Marco Rubio Does Not Have It All as US Secretary of State

By Misión Verdad – Jan , 2025

On January 15, one of the most anticipated Senate hearings took place: the confirmation of Marco Rubio as US Secretary of State for the Donald Trump administration. The Cuban-American politician, known for his sponsorship of “regime change” against countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua and for being a traditional anti-China hawk, faced questions about his abilities to lead the US diplomatic portfolio.

Beyond the hearing and his answers, which fixated on Iran, China, and other topics of hawkish obsession, the nominee faces serious limitations in performing his duties within the Trump administration. The appointment of multiple special envoys with direct access to the president represents a structural challenge to State Department leadership and significantly reduces the next secretary of state’s room for maneuver.

Special envoys in the State Department
The recent appointment of Richard Grenell as special envoy for Venezuela and North Korea represents a strategic move in the diplomatic framework of the incoming Trump administration. This role not only reinforces the next president’s priorities but also evidences an attempt to channel foreign policy toward core issues that require specialized and sustained attention.

Since the days of George Washington, with Gouverneur Morris as a private agent for trade negotiations with England, the figure of special envoys has been a flexible tool in US foreign policy.

Over the years, their role has evolved to address complex issues that require exclusive attention, which has prevented the saturation of State Department offices. During Barack Obama’s presidency, this mechanism underwent an unprecedented expansion and highlighted its effectiveness in managing specific issues in an intensive and focused manner.

In the case of Grenell, the special envoy’s mission is twofold. On the one hand, the position gives him relevance in executing Trump’s directives on Venezuela and moves him away from mere coordination with traditional figures such as the secretary of State. On the other hand, his role may face serious obstacles in dealing with a State Department, whose often rigid and labyrinthine structure may hinder negotiations or implement extremist strategies.

In this case, Rubio will find limits to the pragmatism that Grenell will have to employ with a view to conducting possible negotiations, especially considering the economic and energy interests at stake between Caracas and Washington.

Indeed, according to Bloomberg, “Rubio, the intellectual, could use his prodigious intellect to accommodate Trump’s whims, in effect articulating everything the president does, whether it makes sense or not. In this way, he could keep his job. Alternatively, he could stick to his principles and be out of a job in short order.” This balance between pragmatism and fundamentals will be one of the biggest tests for Rubio, who, even in the Democratic wing, is widely regarded as an “institutionalist,” as Emily Horne, a former National Security Council spokeswoman in the Biden administration, put it.

In short, the assignment of Grenell, who will operate directly under Trump’s command, suggests that this is an attempt to shape a less chaotic and more structured strategy towards Venezuela. However, the “success” of this mission will depend on several factors:

Presidential pragmatism: Trump will need to balance the interests of his political base with the strategic benefits of keeping certain channels of communication open with Caracas.
State Department bureaucracy: Grenell will need to navigate the bureaucratic corridors and coordinate effectively with the State Department’s regional bureaus to advance his mission. Rubio will be a stumbling block.
The oil lobby: The influence of Chevron and other players in the energy sphere will be crucial for containing the impulses of more radical sectors in Congress.

The appointment of the special envoy in question could be an opportunity to redesign the US policy towards Venezuela, tempering it of ideological obsessions and bringing it closer to more pragmatic objectives. However, the risk of repeating past mistakes persists, especially if the “extremist lobby” led by Rubio and others succeeds in dragging the administration back into erratic and geopolitically unsustainable policies.

The scenario will ultimately be a test not only for Grenell but also for the Trump administration’s ability to reconfigure its strategy towards a country whose regional and global impact cannot be ignored.

Sanctions: the preferred weapon, with Venezuela on the radar
In one of the rounds of questions at the hearing, Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) momentarily rattled the prevailing narrative of the hearing by asking, “Can you give me examples where sanctions have improved behavior?” Rubio responded with evasive justification, admitting that sanctions may not generate change but insisting that they serve the purpose of “denying resources to governments.”

Rubio added that what cannot continue to happen is for China to continue to get all the benefits of the international system, and in this scenario, “the only other alternative left in the toolbox is economic sanctions.”

Against that, Paul closed the debate with an uncomfortable observation: “I do not think we are achieving it very often. Maybe it is time to think about a different way of doing business rather than just saying, let’s sanction everybody and call people names we don’t like because I don’t think that helps.”

