Interview: ‘Fighting Zionism Has Been Harder Than Fighting South African Apartheid’

Seyyed Mohammad Marandi and Zeinab Ghasemi Tari, professors at the University of Tehran, have been in Venezuela as observers of the May 25 regional elections, spending several days in Caracas. On one occasion in their visit, they visited the editorial desk of Misión Verdad.

Marandi (SMM) is a professor of English literature and Orientalism in Tehran. He once headed the North American studies program and is a recognizable figure due to his participation in Western media.

Dr. Ghasemi (ZGT) is an associate professor in the Department of North American Studies in the School of Global Studies, where many of her graduate students serve in the Foreign Office and Foreign Service.

The following is a transcript of an hours-long dialogue between the professors and the Misión Verdad team, in which Betzabeth Aldana, Joseph Soto, Heathcliff Cedeño, Oleno León Hernández, and José Miguel Aponte played a role in formulating questions.

Perhaps a good way to title this conversation could have been “Americans Do Not Know What They Want,” precisely because, in the more than hour and a half of questions and answers, it was an inevitable recurring response. Although, as will be seen, the scope and themes of this multi-person interview far transcend that concern alone.

The initials of both teachers identify who is responsible for the answer or comment. The editorial desk questions were unified.

With the fifth round of indirect talks for a nuclear agreement now complete, it seems that the contradictions on the part of one side, not precisely Iran, are obscuring whether substantial progress has been made. Is this true?

SMM: It is very difficult for me to answer that question because, obviously, I do not have any behind-the-scenes information. I am not involved in the negotiations, clearly, but from the sources we have, it is very unclear why the US has said different things. One day, they talk about only wanting to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons, and then two days later, they say Iran cannot have a nuclear fuel cycle, and for Iran, that is not acceptable. It is a red line for a number of reasons. However, the main ones are: a) Iran’s sovereign right, and b) Iran has invested in the fuel cycle partly because it does not trust external sources. If Iran builds five or six nuclear reactors and then does not have fuel for them, it would be wasted money and would create an economic crisis. So, it will definitely preserve its ability to produce its own fuel.

Depending on the day of the week, Trump is posting on Truth Social, and what he says constantly changes. It is not just Trump but others in his administration as well. Stephen Witkoff has said one thing one day and something else the next. Witkoff himself has said it is nuclear weapons, and then that the fuel cycle will not be accepted. For me, it is impossible to see what will happen at this stage. The mere fact that we have had five rounds of negotiations, and they have not collapsed, I think, means there might be hope. However, one question I ask myself is, if we pretend that the US negotiators will behave reasonably and that we have a nuclear deal, what would happen if, after the deal, they say no, they do not want it?

If you recall, this is what was done with the Gaza ceasefire in March. The night he took office, Witkoff came and said he had reached an agreement, but literally two weeks later, Trump said the Palestinians have to leave Gaza. That was his ceasefire! It was not Obama’s or Biden’s, it was his. So, this makes it even harder for me to say what will happen.

Do you think this inconsistency is something that follows a plan?

SMM: I think it is chaos. I think it is a lack of professionalism. I think it is part of Trump’s personality. I also think he has people around him who are more than prepared to accept this kind of behavior from the president. He has submissive people around him who will say yes to everything. They like to call it “The Art of the Deal” or “Strategic Uncertainty,” but there is no sign of it being that. It is more sudden shifts, emotional responses, and chaos. It is more chaotic than anything else.

What that does is make everyone wary of working with the United States. It is not just Iran. We see it in trade wars and how it attacks and then retreats, like with China. Or, recently, with the European Union, and then Canada. Or with Russia, with which the US says it is going to end the war in one day and then, now, it is starting to sound very similar to Biden after almost four months. So I do not think there is any real method to that madness.

Some say Trump is using a Nixonian negotiating technique—to bare his teeth, threaten, and, in his most volatile and aggressive way, to make his adversary see that he is indeed capable of such things—but that he really wants to negotiate on more “middle ground.” Could that be true?

