
The presidential palace in Chile was bombed by tanks and jets in October 1973. Photo: Bettmann via Getty.
Orinoco Tribune – News and opinion pieces about Venezuela and beyond
From Venezuela and made by Venezuelan Chavistas
The presidential palace in Chile was bombed by tanks and jets in October 1973. Photo: Bettmann via Getty.
By Mark Curtis – Sep 4, 2023
When the Chilean military overthrew Salvador Allendeâs democratically elected government in September 1973, UK officials supported and worked with the new junta as it indulged in widespread atrocities, declassified files show.
⢠âFor British interests⌠there is no doubt that Chile under the junta is a better prospect than Allendeâs chaotic road to socialismâ, the foreign secretary said
⢠âThe prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighter under the new regimeâ, Britainâs ambassador in Santiago agreed.
⢠UK and US officials feared Allendeâs successful economic policies could be replicated throughout Latin America
On 11 September 1973, a democratically-elected Chilean government under President Salvador Allende was overthrown in a brutal coup organised by the Chilean military with the backing of the CIA.
The presidential palace was rocketed by the military and Allende committed suicide. Thousands of people were imprisoned, Congress was suspended and all political parties and the trade union movement were banned.
General Augusto Pinochet soon emerged as the leader of the military junta as summary executions took place throughout the country. At least 3,000 people were soon killed, most executed, died under torture or âdisappearedâ.
Pinochet went on to rule Chile for 17 years. His regime became one of Latin Americaâs most repressive and bloody in modern history.
After the fall of the dictatorship in 1990, a truth commission confirmed that more than 40,000 people were tortured and over 200,000 fled into exile.
Declassified British files show UK officials described the 1973 coup as âcold-bloodedâ and âruthlessâ. It was widely condemned throughout the world as an illegitimate overthrow of a progressive government.
It also elicited much public outrage, including among the British public, especially as the Edward Heath government did nothing in public to strongly condemn the coup.
In fact, in private his Conservative government strongly supported it, the declassified files at the National Archives show.
Officials were completely aware of the scale of atrocities. Three days after the coup, ambassador Reginald SecondĂŠ reported to the Foreign Office that âit is likely that casualties run into the thousands, certainly it has been far from a bloodless coupâ.
âThe extent of the bloodshed has shocked peopleâ
Six days after, he noted that âstories of military excesses and mounting casualties have begun increasingly to circulate. The extent of the bloodshed has shocked peopleâ.
But it did not appear to shock SecondĂŠ and his staff in Santiago. He immediately reported that âwe still have enough at stake in economic relations with Chile to require good relations with the government in powerâ.
But he suggested those good relations should be kept secret, writing: âIt would not be in anyoneâs interests to identify too closely with those responsible for the coupâ.
âOrderly governmentâ
After cabling London about casualties reaching into the thousands, SecondĂŠ further told the Foreign Office that âwhatever the excesses of the military during the coupâ the Allende government had been leading the country into âeconomic ruinâ.
Therefore, Britain should welcome the new rulers since âthere is every reason to suppose that they will now⌠try to impose a period of sensible, orderly governmentâ.
Indeed, SecondĂŠ effectively condoned the political repression, noting that âthe lack of political activity is, for the time being, no lossâ.
The ambassador also told the Foreign Office that âmost British businessmen⌠will be overjoyed at the prospect of consolidation which the new military regime offersâ. British companies, such as Shell, he added, âare all breathing deep sighs of reliefâ.
The reference was to Allendeâs nationalisation campaign that had taken over some key Western commercial interests in the country, notably copper, the countryâs principal economic resource.
âNow is the time to get inâ, he recommended, while urging the British government to provide early diplomatic recognition of the new regime.
âBetter prospectâ
The foreign secretary in Edward Heathâs Conservative government, Alec Douglas Home, sent an official âguidanceâ memorandum to various British embassies on 21 September outlining British support for the new junta.
It said: âFor British interests⌠there is no doubt that Chile under the junta is a better prospect than Allendeâs chaotic road to socialism, our investments should do better, our loans may be successfully rescheduled, and export credits later resumed, and the sky-high price of copper (important to us) should fall as Chilean production is restoredâ.
Indeed, the Foreign Office decided to go to extraordinary lengths to assure the Chilean junta of Britainâs desire for good relations.
