The flags of the US (left) and Venezuela (right), with a photo of columnist Clodovaldo Hernández (middle). Photo: Venezuelanalysis.
By Clodovaldo Hernández – Feb 19, 2025
VA columnist Clodovaldo Hernández reflects on recent events in the Trump II era and examines their impact on Venezuela’s opposition.
Few could have predicted that the first month and a half of 2025 would be so favorable for the Nicolás Maduro government and so disastrous for Venezuela’s main opposition forces.
At the end of 2024, expectations pointed to a turbulent January, marked by Maduro’s contested inauguration for his third six-year term on January 10 and the start of Donald Trump’s new administration on January 20.
However, the massive anti-Maduro demonstrations announced for January 9 never took place. There were no military uprisings or foreign interventions to impose the swearing-in of opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. The formal process to ratify the re-elected president went on without any incidents, while fractures within the opposition leadership became increasingly evident.
Likewise, hopes that Trump, upon returning to the White House, would immediately launch a second phase of his “maximum pressure” strategy against Maduro – as he did in his first administration (2017-2021) – were shattered. Instead, the signs have been unexpectedly different. The unconventional US president made a clear first move regarding Venezuela: his special envoy, Richard Grenell, traveled to Caracas and met with Maduro at the Miraflores presidential palace under a so-called “zero agenda” framework; essentially this was a fresh start in bilateral relations.
The tone of the meeting and the apparent silencing of Secretary of State Marco Rubio – one of the most vocal enemies of the Bolivarian Revolution – have given these early “Trump II” weeks an unexpected twist.
Grenell returned to the US with six US citizens who had been imprisoned in Venezuela on various charges. For its part, Chavismo considered the non-withdrawal of the Chevron license to operate in the South American country’s oil sector a victory.
Migration and Deportation Policy Shift
Further reshaping the landscape, Venezuela’s state airline Conviasa has been able to fly to the US to repatriate undocumented Venezuelan migrants.
This has been particularly striking, as those returning have done so in dignified conditions and were even welcomed at the airport by Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, one of Washington’s most vilified figures. This stands in stark contrast to the humiliating deportations faced by Brazilian and Colombian migrants.
The dominant narrative portraying Venezuelan migrants as criminals or alleged members of the Tren de Aragua gang has suffered a severe blow.
This issue has also dealt another blow to the opposition leadership, as their dubious handling of humanitarian aid and their reckless encouragement of thousands of people to falsely claim political persecution for asylum purposes have been exposed.
The Venezuelan government remains cautiously optimistic. No one is proclaiming Trump as a “new best friend.” Still, it is evident that relations differ significantly from his first term, when economic sanctions intensified, unilateral coercive measures peaked, and the White House backed the fake “interim government” led by opposition lawmaker Juan Guaidó – a scheme that led to the looting of Venezuela’s foreign assets, including Citgo, PDVSA’s US-based subsidiary.
The USAID Factor
Another surprising turn of events came with Trump’s decision to suspend US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding for Venezuelan opposition parties, NGOs, and media outlets for three months.
This move validated long-standing claims by Venezuelan government officials regarding the continuous flow of funds from the Global North to support destabilization efforts.
The financial cut is a severe blow to the sector of the opposition that has become reliant on foreign funds, to the point that its leaders seem more interested in securing financial support than in winning votes and attaining power.
The temporary suspension of funding also shook the opposition-aligned media landscape, as many outlets were created and sustained through USAID and other US government-linked entities.
Additionally, the scandal has revealed deep divisions within the opposition, with fierce internal disputes over foreign funds, some of which have reportedly ended up in the personal accounts of political leaders.
The turmoil caused by Trump’s USAID decision has left key figures of the failed “interim government” reeling, while the collapse of expectations surrounding the January 10 inauguration has weakened the alliance between María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia.
Venezuela’s VP Condemns Trump’s Revocation of Chevron License
Elections vs. Abstentionism
Meanwhile, Chavismo has capitalized on the opposition’s disarray and the shifting tone in US-Venezuela relations. Since the start of the year, the government has established a national dialogue table, set dates for parliamentary and gubernatorial elections, and proposed a constitutional reform project. The revolutionary leadership appears firmly in control of the political agenda.
Trapped by an all-or-nothing strategy, Machado has doubled down on calling for an electoral boycott, widening the divide between her faction and the opposition sector advocating participation to build a viable alternative to Chavismo in the medium term.
Attempts to delegitimize elected authorities by boycotting elections are nothing new, but they have consistently backfired – only serving to consolidate Chavismo’s grip on power.
The opposition boycotted the 2005 parliamentary elections, leaving the National Assembly entirely in government hands from 2006 to 2010. Opposition parties also abstained from elections between 2017 and 2022, including the 2018 presidential race. As a result, Chavismo regained control of the National Assembly, which had been lost in 2015, and dominated regional and municipal offices. Some opposition leaders and parties did break ranks and participated, securing governorships in Zulia, Táchira, Mérida, Anzoátegui, Cojedes and Nueva Esparta.
If the opposition leadership chooses to abstain from the April 27 parliamentary elections, Chavismo will easily renew its current majority in the National Assembly. This would allow it to approve new laws and constitutional reforms without obstacles.
In the coming weeks, Venezuela’s opposition forces will have to make crucial decisions, the most pressing being if they participate in the regional and legislative contests – all amid deep internal contradictions. For now, and against many predictions, the government appears to be winning the game.
Clodovaldo Hernández
Venezuelan journalist and writer. He writes regularly for La IguanaTV, Supuesto Negado, and Mision Verdad.