SMM: Like in Laos, Cambodia, the bombings and that sort of thing? I do not think so, because the problem, again, is that it is constantly changing. That was quite brutal and barbaric, of course, but Nixon imposed this cruelty on Vietnam to extract concessions. These are not means of applying pressure. It is simply moving the goalposts, and when you move it, you cannot negotiate.

Nixon did this thinking he would get something at the negotiating table. The other side has to feel that is precisely the goal. That pressure should tell me you want something, but [with Trump] I do not know what you really want from me. If I do not know what you want, the pressure is pointless.

The media has repeatedly labeled you as an advisor to the Iranian side in previous rounds of negotiations. What differences do you see with the current one?

SMM: Back then, I was first Dr. Zarif’s media advisor. Ten years ago, for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (better known as JCPOA). Dr. Gahsemi was also involved, along with three or four other people. I even brought in Pepe Escobar and a few others, including Gareth Porter.

I was also there three years ago during the negotiations, but even ten years ago, I kept my distance. I did not want to know the details, because if you know too much, you cannot talk to the media.

In Dr. Zarif’s case, I think it was clear what the United States wanted. They were pushing hard and had a particular framework they were seeking. In Biden’s case, the US negotiators were pushing, again, in a particular direction. That was also clear.

(Marandi specifies that he mentions the most famous rounds of negotiations, and that there were others less reported in the media. The cardinal difference is the same: it is not clear where the United States wants to go now. “Perhaps, and here I am guessing 100%,” he adds, “and this is just my point of view, they may be buying time. They are dragging out the negotiations for whatever reason. I do not know why. I could be wrong.”)

ZGT: I can add that the nuclear deal has its domestic consumption version as well, for both sides. In Iran, the US probably knows that by continuing negotiations and sometimes saying they will continue or not, they also affect the Iranian market, impacting the value of the currency—the rial—which has become, in its own way, an advantage. People are always waiting for news that perhaps the situation will change, that they will feel some relief from the sanctions, and that has an impact. I think they know they can manipulate domestic issues by taking advantage of that.

Playing with the expectations of the population.

SMM: Yes, I think so. When Trump started threatening Iran, the rial devalued by over 20%. I do not remember the exact figure, but it was a huge devaluation. Of course, when you keep doing this, people start to ignore it. Now, Trump says he is going to destroy Iran, so it does not have the impact it had before.

At first, I was convinced that was the case, that they were playing with the Iranian market. I think it could be one of the reasons if they are intentionally delaying it. It could be due to internal issues, but also because they want to keep ordinary Iranian citizens waiting.

ZGT: I also think that if this fails, it is a way to blame the Iranian team. I think this is how they are trying to frame it. I do not think it is working. At first, it seemed like they were sincerely trying to resolve the issue, which would portray him positively, but if it fails, they will blame the Iranian government. It worked in previous administrations, I think, especially during the Obama administrations. But now I think, because Trump himself is not viewed positively in Iran, it will not have the same result.

SMM: Just to add to what Dr. Ghasemi said, which I think is an important point…

I do not know how true this is for Venezuela, but Trump does not have Obama’s soft power capabilities, and I even think he is worse than Biden. She is right: the United States would like to blame Iran for any lack of progress, but I think the Iranians will blame Trump. If it were Obama, many Iranians would blame Iran. They would say Obama wants a deal. His father was Black, he was mixed-race, and he knew how to talk; he was very careful. So, many young, liberal Iranians will say, “Look, they had a solution, and these people [the Iranian negotiators] do not want it.” Obama knew how to do this. Biden less so, especially after Gaza, I think. Nevertheless, negotiations took place before Gaza. Even so, Biden’s team was smarter. Trump’s team is very weak. They have no appealing ability. I do not know if it is the same here in Venezuela, but people in Iran do not like Trump. Very simple.

With Netanyahu around and the usual backers in Washington, how plausible is the risk of war?