âThey are anxious to enter early into good relations with the new governmentâ
Eleven days after the coup, SecondĂŠ met Admiral Huerta, the juntaâs new foreign minister. The ambassadorâs briefing notes for this meeting state that: âI shall put it to him frankly that HMG [Her Majestyâs Government] understands the problems which the Chilean armed forces faced before the coup and are now facing: this is a particular reason why they are anxious to enter early into good relations with the new governmentâ.
Then SecondĂŠ said he would refer to âour own problems of public opinion at home. It would therefore help us if he [ie, Huerta] could agree that we should be able to say something to reassure public opinion at homeâ.
SecondĂŠâs record of his meeting with Huerta confirms that he said that the British government âunderstood the motives of the armed forces, intervention and the problems facing the military governmentâ â diplomatic language for support for the junta.
The British ambassador then gave Huerta a draft form of wording to be used in public by the UK government, to which Huerta was asked to agree.
Agreed statement
This agreed statement was an apologia for what the military junta was then doing, undertaken in order to placate public opinion in Britain.
It said Britain accepted that the internal situation in Chile âis of course a matter for the Chilean government onlyâ and that the UK ambassador had expressed âthe very strong feeling which exists in many quarters in Britain over the deaths of President Allende and others and over the many people arrestedâ.
It added that âthe Chilean government offered assurances that they will deal in a humane mannerâ with those in detention and in political opposition â an obvious lie, since SecondĂŠ and Whitehall were perfectly aware of the scale of atrocities being committed.
Douglas Home was delighted with SecondĂŠâs success in reaching agreement with the junta on a form of words. He cabled the ambassador praising him for carrying out a âdifficult briefâ, adding: âThe statement helped us to defend our relatively early recognition of the new government against domestic criticismâ.
âProper perspectiveâ
The removal of the democratically elected government was explained away by SecondĂŠ. He said in a reflective 20 page dispatch three weeks after the coup that âthe overthrow of constitutional government was not what it may seem in Britainâ.
While he recognised that the armed forces were being widely condemned internationally âthis must be put into its proper perspectiveâ, SecondĂŠ added.
His analysis referred to the regular defeats Allendeâs government suffered in the Congress and the governmentâs retention of power on the basis of the 36 per cent of the vote won by Allende in the 1970 presidential election, which, SecondĂŠ was convinced, would never happen in Britain.
âThe prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighterâ
As for the new military junta, SecondĂŠ noted that âcircumstances also will push them into directions which British public opinion will deploreâ and âthe next few years may be grey ones, in which freedom of expression may sufferâ.
âBut this regime suits British interests much better than its predecessorâ, he concluded, adding: âThe prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighter under the new regime⌠The new leaders are unequivocally on our side and want to do business, in the widest sense, with usââ.
This was in the context of clear recognition by British planners that âtorture is going on in Chileâ and also of the âallegedly quasi-fascist inclination of the new leadersâ.
It was also recognised, as SecondĂŠ noted above, that the new regime was going to continue to be repressive for a long while. As one Foreign Office official noted: âIt seems very hard to foresee a return for many years to anything like democratic government of the kind to which Chile has been accustomed for many years to comeâ.
Aiding the regime
Foreign minister Leo Amery made clear in private meetings with Judith Hart, Labourâs shadow minister for overseas development, that the UK aid programme and credit lines would not be suspended, as some donors had done.
In reply to a parliamentary question, the Foreign Office drafted: âOur priorities in Latin America are determined largely by our trading and investment interests⌠On the recent events in Chile, our public policy is to refuse to be drawn into the controversy of the rights or wrongs of President Allendeâs government or the new military governmentâ.
The issue of British arms exports to the junta was especially pertinent since Hawker Hunter aircraft supplied by Britain had been used in the coup to attack Allendeâs presidential palace and his residence.
The ambassador noted that âHawker Hunters swept down with their aerial rockets, directed with remarkable accuracy at the palace, which was severely damaged and set on fireâ.
With the junta in power, British officials made clear that arms contracts agreed with Allende would be honoured, involving eight Hawker Hunters and other equipment worth over ÂŁ50m.
But they went further, saying in the secret files that âwe shall want in due course to make the most of the opportunities which will be presented by the change in governmentâ.
Expectations were for new requests for arms from the junta but âwe shall wish to play these as quietly as possible for some time to comeâ owing to widespread public opposition.
