Oil installations on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela in 1935. Photo: Alamy.
By Ana Maria Monjardino and John McEvoy – Feb 6, 2026
Declassified files expose how the UK has tried to control Venezuelaâs oil for over a century, seeking to thwart nationalisation through political pressure, propaganda, and covert operations.
In October 2001, two years into his presidency, Hugo ChĂĄvez made a trip to London to meet with then UK prime minister Tony Blair and other high-level officials.
Official records detail how the Venezuelan presidentâs proposed Hydrocarbons Law, a major restructuring of Venezuelaâs oil industry, was high on the British agenda.
The law aimed to assert sovereignty over Venezuelaâs resources by mandating at least 50% state ownership in mixed enterprises and increasing royalties on foreign oil interests.
This was a serious cause for concern for Britain, whose main interests in Venezuela centred on Shell, BP, and BG Groupâs investments in the oil and gas industry.
âBritish companies have over $4bn already investedâ in Venezuela, noted one Foreign Office official, with new investments of another $3bn planned for the oil industry.
Blair was thus instructed by advisers to impress on ChĂĄvez that the UK government was âfollowing your proposed hydrocarbons legislation very closelyâ.
In private, Blairâs adviser and future MI6 chief John Sawers wrote that âthe only reason for seeing him is to benefit British oil and gas companiesâ.
Sawersâ note drove at the core issue which had been guiding Britainâs relations with Venezuela for over a century: oil.
Declassified has combed through dozens of files in the National Archives which expose how the UK government has repeatedly sought to thwart the nationalisation of oil in Venezuela since it was first discovered during the early twentieth century.
Working in partnership with Britainâs leading oil corporations, the Foreign Office has resorted to political pressure, propaganda activities, and covert operations to maintain control over Venezuelaâs lucrative crude.
The origins of Britainâs interest in Venezuelaâs oil
In 1912, Royal Dutch-Shell began operations in Venezuela and, two years later, the company â alongside US firm General Asphalt â discovered a petroleum field in the small town of Mene Grande.
George Bernard Reynolds, a geologist at Venezuelan Oil Concessions Limited (VOC), a Shell subsidiary, described the supplies as âenough to satisfy the most exactingâ.
By 1920, the CIA reported that practically all of Venezuelaâs oil production and its most promising concessions were held by Royal Dutch-Shell and two American companies, Jersey Standard (SOCNJ) and Gulf.
Indeed, Venezuelan oil controlled by Royal Dutch-Shell had increased by over 600% from 210,000 barrels in 1917 to 1,584,000 in 1921.
âIs there any other company more conclusively British than thisâ, asked Sir Marcus Samuel, chairman of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, in June 1915, âwho have proved themselves more willing and able to serve the interests of the Empire?â
But foreign control over oil had serious consequences for Venezuelaâs land and people.
In 1936, oil workers in Maracaibo called a general strike in response to low wages, poor living conditions and the association of oil firms with the late dictator, Juan Vicente Gómez. It lasted for 43 days, during which time oil production decreased by 39%.
In response, Venezuelan president General Eleazar LĂłpez Contreras introduced a series of reforms to improve labour conditions.
This made him unpopular with the British and US oil executives, who were described by US ambassador Meredith Nicholson as belonging to âthe old school of âimperialistsâ who believed that might â in the business sense â was rightâ.
Venezuelaâs oil nonetheless remained central to the British imperial project and, by the outbreak of World War Two, Venezuelan oil âtook on particular significance within the British war effort as oil from the Middle East became less accessible following the closure of the Mediterranean in 1940â, according to research by academic Mark Seddon.
Officials therefore became increasingly worried about nationalisation in Latin America, particularly after foreign oil interests â including those of Shell â had been expropriated in Mexico in 1938.
That year, for instance, British diplomat John Balfour wrote: âWe should do all we can to show that it is not in the interests of a Latin-American country like Mexico to eliminate British interests from participating in the exploitation of its oil resourcesâ.