SMM: I think in the broadest sense, kind of…

Kinetics.

SMM: Yes, like in Ukraine. It is not going to happen.

The US does not have the ability to wage war against Iran. They would need to bring in 1.5 million troops, and it would take half a year to do that. It would cost trillions of dollars, and it would be far, far worse than Iraq, Afghanistan, or Vietnam. The world’s oil and gas come from the Persian Gulf. It would be a disaster for the US. It would be, I think, the end of US imperialism. We saw that in Yemen.

There was an article in The New York Times that said they wasted $7 billion bombing a country they could not find on a map, and they spent all of that without troops on the ground in just, like, five weeks? Without accomplishing anything. Then, they finally capitulated. They said Ansar Allah—the government in Yemen—capitulated. However, when you look at what that deal was about, it is clear that the US was the one that capitulated. So I do not see a scenario where the US go to war against Iran. Yemen is not Iran. It is much weaker than Iran, and the US could not even damage its defensive capabilities. I think it was The Wall Street Journal that said it had no impact on its underground bases. So I do not see a war.

Of any kind?

SMM: There is the potential for airstrikes, that is possible. However, the Russians and Ukrainians are constantly attacking each other; a few airstrikes are not going to make much difference. Besides, Iran’s defenses are formidable. It has been working on its air defenses in recent months. If the US launches airstrikes, they would have to come from Diego Garcia. They cannot do it from Qatar because Iran would destroy those countries. Or maybe from the Mediterranean, from…

Cyprus.

SMM: Cyprus, Syria, or Iraq. However, that would be a problem in Iraq. It would still be very difficult for the US, especially heavy bombers. They would have to land somewhere, and those bombers would be very vulnerable to Iranian air defenses because they are not exactly stealthy. We also saw Yemen almost shoot down an F-35. They almost shot down a stealth bomber. So, if Yemen can put one of those aircraft at risk, it would be very dangerous to get involved in that, and Iran, of course, would respond. So, airstrikes are a possibility. I am not sure about a war, but if they do it, they would pay a high price. They would not win, and I think they know that. The only reason they would do it is because they are under pressure from the Zionist lobby, the neoconservatives, and the Israel firsters.

In Tehran, some members of Misión Verdad team were able to see how the economic issue was a significant source of discontent, and also how some people viewed the son of the deposed Shah, Reza Pahlavi, as a savior who would magically “save” the country.

SMM: According to surveys conducted not only by Iranians but also by the US itself, such as those conducted by the University of Maryland, neither the Shah’s son nor other groups outside Iran have any traction in the country. The areas you visited, just as any tourist would, are generally the wealthier neighborhoods.

North Tehran.

SMM: Yes, there is a lot of money in northern Tehran. I imagine it is more so than here in the wealthy areas of Caracas, and I am speaking from an outsider’s perspective. There, you see a world that is not entirely different, but almost, and these kinds of things are probably more prevalent. Generally speaking, though, I would say dissatisfaction is very high when it comes to the economy. Overwhelmingly, Iranians—and when I say this, I mean well over 50%—have a very high rate of dissatisfaction.

Even in places like the subway heading south in Tehran, at least someone on our team overheard a citizen complaining about not having won a US visa through the State Department’s lottery system.

SMM: Yes. I do not know how Western media works here in Venezuela because I know there is Spanish-language media from all these different countries. In Iran, we have a lot of Persian media funded by Western governments, mostly the US.

In the past, the Saudis also paid, but now it is primarily Western governments. They broadcast to Iran from London, Washington and elsewhere. Traditionally, it is television, but now it is digital, multiplatform. It is different now, much more sophisticated. You know, this is your field.

The media that broadcasts to Iran from abroad are very well-funded. They basically tell Iranians they are the most miserable people in the world, so there is a perception among a significant portion of the population that Iran is very poor. Now, for some of you who have visited it and gone to other countries, Iran is probably one of the richest countries in the world. Not fantastic, but despite the sanctions, it has more than some African countries, probably more than different parts of Latin America, and more than most countries in our region, except for the gas and oil countries of the Persian Gulf, but that is not how people [in Iran] see it.

