![Opposition protesters, seen behind a Venezuelan flag, during the violent opposition protests known as "guarimbas" in 2017. Photo: Juan Barreto/AFP/File photo.](https://orinocotribune.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Venezuela-protest-flag-1024x682-1.jpg)
Opposition protesters, seen behind a Venezuelan flag, during the violent opposition protests known as "guarimbas" in 2017. Photo: Juan Barreto/AFP/File photo.
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Opposition protesters, seen behind a Venezuelan flag, during the violent opposition protests known as "guarimbas" in 2017. Photo: Juan Barreto/AFP/File photo.
By Misión Verdad – May 20, 2024
In recent months, the Venezuelan opposition has been spreading the idea that a political transition is approaching. This would mean that after the presidential elections on July 28, the scenario would be determined by the handover of power by President Nicolás Maduro.
The word “transition” is already a catchphrase or mantra in the opposition’s discourse. There is even talk of a post-Chavez era, portraying a country without political conflicts, with social and economic freedoms, and without sanctions.
However, for this reality to be fulfilled, the presidential elections must first be won. The evident division in the opposition’s ecosystem makes the materialization of this narrative less viable.
Although the idea of a “transition” had existed since the attempt to impose Juan Guaidó’s fake government, its attempt to secure it became more common with the holding of the opposition primaries in October 2023. Since then, a sector of the opposition valued this internal process as a general presidential election, although it was directed only at its supporters, with a minimal percentage of the electoral roll participating.
That is why disqualified candidate María Corina Machado claims to embody the figure of the “transition” in Venezuela as if that process had already begun. Machado has tried to continue representing the image of “change” even though she will not participate in the elections. “That will be a transition that respects the mandate of October 22, not a transition of political elites,” she said recently at a press conference in Maracaibo.
The triumphalism the opposition displays could be a strategy to instill the idea that a reality different from the one they have experienced since October 28 is not possible: a defeat for the current Unitary Platform (PUD) candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia.
However, it is worth noting that this is not the first time that the opposition has portrayed itself as superior to Chavismo and as certain that “now” it will triumph. The same story has been repeated in all electoral processes nationally and regionally: the opposition portrays itself as the majority but ends up being defeated, so their voters then have to cope with their frustrations.
The feeling of superiority could serve the opposition as a strategy to mobilize its voters. On the other hand, the enormous expectations generated could be used as a breeding ground to promote scenarios of violence, with frustrations over defeat leading to tensions because there was “fraud” in the July 28 elections. How can we not assume that Chavismo—once again—stole the elections if the opposition were so sure they were going to win?
It has been repeated ad nauseam that the CNE is not an impartial body when the electoral results do not favor the opposition. The presence of some international observers has been questioned, and false expectations have been created for the presidential elections. There is no doubt that all these factors serve as fuel to generate violence, whose goal, as in previous cases, is destabilization to promote regime change.
This scenario is not new but is among the opposition sectors’ most used practices in the various elections held in Venezuela over the last 25 years. It is the non-recognition of the results when they do not favor the opposition and the call for violence and institutional ignorance by their followers.
The opposition’s recent visits to the Venezuelan countryside, especially by groups related to Vente Venezuela, would be aimed at organizing post-electoral violence. President Nicolás Maduro and the leadership of the Bolivarian Revolution have condemned these moves.
Venezuela knows very well how the calls to “offload their anger,” the mobilizations “to Miraflores,” or the promises to go “to the end” turn out. Everything indicates that the opposition plans to reissue scenarios of violence already seen to cause greater tension.
It is not surprising that, given the evidence, Chavismo is not only guaranteeing the electoral victory of July 28 with the organization and mobilization of its base and militancy but is also calling for the defense of said victory. Election day must not only win a new presidential mandate but also the peace and political stability of the republic.
Tensions in the electoral process are also generated by the fact that the elections in Venezuela are among the most monitored in the world due to the political context in recent years and that the government and the opposition have previously established guidelines for dialogue in search of a way out of the crisis. An unfavorable outcome for the opposition could be used to impose more illegal sanctions against the country, as it has in previous years, and for scenarios of violence to destabilize the country.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/JRE/SF
Misión Verdad is a Venezuelan investigative journalism website with a socialist perspective in defense of the Bolivarian Revolution