A dangerous opponent of capital
Concerns around nationalisation arose once again during the RĂłmulo Betancourt administration in the 1940s.
He was described by the Foreign Office in 1945 as âby far the most dangerous opponent of capital in Venezuelaâ, while the oil companies worried about his past support for communism.
These concerns proved overblown as Betancourt developed into a staunch anti-communist. According to a CIA file dated March 1948, Betancourt and his predecessor, RĂłmulo Gallegos, met to discuss âthe proposed outlawing of the Communist Party in Venezuela.â
The first step, according to the document, âwas the dismissal from the [oil workers union] Fedepetrol of all Communist Party petroleum syndicate delegatesâ.
Shellâs directors nonetheless responded positively to the military coup which toppled Betancourt in 1948.
They believed, as UK ambassador John H. Magowan noted in February 1949, that the new administration would âreverse the Betancourt tendency to hostility towards the âcapitalistsâ and âcolonialâ powersâ.
While US-owned SOCNJ had emerged as Venezuelaâs main oil producer by this time, Shell remained the second most important player and, by 1950, the company had centralized its operations, building a modernist headquarters in northern Caracas.
The propaganda campaign
During the 1960s, as the shadow of the Cold War cast over Latin America, a propaganda unit within the Foreign Office secretly worked to protect Britainâs oil interests in Venezuela.
That unit, named the Information Research Department (IRD), had been set up in 1948 to collect information about communism and distribute it to contacts worldwide.
The goal was to build resilience against communist and other national liberation movements while cultivating foreign agents of influence such as journalists, politicians, military officers, and businessmen.
By 1961, the IRD viewed Venezuela as the third most important country in Latin America in light of the risk of left-wing âsubversionâ and Britainâs strategic stake in the countryâs oil industry.
That year, the IRD worked with Britainâs intelligence services to promote a boycott of El Nacional, the largest newspaper in Venezuela, with the goal of forcing it âto abandon its campaign in favor of expropriating foreign companies and promoting communist agitationâ.
The campaign not only had the backing of powerful conservative and anti-communist groups in Venezuela but also the foreign oil companies, who agreed to suspend their advertising in the newspaper.
By 1962, IRD officer Leslie Boas was able to boast that El Nacional had âchanged its tone in a great wayâ, with the newspaperâs circulation also dropping from 70,000 to 45,000 per day.
Reactionary networks in Venezuela were also being covertly funded by Shell in this period, according to recently declassified files.
In April 1962, Boas wrote to IRD chief Donald Hopson about the Latin American Information Committee (LAIC) which was ânow doing quite active work⊠in Venezuelaâ.
The first director of LAIC was Enno Hobbing, who divided his work between Time/Life magazine and the CIA and later played a role in Chileâs 1973 coup dâĂ©tat.
Boas explained that he âhad a long talk with Hobbing [âŠ] and there do seem to be one or two ways in which we can be of mutual help without either of us burning our fingersâ.
Such help would include âan unattributable supply of IRD material to contactsâ of LAIC in return for LAIC supplying Boas with access to and information about local anti-communist networks.
Remarkably, Boas disclosed that Shell was âcontributing financially toâ LAIC alongside US retailer Sears Roebuck and other âInternational Business Machinesâ.
He added that ânone of the local branches of these companies such as Shell de Venezuela are cooperating either financially or overtly in any way, it is being done through their head offices and LAIC who have their own offices in New Yorkâ.
It was during this period that Shell and BP were also providing direct, âhandsomeâ subsidies to the IRD to promote their oil interests across Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.
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Nationalisation rekindled
The IRD continued to promote Britainâs oil interests in Venezuela through the 1960s and 1970s, until the unit was closed down in 1977.
In a country assessment sheet for Venezuela, dated 1969, an IRD official noted how âwe have considerable investments in the country, particularly those of Shell, whose fixed installations alone have been conservatively valued at ÂŁ300 millionâ.
The official continued: âShellâs operations in Venezuela play an important role in the companyâs very substantial contribution in invisibles [earnings through intangible assets] to our balance of paymentsâ, noting that Britainâs key objective was therefore âto protect our investmentsâ.
