In a region built on engineered water, the next escalation may not strike oil, but the systems that make life possible
Persian Gulf water security now faces an existential test as desalination plants shift from pillars of development into strategic military targets, placing the continuity of urban life and investment flows across the region at unprecedented risk.
The structural dependence of Gulf states on seawater desalination for water security exposes a critical vulnerability under the ongoing US–Israeli aggression against Iran launched at the end of last February.
As reciprocal bombardments expand and persist, concern is mounting that the strategic focus of the warring sides will move beyond military sites and conventional energy infrastructure toward the waterfront itself.
Economic indicators show that any disruption to desalination plants threatens the continuity of urban centers and industrial activity in a region entirely devoid of renewable natural water resources.
A region engineered against its own limits
The Persian Gulf hosts the world’s largest desalination market, with roughly 3,401 operational plants – spanning major facilities, mid-scale reverse osmosis systems, and units embedded in industrial complexes.
Together, they produce more than 22 million cubic meters daily, accounting for nearly one-third of global output. The dependence is near total: Qatar relies on desalination for 99 percent of its water, Bahrain and Kuwait for 90 percent, Oman for 86 percent, and the UAE for 42 percent. Saudi Arabia depends on desalination for around 70 percent of its supply to major cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah.
These plants cluster along coastlines within range of Iranian missiles and drones, binding Gulf national security directly to the survival of these installations. Losing them would bring entire cities to a standstill.
Cities such as Dubai and Doha rely on uninterrupted water flow to sustain cooling systems in data centers and vast commercial complexes. A disruption lasting more than 48 hours would trigger economic and social fallout far beyond the capacity of local crisis management systems.
When water becomes a battlefield
Most desalination facilities in the Gulf operate through linear production systems, where damage to a single stage – high-pressure pumps or membrane units – halts the entire process.
Reports from the first week of the aggression pointed to damage at the Fujairah plant in the UAE and the Doha West plant in Kuwait caused by interceptor missile debris. Tehran accused Washington of striking a facility on Qeshm Island, while Manama blamed Iran for targeting a Bahraini plant. These incidents signal a potential shift toward targeting the infrastructure that sustains civilian life, raising the cost of war on every front.
These facilities are inherently difficult to defend. Their scale, exposure, and dependence on direct seawater intake limit hardening options. Protecting them demands extensive air defense resources, draining interceptor missile stockpiles in what is shaping into a prolonged war of attrition. A single drone breaching a central control unit could disable a plant serving one million people for weeks.
Energy and water: A single point of failure
Around 75 percent of Gulf desalination plants operate through cogeneration, tying water production directly to electricity generation. Any strike on gas supply networks or power stations would shut down water production without directly hitting desalination units.
This interdependence creates layered vulnerability: a single strike can knock out both electricity and water simultaneously.
It also complicates recovery. Destroyed transformers in desalination complexes require heavy, specialized imports – difficult to secure as maritime routes face disruption or ports come under fire. Restarting thermal plants after sudden shutdowns risks lasting damage to turbines and boilers due to abrupt shifts in temperature and pressure.
Desalination itself consumes enormous energy. Each cubic meter requires significant fuel or electricity input. As the US-Israeli assault enters its fifth week, Gulf energy sectors face mounting pressure to sustain domestic demand while maintaining export commitments.
The invisible war: Cyber frontlines
Modern desalination plants rely on complex digital control systems, opening a parallel battlefield in cyberspace. Iran has demonstrated advanced capability in targeting water and energy infrastructure through cyber operations.
Penetrating these systems allows attackers to halt production, damage internal components by altering rotation speeds or pressure, or manipulate chemical treatment levels – rendering water unsafe for consumption.
Cyberattacks are difficult to detect in real time and can cripple operations without visible destruction, complicating repairs and deepening confusion within crisis management structures. Operators are forced to allocate vast resources to cybersecurity, yet vulnerabilities persist due to globally integrated software and hardware supply chains.
Even minor software manipulation can trigger chemical imbalances, exposing populations to unsafe water before detection. Such attacks aim not only at infrastructure but at public confidence – weaponizing panic as part of hybrid warfare.
Pollution as a weapon of war
The Persian Gulf’s semi-enclosed nature makes it highly susceptible to rapid environmental contamination. Oil spills, whether deliberate or collateral, can shut down desalination plants by forcing the closure of intake points to protect sensitive membranes.