However, after the initial statements loaded with rhetoric and ambitious promises, the emphasis on Venezuela did not occupy a central place in the session. Nevertheless, the topic did not take long to emerge, and almost as a personal obsession was promoted by Rick Scott (R-Florida) in an attempt to stoke the discursive attacks against Venezuela, stating that “the Biden administration allowed the oil to flow, stole the elections, completely violated what Biden told me he would do,” and emphasized that thanks to Rubio, Donald Trump published a tweet about María Corina Machado.

In this way, Rubio took the opportunity to deploy his usual repertoire of visceral statements, among which the following standouts:

Venezuela, unfortunately, is not governed by a government. It is governed by a drug trafficking organization.
I strongly disagree that we enter into negotiations with Maduro.
They used migration against us to get these concessions.
They have these blanket licenses where companies like Chevron are actually providing billions of dollars to the regime’s coffers.
All of that needs to be re-explored because, in Venezuela, you have a Russian presence; you have a very strong Iranian presence.

Rubio, who, together with Leopoldo López, was the promoter of the illegal sanctions that have seriously impacted the Venezuelan economy, is immovable in his position. However, behind his insistence on tightening sanctions, a strategic question arises: how powerful is Chevron’s lobby to maintain its operation in Venezuela amid Rubio’s sanctioning fervor?

The reality is that, beyond the Florida Republican’s speech, solid technical arguments justify the continuity of the license granted to Chevron. But, as Rubio well knows, in Washington, technical arguments do not always prevail; political will is what defines the game.

Ultimately, the real question is not whether the sanctions will achieve their objective but to what extent the United States is willing to sacrifice its own commercial and energy interests for the sake of a stubbornly rigid foreign policy.

Washington’s Attempts to Bully China Will Only Backfire

China: axis of US foreign policy
Rubio began his remarks with an aggressive and hostile criticism of China, describing it as a “clear but hidden” partner of adversaries such as Russia. He claimed that Beijing has indirectly contributed to the Russian military effort in Ukraine through sanctions evasion and technology sales.

Beyond his usual anti-China rhetoric, he stressed the importance of maintaining a balance between confrontation and diplomacy, acknowledging that “never in human history have two powers like the United States and China clashed without catastrophic consequences.”

During the session, Nebraska Republican Senator Pete Ricketts introduced one of the most incisive questions of the session: China’s place as the United States’ greatest adversary. Ricketts called the People’s Republic of China “the head of the stake in this axis of dictators,” noting that Beijing is involved in nearly every current international issue affecting the United States, from fentanyl to tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

“The Chinese Communist Party is the biggest challenge we face,” Rubio responded, which was not unexpected because, in his long legislative career, he devoted most of his time and energy to issues with China. Between 2023 and 2024, the senator promoted more than 100 bills against the country.

So, in his response, Rubio described the People’s Republic of China as an adversary that combines technological, industrial, economic, scientific and geopolitical dimensions, characteristics that, according to him, surpass the capabilities of even the extinct Soviet Union. For him, the bilateral relationship will be the defining issue of the 21st century, a sort of common thread to understand the geopolitical challenges that will mark the coming decades.

From trade to supply chains, the United States depends on China to a degree that makes any direct confrontation both risky and costly. The central question is not whether the United States wishes to oppose China but whether it can do so without compromising its own economy.

Results of the hearing
Overall, the US Senate hearing to evaluate Rubio’s nomination as Secretary of State in the Trump administration provided an image of the priorities and challenges that will mark US foreign policy in the coming years.

The confirmation, which appears likely to pass on a snap vote on Trump’s first day in office, would mark an era of greater confrontation in US foreign policy, especially with China.

Ultimately, the impact of these initiatives will depend on Marco Rubio’s ability to align with Donald Trump’s foreign policy priorities or whether the former president will find in his secretary an enforcer willing to follow his lead. This balance between strategic leadership and subordination will define the effectiveness of policies pushed against Venezuela and how they fit into the current geopolitical landscape.

The hearing also reflected a broader picture of the challenges that Rubio will face in working with a president whose conception of foreign policy is dominated by electoral pragmatism and the personalization of power. He could choose to adapt to Trump or stand firm in his convictions and risk becoming politically isolated.

The appointment of special envoys like Grenell reinforces this challenge, as they will operate directly under Trump’s orders, further reducing the State Department’s autonomy. This, combined with the differences between the two on issues such as China and sanctions, raises a fundamental question: will Marco Rubio be an enforcer of Trump’s vision, or will he do everything possible to make his dogmas prevail, even at the expense of the position?

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/SC/SF