Two years later, IRD field officer Ian Knight Smith wrote to London with concerns about how âthe emotional issue of economic nationalism, always a potent force in a country whose main natural resources are largely in the hands of foreign companies, was [being] rekindledâ.
Worse still, the Venezuelan president, Rafael Caldera, had âmade his own contribution to the new nationalism â in the shape of a law nationalising all natural gas depositsâ.
The IRD consequently prepared briefings âon communist instigation of charges against the international oil companiesâ to be shared with contacts across Venezuela.
In addition, the propaganda unit âcast around for material with which to brief IRD contacts who are in a position to influence government policy or legislation affecting foreign investments in Venezuelaâ.
Officials were particularly interested in commissioning a âwell-researched paper on the positive aspects of foreign investment in developing countries, helping to counter the growing assumption, carefully fostered by the extreme left, that all foreign investment is basically suspectâ.
It was within this context that the Foreign Office privately advised that âwe should protect as far as we are able Shellâs continued access to Venezuelan oilâ.
Venezuelan oil was officially nationalised in 1976, with foreign companies including Shell being replaced by the state-owned PetrĂłleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).
But this was by no means the end of the road for Britainâs oil interests in Venezuela.
In a background briefing for a visit by Venezuelan president Carlos AndrĂ©s PĂ©rez, dated November 1977, the Foreign Office observed that âShell is still our largest single interestâ.
The official added: âIt should not be forgotten that despite nationalisation our largest commercial stake in this country is still Shell, and although they no longer, since nationalisation, produce oil here, they earn millions of dollars from their service and marketing contracts with their former companyâ.
The company also continued âto off-take very large volumes of Venezuelan oil for sale mostly in the US and Canadaâ.
Another official remarked upon the âfurious activity of all European countries, including ourselves, in trying to get our share of Venezuelaâs economic gravyâ.
By 1978, the New York Times went so far as to say that Shell was âbusier in Venezuela than before the oil industry was nationalizedâ.
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âShell has been activeâ
Even still, Britainâs oil firms wished to return to Venezuelaâs oilfields.
Those hopes were stoked in the early 1990s by the âOil Openingâ of President Carlos AndrĂ©s PĂ©res, whose austerity measures led to an explosion of poverty and street protests, but dashed once again by ChĂĄvezâ proposed Hydrocarbons Law in 2001.
In the lead-up to ChĂĄvezâ visit that year to London, Britainâs leading oil companies were once again in the prime ministerâs ear about the projected impact on their interests.
Blairâs briefing noted unambiguously that UK and US companies were âconcernedâ about the oil reforms and wanted them watered down.
Days before the visit, Shellâs chairman Philip Watts offered suggestions on how Blair might handle ChĂĄvez.
âAs you may have appreciated, Shell has been active in helping in the preparations for the visit through the Foreign Officeâ, Watts wrote.
âConsidering the importance of the energy sector for both the Venezuelan and UK economies, I thought the PM may appreciate a small briefing on our⊠plans in Venezuelaâ, he added.
Those plans involved ameliorating the âuncertain investment climateâ and softening the âfiscal and legal frameworkâ in the country.
As part of the charm offensive, Watts also hosted a âfarewellâ banquet for ChĂĄvez, to which foreign secretary Jack Straw and other senior ministers were invited.
BP and BG Group also âregistered their interest with No.10 about the visitâ, with BP preparing âto put their case⊠forcefullyâ in favour of a meeting between the two leaders.
âThe Americans are concernedâ
The US government also weighed in on the matter.
On 18 October, an official in the British embassy in Washington wrote to London that âthe Americans are concerned about the impact that the Hydrocarbons Law will have on investment in the energy sectorâ.
They continued: âThe major oil companies, including BP, had all made clear that its tax and restrictive joint venture productions would hinder their operationsâ.
The US state department âthought it would be particularly useful for Chavez to hear these concerns in London, given his tendency to discount messages from the USâ.