There are problems in Iran, major problems. Sanctions, but also incompetence—problems of all kinds. However, I do not think there is a substantive threat in Iran from an “alternative” to which people say, “this is what we want.” In fact, according to polls, the vast majority of Iranians say they do not have a problem with the system, they support it. You saw it, for example, when General Soleimani was killed or when President Raisi was martyred in the helicopter crash; you saw the large crowds in the streets, including in Tehran.

(Here Professor Marandi touches on a key issue that is not usually distinguished on this side of the world. There may be dissatisfaction, there may be conflicting positions regarding who governs the vote may swing between principled or reformist without fearing that this will entail a profound structural shift, but support for the system of Islamic democracy is wide.)

“I think the biggest problem the Iranian government has,” he concludes, “is that people are deeply dissatisfied with the administration and the economy. Jobs and inflation are the two main problems. In fact, if you ask people in a survey if cultural issues are a problem, maybe 1% or 2% will say so. On other issues, it is 1%, 2%, or 3%, but if you ask them about employment…

When you mention jobs, do you mean salaries?

SMM: No, unemployment, and also inflation. In a distant third place, if I am not mistaken, corruption. So it is inflation, employment, and much lower down, corruption. After that, nothing substantial.

In some ways, it is similar to the main issues here [in Venezuela]. The issues people would put first are precisely the same. Although I do have a concern here, and I think we share the same idea here, but yes, these are issues that can be addressed, perhaps some can be improved over time. However, on a psychological level…

Perhaps I should add that I think turnout in the most recent presidential elections, in the first round, although there was a diversity of candidates, was quite low. In the second round, it rose to 50%, so I think this apathy is also an issue. When President Raisi was elected, I think the turnout was 60%. Yet, in the first round of this latest election, it was 40%— that is a significant drop. I think the lowest turnout in the entire country was in Tehran.

The typical rural-urban divide.

SMM: Yes.

I think the issue of apathy is important because, as you saw here, turnout was not that high. Although this is often the case when it is not a presidential election, is this political apathy, which is not necessarily seen exclusively in the electoral sphere, for example, one of the successes of sanctions programs here and there?

I think they have an important role, yes. This is precisely where the US has an advantage, and that is why Trump is not a good president and does not exploit it. Obama created an ecosystem in which many Iranians believed that if only we had an agreement, everything would be fine. Iran would be heaven. Although there is no heaven, not even in Switzerland, but they said we just have to have an agreement with Obama, and everyone will be happy.

That kind of mythologizing did exist, and that put a lot of pressure on the agreement. I think, in that sense, many concessions were made [from the Iranian side] because they were under pressure to reach an agreement. Now, probably—I do not have the numbers—the Iranians will think they are more realistic compared to ten years ago. I am pretty sure that is true. Iranians feel that the sanctions are very significant in harming ordinary citizens.

Because it precisely increases the perception of these things.

SMM: Venezuela may be less corrupt than the other countries in the region, but when you have sanctions doing damage and people feel it, they see the corruption even more.

For example, the Emirates must be one of the most corrupt countries in the world, but the Emiratis have enough money, so they accept it. Qatar is very corrupt, but the Qataris—not the slaves and servants, but the citizens—have money, which also makes it acceptable. So, they are more content. However, in Venezuela, if people have problems, they are more visible.

Also, you do have more corruption in certain ways because sanctions force governments to do things clandestinely. For example, I send money to the bank, it goes through the system, and everything is clear. However, if I cannot use the bank, I have to use cash, and then it is not clear how much money arrives, what happens in between, how much the intermediary takes, and that sort of thing. You have that same sort of thing here, I am sure.

Sanctions are designed to encourage corruption. They incentivize it. On the other hand, they create extraterritorial laws specifically aimed at combating corruption. It is a circular thing.