The Heath government defied calls from the Labour party to impose an arms embargo on Chile and all the Hawker Hunters had been delivered by the time of the 1974 British general election.
A further major task was to counter the British and international opposition to the military regimeâs atrocities.
âWe can do little about the pressâ, he added âbut you can assure them [the Chilean junta] that we and our ministers do understand the factsâ.
Carless also mused that âChileans must be wondering why on Earth⌠so much unfair attention is being paid to their change of governmentâ.
He continued by noting that due to the emergence of a worldwide Chile Solidarity Movement protesting against the new regime, âwe shall, occasionally, have to adopt a lower profile than we would likeâ.
This was especially the case in providing arms, helping the junta with debt relief and to ârescue them from being pilloried in international meetingsâ.
âViolent revolutionâ
The impact of the coup on Chileans was harsh. But the removal of a popular government may also have had another effect beyond the country, signalling that a peaceful, democratic path to improving the position of the poor in a developing country would be met by violence.
Ambassador SecondĂŠ noted in a dispatch after the coup that âthe final seal of failure has now been put on this experiment by the Chilean armed forcesâ.
âThe final seal of failure has now been put on this experiment by the Chilean armed forcesâ
âThis has some obvious advantagesâ, he noted, but also disadvantages, one of which was that âit will be widely concluded that violent revolution is the only effective way to communismâ.
Douglas Home similarly suggested that âthe overthrow of Allende has ruined prospects for social change to be achieved democratically in Latin Americaâ.
âOur major interest in Chile is copperâ
A Foreign Office brief noted that âour major interest in Chile is copperâ which accounted for one third of the UKâs copper imports.
The disruption in Chile under Allende and âfear for the futureâ had recently meant large rises in copper prices which were costing the UK an extra ÂŁ500,000 in foreign exchange. âWe therefore have a major interest in Chile regaining stability, regardless of politicsâ, the Foreign Office stated.
Allendeâs primary heresy as seen from London and Washington was nationalisation. In July 1971 the copper industry â which provided 70 per cent of Chileâs export earnings â was fully nationalised and the US-owned copper mines taken over by the government, with the unanimous approval of the Congress.
The US reacted sharply and cut off all credit and new aid to the government and pressed the World Bank to do the same. The chief US mining corporations, Kennecott and Anaconda, began legal proceedings against the government.
The US ambassador, Nathaniel Davis, told Reginald SecondĂŠ that the US government was concerned ânot only about the loss to the copper companies, but also about the precedent that the Chilean action would set for the nationalisation of other big American interests throughout the developing worldâ.
Several banks were also nationalised while in early 1972 the government announced its intention to take over 91 key firms which accounted for around half of Chileâs economic output.
A British Conservative Party briefing paper noted that UK companies had been affected by nationalisation âbut it was generally considered at the time that where nationalisation of British assets had taken place the compensation agreed upon had been fairâ.
In a despatch just eight days before the coup, SecondĂŠ admitted that Chile ââhas at least caught her social problems by the tail: many people in the poorer and most depressed sections of the community have, as a result of President Allendeâs administration, attained a new status and at least tasted, during its early days, a better standard of living, though it has been eroded by inflationâ.
SecondĂŠ concluded that âthis is a major achievement and has set Chile apart from most other Latin American statesâ.
50 Years After Chileâs Coup, the First Year of Popular Unity
Threat of a good example
Yet it was precisely because Allendeâs government was being successful that British and US planners wanted him to be removed.
After being elected in 1970, Allende was appointed president of a Popular Unity government with the consent of the Christian Democratic Party. He inherited an economy that, as in most of Latin America, was controlled by a small elite.
In his victory speech in November 1970 Allende proclaimed a programme for fundamental economic change, proposing to abolish the monopolies âwhich grant control of the economy to a few dozen familiesâ.
He also pledged to abolish the tax system that favoured the rich, abolish the âlarge estates which condemn thousands of peasants to serfdomâ and âput an end to the foreign ownership of our industryâ.
âThe road to socialism lies through democracy, pluralism and freedomâ, Allende proclaimed.
The strategy was to create a restructured society based on state, mixed and private ownership of resources to be achieved mainly through the rapid extension of state control over large parts of the economy, either by direct nationalisation or government investment.