To this end, the George Bush administration hoped Blair would âtalk sense into [ChĂĄvez] on the Hydrocarbons Law, where BP are among those who stand to loseâ.
Further pressure was applied by Gustavo Cisneros, a Venezuelan billionaire and media mogul who was introduced to Blair in 2000 by Daily Telegraph owner Conrad Black.
Sawers, Blairâs adviser, noted that Cisnerosâ âsole messageâ for Blair âwas that ChĂĄvez was a real danger to stability and free markets (and, of course, rich Venezuelans like himself)â.
A briefing document prepared by Cisneros, for instance, warned that âChavez will likely reactâ to oil prices dropping âby lashing out at the private sectorâ.
Sawers viewed Cisneros with suspicion but broadly agreed that ChĂĄvez was objectionable. There was, he wrote, âa chance that the picture [with ChĂĄvez] at the front door [of Downing Street] would come back to haunt usâ.
He continued: âThis is one of the Worldâs tyrants whose hand I wonât have to shakeâ.
The coup against ChĂĄvez
A coup against ChĂĄvez broke out in April 2002, orchestrated by dissident military and political figures with support from Washington.
Pedro Carmona, an economist who was unconstitutionally appointed Venezuelaâs president, quickly set about dismantling the countryâs democracy and reversing ChĂĄvezâs oil reforms.
He happened to be in the offices of Cisneros, the mega mogul who had taken the opportunity to âpour poisonâ into Blairâs ears about ChĂĄvez, when the coup broke out.
The declassified files show how Britain quietly hoped the Carmona regime would be more accommodating to foreign interests while noting the unconstitutional nature of the coup.
âThe Cabinet is strong on experience and businessâ and âhopefully its management capability will be much higherâ, wrote the British embassy in Caracas.
The embassy was also informed by UK business leaders in Venezuela that âtheir operations should be back to normal by 15 Aprilâ, while Shellâs âproduction of oil was unaffectedâ.
At the same time, however, the Foreign Office was disturbed by the fact that âno oneâ had âever electedâ the Carmona regime.
âVenezuela may or may not have wanted to get rid of Chavez, but not necessarily to lose the other parts of their democratic systemâ, one official wrote. âThe right-wing businessmen seem to have shot themselves in the footâ.
Notably, the UK government seemed to have some knowledge of Washingtonâs role in the events.
On 14 April, with ChĂĄvez imprisoned in a military barracks, the British embassy in Caracas cabled to London that the US ambassador had been spending âsome hours in the Presidential Palaceâ.
âPlease protect [the information]â, they instructed.
The opposition
The coup was short-lived.
ChĂĄvez was reinstated within 47 hours following a wave of popular mobilisations across Caracas.
With ChĂĄvez back at the helm, the Foreign Office quietly hoped that âthe events of the last few daysâ would be seen as âa serious warning to change his waysâ.
But the situation remained tense, with UK foreign secretary Jack Straw noting in July 2002 that ChĂĄvezâs position âremain[ed] shakyâ.
The political opposition in Venezuela was seen by Whitehall as particularly intransigent, with Straw declaring that ChĂĄvez looks âpositively resplendent compared with [them]â.
The Venezuelan opposition, Straw continued, âappear to be united, indeed motivated, by sheer indignation that someone like ChĂĄvez (not one of them and above all not white) should be in charge and have such a popular power baseâ.
An official in Britainâs embassy in Caracas similarly noted in 2002 that the Venezuela opposition âlooks like a train that tried to breach a wall on one track in April and are now seeking to do the same on a slightly different track and at a slightly different angleâ.
They added: âThe oppositionâs self-delusion is growing worse by the day: they claim alternately they are living in either a fascist or communist dictatorshipâ.
One of the key opposition figures in this period was MarĂa Corina Machado, with whom the UK government is currently in talks amid a renewed regime change campaign in Venezuela.
John McEvoy
Independent journalist @theCanaryUK, @jacobinmag, @ColombiaReports , & International History Review.
