazilian governmentâs veto on Venezuela and Nicaragua joining the BRICS.
âPerhaps itâs not yet possible to reach a conclusion. Iâm not worried about whether Venezuela joins or not, weâre not making a moral or political judgment about the country itself.
The BRICS has countries that practice certain types of regime, and other types of regime, the question is whether they have the capacity, due to their political weight and relationship capacity, to contribute to a more peaceful world.â
What?
Some valid questions:
⢠Relationship with whom?
⢠How exactly would Brazil be contributing to a more peaceful world when the countryâs leadership is undermining and indefinitely delaying the resolution of a crisis stemming from an attempted coup dâĂŠtat and regime change, which could well have led to a civil war in the neighboring country?
⢠Or when, despite all the denouncing, it continues to negotiate various supplies with Israel, indirectly supporting the genocide in Gaza?
Monroe Doctrine, house niggers and field niggers
In fact, the shameful stance of the Brazilian leadership, which has invested heavily in the BRICS to support Argentinaâs accession to the group, and refuses to allow Venezuela and Nicaragua to join, is only apparently contradictory. Like everything else related to the BRICS, the key lies in the concept of sovereignty. In fact, since Dilma Rousseffâs impeachment, successive administrations have endeavored to consolidate and deepen the architecture of austerity, economic dependence and reduced sovereignty, resulting from the liquidation of resources and strategic infrastructure due to the capitulation of the â flagrantly inept â left-wing leadership to the hybrid attacks of the US, via Operation Car Wash and other actions, in the first half of the last decade.
All in all, in 2024, there is no shortage of evidence of the Brazilian leadershipâs willingness to adapt to the Monroe Doctrine 2.0, which is being vocally promoted by General Laura J. Richardson, head of the Southern Command of the US Armed Forces.
In this context, Brazil is repositioning itself to be the regionâs captain â or the house nigger, as Malcom X would say â acting, on the one hand, as a soft representative of Washingtonâs interventionist policies in South America, and on the other, acting as a containment valve to prevent the expansion of the BRICS in the area.
The main nuance of this policy consists of not allowing the entry of sovereign countries that openly rival the US and have direct relations with Russia, China and Iran without Brazilian mediation. For this reason, in the short-sighted view of Brazilâs comprador elites, there is no problem in supporting Argentina, which has positioned itself as a junior member and channeled its demands through Brazilian diplomacy from the outset. Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba are genuinely sovereign countries, with independent bilateral relations with other BRICS members, and outside Washingtonâs sphere of influence in the region. Again, just watch the continued freezing or deterioration of bilateral relations with these countries.
Chain reversals
The 2022 federal elections have made Brazil a genuine member of the club of Western liberal democracies.
The political architecture based on a broad center-right alliance contesting the elections against an extreme right, replicating the US and the EU, has made the popular vote obsolete. Polarization has shifted from the class struggle to disagreements over individual morals and customs. Multinational NGOs have taken over popular representation in collegiate forums. The external enemy, historically identified as the US, disappeared from the discourse of the political class and broad popular sectors, associated with evangelical churches, became the internal enemy.
Liberal democracies can only be managed by making intensive use of political, cultural and cognitive inversions. Coups against democratically elected governments to defend democracy. Mass censorship to protect freedom of expression. Imposition of socio-cultural standards to defend diversity. Economic liberalization, which leads to income concentration, to promote prosperity. Reduction of the state, social programs and privatization of public infrastructure to improve services. Etc.
In 2024, all these elements are present in Brazilian foreign and domestic policies.
As far as BRICS is concerned, the main reversal taking place at the moment is the veto on Venezuela and Nicaragua joining, which completely negates the organizationâs purpose as a promoter of multipolarity and a platform for exercising sovereignty.
Basically, the superficial and obtuse rhetoric of Lula, Celso Amorim and Mauro Vieira matters little, because the fact is that two sovereign Latin American countries, which dare to confront the imperialism of the Collective West in the region and pursue the improvement of conditions for their people, have been prevented from joining the main instrument for change in this direction.
Leveraging the veto power in BRICS as an instrument to indirectly implement the imperialist policies of the Collective West in Latin America constitutes an act of economic and geopolitical sabotage, which will inexorably end up qualifying Brazilian diplomacy as a Trojan Horse within the organization.
In addition, it calls into question the mechanism of decision-making by consensus between members, which is in force in the BRICS, and raises red flags about the candidacy of countries like Turkey, which as a NATO member would automatically be in a position to play the same game in Central Asia.
Why is this a betrayal?
The answer is direct and simple. Lula was not elected on the premise of bringing about the definitive conversion of the country into a liberal democracy, nor of consolidating Brazil as a US lieutenant-vassal in Latin America. The millions of workers who voted for Lula sincerely believed his promises that there would be an effort to recover Brazilâs stature and strategic infrastructure and a broad exercise of solidarity with our partners on the continent.
Lula is not senile enough to forget the platform on which he was elected, and he understands very well that his election will be for an indefinite period the last exercise of a de facto popular vote to elect a ruler on the basis of a truly progressive political, social and economic recovery program.
So what changed in the man between 2010 and 2022?
A very popular explanation suggests that Lula version 3.0 is a hostage who has negotiated his release from prison, and the rescue of his personal dignity, with his native and overseas tormentors, in exchange for the votes needed to defeat Bolsonaro in 2022 and guarantee the arrival of the Broad Front for Democracy to power, restoring political normality in the country around a new center-right liberal pact.
Personally, I believe there is some truth in this. According to the proponents of this theory, this is a politician under blackmail, as evidenced, for example, by the US initiative to investigate the purchase of Gripen fighter jets by the Brazilian air force in 2014. The deal led to an accusation, within the scope of Operation Zelotes, of alleged influence peddling by Lula and one of his sons in the deal. The investigation was closed in 2022 by Ricardo Lewandowski, of the Federal Supreme Court and current Minister of Justice, due to the absolute lack of evidence. The fact is that Lula was imprisoned on the basis of cases of this kind and some of his staunchest accusers are now part of his government. The vice-president is an excellent example.
Contrary to what it might seem at first glance, this explanation does not excuse Lula.
If this is indeed the case, we are under the leadership of a man who has placed his personal circumstances above the present and future well-being of his people, and would therefore not be up to the task of guiding Brazil towards multipolarity as a sovereign country loyal to its geopolitical partners.
Translation by Internationalist 360°