SMM: Then those anticorruption laws slow down the economy. They make things go slower. So, by wanting to stop corruption, by trying to curb it, you have all these new layers of bureaucracy. So, more bureaucracy, more slowdown, and the corruption itself that comes from sanctions. It is a multi-layered problem.

Sanctions are invisible, but corrupt officials are visible, known, and connected, which even creates an identity problem. There is no direct identification with sanctions, no visible links, and therefore, officials—those who betrayed and became corrupt—are more connected to the population. In everyday life, they seem faceless. You do not see when they are causing harm. They cultivate identity through sanctions. One of the effects is that you cannot identify sanctions as a person, but you can identify corruption in a person, so it exacerbates the problem.

When life gets tough, they start demanding to know why they are “not doing anything” about it. Then, they think the targeted governments wanted the sanctions because corruption is necessary, because they are corrupt. Then, the Western and Persian media use that and say, “Yes, the government is corrupt, so they want sanctions,” and that builds the narrative. It is a very effective tool.

I do not think it will undermine Iran in any way, shape, or form, but it does cripple the country and make the state less credible in the public eye. Of course, the sanctions themselves have a real effect on lives, but the blame shifts: you are the one killing people, the one harming them.

However, it is not like they are dropping bombs; it is not like in Gaza, where you can say Israel is evil. Although this is also true, it is a type of war, but it does not work that way; it is more subtle. The US does get some of the blame, but so do we. They have the media to pursue this narrative. The war in Ukraine was a gift from the United States because the Russians were sanctioned and had to join our club, and this creates incentives for a solution, just like in Venezuela. Now that China has the tariff war, it also has incentives to seek solutions. So, I am sure Venezuela, Cuba, just like Iran, will say, “Okay, now there are more of us countries that want to find a way out,” but it is still a big problem for now.

42% of the world’s oil is under sanctions.

SMM:  Yes. And this was the reason Syria collapsed. Syria does not like these terrorists who now rule. I have been to Syria many times, and they do not like these people—Jolani’s people. There, they emptied the country, impoverished it so much that they tore it to pieces, and the people said anything was better.

What impact has the Holocaust in Gaza had on Iranian society? Has anything changed?

ZGT: I think something has changed within Iran. Before, I remember when I was teaching Orientalism, Edward Said’s book, students would say that Said’s book is about the Arabs, how they are seen by the West, but that the view of Iran was very different. Iranian civilization comes to mind, and the idea, based on that, that the West can make a distinction between Iran and the Arabs.

This was the naive view many Iranian students had at the time, but I think what is happening now is that they see that the West—or Israel—cannot differentiate between Iranians and Palestinians, that what is happening in Palestine could easily happen to Iranians, but also, for example, to the Chinese, to anyone who is not part of the Western narrative. I think that has changed: the way many people viewed the West. The belief that this difference allowed the West to come to an agreement with Iran. The tragedy in Gaza has changed that.

SMM: That does not mean, however, that these students are now pro-revolution. Some are, but those who idealized the West, who believed the problem was with the Arabs, now see it differently. They see the United States in a negative light, but that does not mean they now say the Iranian revolution is very good; it just means they no longer see them as “the good guys.”

The same can be said about what is happening with our migrants. It is not that they are going to support the government now—some will. Some are genuinely grateful to the government for intervening, but perceptions of the United States have certainly been changing, and it will no longer be seen as the golden panacea they once thought it was.

I think this is probably similar, and this is an opportunity. When your adversary becomes unpopular, if you are smart, you can build on this. However, it depends on how smart and competent we are, and we are not often competent or smart.

Iran is not good at soft power, not as bad as the Chinese, who are terrible even if they have money, but I think we are very bad.

