Regime-Change Machine in Venezuela Grinds to a Halt

By Misión Verdad – Dec 2, 2024

The extremist sector of the Venezuelan opposition, represented by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, suffered a new setback both nationally and internationally on December 1, when a call to protest to demand “justice” before the International Criminal Court resulted in remarkably low participation.

“Today, Sunday, December 1, we already have a first task to fulfill: Venezuelans are going to raise our unanimous clamor before the International Criminal Court, where we have already provided sufficient evidence for justice to be done,” Machado said on her social networks.

International media, such as the AP agency, reported that the main demonstration took place in Plaza La Castellana, Caracas, where “over one hundred people” gathered, lighting candles and releasing balloons “shouting ‘Freedom’ for the detainees.”

Regarding the protests held inside and outside the country, it was reported that “small groups” protested. Some followed the directive of painting their hands red and covering themselves with white handkerchiefs, with the aim of promoting a narrative about alleged human rights violations in the context of the arrests made by the Venezuelan government of actors involved in the violent events of July 28 and the following days.

It is relevant to mention that María Corina Machado, who is said to be no longer in the country, did not make a public appearance during the protest.

This event reinforces the perception of a deterioration in the capacity to mobilize and convene the extremist opposition group, especially in the context of the lead-up to the inauguration of re-elected President Nicolás Maduro, scheduled for January 10. The situation also occurs at a time when this sector of the opposition is seeking to capture the attention of the new Donald Trump administration with the intention of reactivating the “maximum pressure” strategy that characterized his previous administration.

To understand the magnitude of this latest failure of the Venezuelan opposition led by María Corina Machado, it is necessary to contextualize it within a series of collapses suffered since the July 28 elections.

Post-electoral violence and sabotage
After the July 28 elections, the Vente Venezuela commanders unleashed a wave of violence in the country that lasted until July 30. The operation was highly coordinated and involved “sleeper cells” composed of criminal gangs and was later accompanied by sabotage of public services such as the National Electric System (SEN) on August 30 and October 16. The aim was to force a regime change.

On September 14, the seriousness of the maneuver was further exposed with the revelation of the attempted assassination of President Nicolás Maduro, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, and other high-ranking officials during the electoral process. Minister Diosdado Cabello attributed this plan to a group of foreign mercenaries in a terrorist operation led by an active US military officer.

Although it caused victims and serious disturbances to public order, this series of conspiracies to destabilize the country resulted in a strategic failure. The security forces effectively neutralized the acts of aggression and sabotage, and government protection measures mitigated their impact on society. The majority of citizens continued with their normal lives, demonstrating resistance to instability and acts of violence, a result of experiences with past events such as the riots of 2014 and 2017 and the attack on the SEN in 2019.

“Almost Venezuela”
The “Almost Venezuela” crusade, promoted mainly by Erik Prince, founder of the mercenary company Blackwater, was launched on September 16 with the intention of collecting funds to prepare armed action against the Venezuelan government. Through a social media campaign, $500,000 in private donations was initially announced, justified with the promise of “restoring the institutions and elected representatives in a legitimate manner,” whitewashing an eventual mercenary invasion operation.

One of the central characters is Iván Simonovis, who later tried to distance himself from the fundraising despite initially aligning himself with the ruse.

An interview with Gustavo Lainette, one of the architects of the campaign and a close associate of Leopoldo López, revealed that several of the prominent actors in “Almost Venezuela” have a history of fraud, exposing the spurious nature of an initiative that was intended to raise at least 10 million dollars.

Despite initial propaganda and ambitious promises, the campaign ultimately fell through with no results.

Swarming and Organized Crime
The swarming strategy promoted by María Corina Machado has attempted to destabilize the Venezuelan government through the coordination of multiple dispersed groups. This tactic makes use of military terminology, speaking volumes about its intention to mobilize opponents and criminal gangs.

This last component is crucial since the participation of criminal organizations, such as the Tren de Aragua and the Tren del Llano, in the escalation of violence proposed by the opposition has been evident. These groups have organizational structures and control of specific territories, which can be used to carry out virulent actions.

Swarming has largely failed due to the government’s efforts to dismantle criminal groups that continue to foment disturbances leading up to January 10, the inauguration of President Nicolás Maduro. Furthermore, this failure is aggravated by the decline of María Corina Machado’s leadership and her eventual escape from the country, which has limited the strategy’s effectiveness by leaving a vacuum of organizational power in the “citizen” front.

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Decline after the “Great World Protest”
Organized by María Corina Machado to take place on August 17, the “Great World Protest for the Truth of Venezuela” sought to project the narrative of electoral fraud globally, taking advantage of the symbolic and media effect of mobilization in large cosmopolitan cities.

The facts were different. The protest failed to meet initial expectations and resulted in a notable disappointment. The images that circulated showed empty streets reflecting a weak influx of people, evidencing the lack of support and mobilization compared to what was expected.

This effect translated into a new perception of decline around María Corina Machado, highlighting the disillusionment among her followers and the loss of political inertia that was portrayed by the media as if it were increasing.

Lacking decisive international support
The opposition demonstrations in August and December 1 shared the objective of internationalizing the regime change agenda in Venezuela. However, the success of this strategy is intrinsically linked to the ability to generate a significant mobilization, both of the population within the country and of Venezuelan migrants abroad.

The results of Edmundo González’s tour of Europe show this situation. Although it was initially projected in the media that this visit could foster international support and reinforce the narrative of “president-elect,” the reality ended up being an obvious stumble, marked by an unclear interest from the European Union.

This tour not only highlighted the low receptivity among European governments to reproduce a scenario similar to that of 2019 with Guaidó’s self-proclaimed “government” but also exposed the internal tensions between González and María Corina Machado.

The inability to effectively mobilize the population, coupled with the neutralization of armed criminal structures and boycott actions, has eroded the driving factors of the regime change agenda.

Far from being an isolated event, the demonstration on December 1 represents a new milestone in a series of failures that reveal a deep internal crisis in the opposition, especially with regard to the “leadership” of María Corina Machado and a manifest ineffectiveness in achieving the institutional breakdown that has been sought since July 28 in Venezuela.

In this context, the insistence on positioning January 10 as the new target becomes a symbol of the urgency to revitalize an agenda that, until now, has not managed to revive itself or find new timing.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/KW/SF