These policies improved the position of the poor, especially in the early part of the Allende presidency, through raising the minimum wage and special bonuses paid to poorly paid workers.
This was matched by rising popularity for the government; in congressional elections in the year of the coup, 1973, the Popular Unity coalition increased its vote to 44 per cent.
âRedistribution of incomeâ
Britainâs Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) recognised âthe Allende government has been directing its economic efforts primarily at effecting a redistribution of incomeâ in which prices had been held down and salaries allowed to rise.
The strategy was âto put right what they regard as economic and social injustices (including foreign domination of certain sectors of the economy)â. Allende was âcommitted to proving that socialism can be brought to Chile in a peaceful and democratic fashionâ.
Just three months after Allende assumed office, the JIC was concluding that âWashington is clearly very perturbed by developments in Chileâ.
âWashington is clearly very perturbed by developments in Chileâ
As well as nationalisation of US business interests, âthe United States must view the prospect of a moderately successful extreme left-wing regime in Chile with considerable misgiving if only because of the effect this might have elsewhere in Latin Americaâ, the JIC noted.
It also expressed the same fear from a British perspective, saying that the course of events in Chile is likely to have âimportant repercussions throughout Latin American and perhaps beyondâ.
It added: âAllendeâs victory has been hailed as strengthening the prevailing radical, anti-American trend in Latin Americaâ. It may lead to a bloc of âlike-minded states comprising Chile, Bolivia and Peru whose negative attitude towards foreign investment has already been demonstratedâ.
Covert action
The CIA had initially sought to prevent Allende taking office. A declassified CIA report reveals that throughout the 1960s and 1970s the US promoted âsustained propaganda efforts, including financial support for major news media, against Allendeâ.
This included âpolitical action projectsâ that âsupported selected parties before and after the 1964 elections and after Allendeâs 1970 electionâ.
In the 1960s, activities included financial assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, the distribution of posters and leaflets, and financial assistance to selected candidates in Congressional elections.
By the time of the 1964 election, won by favoured US candidate Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party, the CIA had provided $3m to prevent Allende winning.
In the run-up to the 1970 election won by Allende, the CIA conducted âspoiling operationsâ to prevent his victory while President Nixon authorised the agency âto seek to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking officeâ.
Declassified has revealed that Britain also conducted a covert propaganda offensive to stop Allende winning the 1964 and 1970 elections.
The Foreign Officeâs Information Research Department (IRD) gathered information designed to damage Allende and lend legitimacy to his political opponents, and distributed material to influential figures within Chilean society.
The IRD also shared intelligence about left-wing activity in the country with the US government. British officials in Santiago assisted a CIA-funded media organisation which was part of extensive US covert action to overthrow Allende, culminating in the 1973 coup.
Overthrow
A few days after Allende assumed office in 1970, the CIA was authorised to establish direct contacts with Chilean military officers âto evaluate the possibilities of stimulating a military coup if a decision were to be made to do soâ.
Arms, including machine guns and ammunition, were provided to one of the groups plotting a coup.
A fund of $10m was authorised âto prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat himâ, which was used to strengthen opposition political parties and assist militant right-wing groups to undermine him.
â$10m was authorised to prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat himâ
CIA money was also used for planting stories in local media and promoting opposition to Allende in the Chilean press. Also approved were efforts âto encourage Chilean businesses to carry out a program of economic disruptionâ.
US ambassador Edward Korry explained that the strategy was to âdo all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a communist society in Chileâ.
After the Pinochet takeover, the CIA notes that it âcontinued some ongoing propaganda projects, including support for news media committed to creating a positive image for the military juntaâ.
Reginald SecondĂŠ went to become British ambassador to Romania and Venezuela, before dying in 2017 at the age of 95.
Mark Curtis is the editor of Declassified UK, and the author of five books and many articles on UK foreign policy.
Support Groundbreaking Anti-Imperialist Journalism: Stand with Orinoco Tribune!
For 6.5 years, weâve delivered unwavering truth from the Global South frontline â no corporate filters, no hidden agenda.
Last yearâs impact:
â˘Â 150K+ active readers demanding bold perspectives
â˘Â 158 original news/opinion pieces published
â˘Â 16 hard-hitting YouTube videos bypassing media gatekeepers
Fuel our truth-telling: Every contribution strengthens independent media that actually challenges imperialism.
Be the difference:Â Donate now to keep radical journalism alive!