At least on the political level, in terms of international relations and hard cooperation, it is difficult to accept this as deficient; on the contrary…

SMM: If we rethink our models of soft power, if we have models at all… even so, if we rethink them, I think this is the best opportunity because Trump is attacking everyone, and people can easily blame him. He is the kind of person you like to hate. Obama was not someone you liked to hate. “He understands our problems,” you might say. He is just as bad as the other one, but for those who follow politics less, who have other jobs, in a factory, who cannot just sit at home and watch these things, who have important things to do, unlike us, someone like Obama is difficult to confront, but Trump is very easy. So we must be very bad if we cannot do something now.

The Western narrative on the entire issue of women’s rights in West Asia, where they experience oppression under conditions of extreme censorship, where they are merely subservient and obedient, and are legally and culturally obligated to be so, is presented as a homogeneous entity as if it were one woman, the Muslim woman. What is the situation regarding rights and development on this issue in Iran?

ZGT: I think, as they say, the best way to see this is through statistics and numbers. Many people tend to compare pre- and post-revolutionary Iran, such as the level of education of women after the revolution, the number of children they have and how they have fewer children now because marriage postpones their education. I think some numbers and statistics demonstrate these changes. In my faculty, in humanities and social sciences, maybe around 80% are women. In engineering and mathematics, it is different, but again, 70% of the graduates are women. If you compare them with other countries in the region, but also around the world…

The average age at which women marry is quite high. I am not saying this is necessarily positive, but it demonstrates the level of dependence on families. It means women are becoming financially independent, which in turn also means they do not have to marry early, relying first on their father and then on their husband. This, in fact, has given Iranian women enormous agency.

I think the media tends to reduce everything to the hijab issue. However, if you look at the position of Iranian women regionally, if you look at it from an educational perspective, you will see how active they are in different areas: medicine, administration, and parliament. It shows that the kind of image they have is very different from what is actually happening in Iran. Reducing Iranian women to the hijab issue will give an unrealistic picture of what is happening to them.

They associate it with religion, as a problem, especially after 2022, with the cycles of demonstrations that the mainstream media labeled as an “uprising against the hijab.”

ZGT: The country in general is very religious. So, you will see that they are following the rules. There are differences in how they define what it means to be religious or devout, but Iranians in general are very religious.

So, before the revolution, many very religious families did not allow girls to go to school because they had their own views on mixed [male and female] schools and things like that. After the revolution, when it became an Islamic republic, you see how many families allow their girls to go to elementary school, high school, and university. That shows how much it has actually helped. Again, I think Iranian women have a different view because it is a type of Islam that is very different from the one practiced in Saudi Arabia or Qatar. In a sense, personally, as a woman, I think it has helped me be less objectified or commodified, in the sense of being seen much more professionally.

It is hard to find an optimistic angle regarding what is happening in Gaza and the region. Was Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023, a mistake?

ZGT: This is one of those questions you will never really be able to answer. There is no answer. I can say that if there was no October 7, the Israelis would be destroying Gaza differently, or more slowly, right now, and the world would be ignoring it. I understand the question.

I think there are two ways of looking at this. One is that the Palestinian question was going to slowly disappear anyway, and they were going to go through ethnic cleansing anyway, but at a different time, and the ethnic cleansing would be accompanied by misery at a different pace. This is one issue.

The second thing we must keep in mind is that this was not an Iranian decision, but a Palestinian one. It was Hamas that made the decision, not Hezbollah, not Islamic Jihad, not Ansarullah.

They made the decision, but it was the responsibility of these entities to support Palestine, regardless of whether they believed it was a good time or not, or a good or a bad tactic. So, Hezbollah had no choice but to support Hamas, to enter the fight so that the Israelis would not send all their troops to wipe out the Palestinians. It got involved in this way.

Ansarullah was blocking the sea route to make it more expensive, and of course, Iran was supporting them all and continues to do so with aid that comes at a price, a high one.

Personally, I think Hamas did the right thing. I think if I were in their position, this is ultimately what would have to be done. If not now, then tomorrow. If not tomorrow, then two weeks from now. Was the Algerian Revolution a good thing or not? Were the revolts against imperialists and colonizers in Latin America a good thing or a bad thing? I am sure that many people, when they were fighting, would say to stop.

When Hezbollah was fighting Israel to liberate Lebanon in the 1980s, many Lebanese were against it at the time. Many questioned why they were getting themselves killed. Ordinary people, not everyone, but many.

A majority?

ZGT: I do not know about a majority, but my friends in Hezbollah, of my generation, my age or older, told me that many people did not like fighting against Israel.

In the villages, they said that when they saw them returning, some people would throw stones at them because they saw them as troublemakers, but in the end, what do you do? If you do not confront them [occupiers], they will never leave. When you drive them out, people will celebrate, but when they are there and people are being shot, some will curse you.

What would we do if we were Hamas? I would probably do the same.

Now, will Gaza be erased? I do not know, but what I believe is that despite all the deaths—and I think it is more than we think—it is probably over 100,000. Many people died from illness, others from injuries after an attack, many are missing—we do not know the figures. But I am sure they are much higher than the official figures.

The war is horrible … although in Gaza, there is not a war but a genocide, a Holocaust. It is horrible everywhere. My question is this: the damage that has been done to Israel’s image, how important is it? I think it is infinitely important. I think Israel has been delegitimized in the eyes of many people around the world, and many people around the world see Israel for what it is. There were people who had no idea, or did not care, or had only heard that there is a fight between Arabs and Israelis over a piece of land. Now, many people know the story. I do not want to say this will change tomorrow, but I think without changing perceptions about Israel, it cannot be defeated.

Does perception matter that much?

ZGT: Just like apartheid in South Africa. That system collapsed because the world began to accept that it could not continue. The West supported apartheid, they supported the idea of making the ANC illegal, and they considered it a terrorist organization. Thatcher said they were terrorists. The US, through a law, made them terrorists, but ultimately, change came.

Civil rights in the United States and decolonization movements around the world during that time made racial division unacceptable. The Zionists used the Holocaust, a European crime, as a weapon to justify the colonization of this land and created this idea that there were no people there.

So, fighting Zionism has been more difficult than fighting South African apartheid. Fighting Zionism also has another problem, which is the demonization of Arabs in the Western psyche; it is different in nature from that of Africans. Africans are seen as backward, less intelligent, but the civil rights movement and its impact elsewhere made that more difficult to accept.

The Arabs, being evil, violent, irrational, terrorists, and Muslims, I think, have helped the Israelis more in the long run in today’s world than the anti-Black narrative they constructed for South Africa. I am speculating here somewhat because I have not done any research on this, so perhaps it is not accurate, but I do think they had an impact on how South Africa was perceived in the United States. However, Palestine did not. Twenty months after the genocide, we see US nationals, Jews, Christians, Muslims, etc., saying no.

The Zionist lobby in the United States is very rich, very powerful. Then, you have the neocons, and you have the complicity, the betrayal in our region. The border states around South Africa were better than Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. They had more principles. Here, you see them getting indignant and condemning but doing business, pretending to support. Yet, the awareness that October 7 has created in the world, I think, is extraordinary.

https://OrinocoTribune.com/chronicle-of-terror-a-survivors-account-of-israels-bombardment-of-south-beirut/

We should not view Venezuela in this context, it is not very important now: it is already anti-imperialist, and people—at least those with a political conscience, I am sure—know about Palestine. Iran is not that important. It is valuable that they become more aware, but it is not the main issue.

What is important are those parts of the world where they did not care or did not know. Suddenly, they are wondering what is going on. If you asked a politically active Venezuelan two years ago, before October 7, they would of course recognize the Palestinians as victims, and the Iranians the same. Now, you see people in the United States, Belgium, Spain, Canada—the bastions of Zionism—wondering what is going on and, of course, everywhere else in Latin America. Governments already openly and actively support Palestine, but I think this would not have happened without October 7.

The price is very, very high, but I believe the value of this shift in perception worldwide is invaluable. This is not a pretty answer.

 

(Misión Verdad) by Diego Sequera

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/JRE/SF