A repeat of 1991 – when Iraq released millions of barrels of oil into Gulf waters – would devastate modern reverse osmosis systems, which are far more sensitive to contamination than older thermal plants.
Strikes on Iranian coastal nuclear or petrochemical facilities could also trigger long-term radioactive or chemical pollution, rendering vast marine areas unusable and damaging ecosystems essential for natural filtration. The result would be higher treatment costs and sharply reduced equipment lifespans.
Protecting intake systems requires constant deployment of floating barriers and rapid response teams. In wartime, such operations face threats from naval mines or explosive-laden vessels. Disrupting the Jebel Ali complex in Dubai, for example, would sever water supply to a global commercial hub, triggering daily losses measured in billions of dollars.
Markets, capital, and the price of water insecurity
Threats to desalination infrastructure strike at the core of the Gulf economic model built on stability and predictability. Credit ratings hinge on the uninterrupted delivery of essential services to citizens and millions of expatriate workers.
Persistent threats to water systems drive up insurance premiums for industrial and coastal assets, raising the cost of doing business. The effects cascade: large real estate and industrial projects stall, foreign investment declines, and state budgets absorb the burden of emergency repairs and costly alternatives amid disrupted global supply chains.
Repeated attacks would accelerate capital flight toward more stable environments. Multinational corporations headquartered in Gulf cities will reassess expansion plans if water availability becomes uncertain. This places long-term economic transformation programs, including Saudi Vision 2030, under direct strain.
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Building resilience under fire
In response, Gulf states are moving to reinforce water resilience. Mobile desalination units – mounted on ships or trucks – offer temporary relief, though their output remains limited.
More strategic measures are underway. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing in aquifer storage, injecting surplus desalinated water underground. Abu Dhabi’s system, for instance, can supply up to 90 days of emergency demand. Underground storage provides protection that exposed reservoirs cannot.
More effective solutions include strategic investments by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in water storage through aquifer injection of surplus desalinated water. The Abu Dhabi project, for example, provides reserves sufficient for 90 days of emergency consumption. This method offers greater protection than exposed storage tanks, as geological layers naturally shield reserves.
Saudi Arabia is also advancing decentralization by promoting smaller, distributed desalination plants. This disperses risk, making system-wide disruption far more difficult.
Additional measures focus on efficiency: reducing water loss in networks and curbing consumption in agriculture and landscaping to extend reserves. Regional water interconnection may also emerge as a collective safeguard, enabling transfers between states if infrastructure remains intact.
Law, war, and impunity
International humanitarian law, particularly Article 54 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, classifies water facilities as indispensable to civilian survival and prohibits targeting them.
Yet US and Israeli practice routinely treats such infrastructure as legitimate targets under the pretext of dual use. This logic risks escalation as Iranian retaliation could place Gulf desalination plants directly in the line of fire, pushing the region toward a full-scale humanitarian crisis.
Supply chains and fragile systems
The continuation of aggression and disruption of maritime routes threatens routine maintenance across Gulf desalination plants, which depend on imported technology and components from western and Asian suppliers.
These facilities rely heavily on specialized expatriate labor. Rising security risks may drive technical staff to leave, leaving operations understaffed and increasing the likelihood of failures.
Critical chemicals – chlorine, anti-scalants, and others – require stable supply chains. Any disruption degrades water quality or forces shutdowns to protect infrastructure. Securing these materials becomes increasingly difficult under sustained bombardment, potentially forcing reliance on costly air transport.
Much of the Gulf’s desalination backbone is already tied to foreign – often Israeli – technology, embedding external leverage directly into the region’s most critical infrastructure.
Water will decide what survives
The desalination front now stands as the defining security challenge for Gulf states. The current war has exposed a central reality: military strength and oil wealth cannot compensate for the absence of water security.
In its aftermath, Gulf states are likely to overhaul water policy, accelerating the use of renewable energy – solar and wind – to decouple desalination from fossil fuels and centralized grids.
Future trajectories point toward nuclear-powered desalination for long-term stability, localized systems to reduce dependence on centralized networks, expanded cyber and physical defenses for water infrastructure, and regional coordination for collective crisis response.
Water – not oil – will ultimately determine whether Gulf states can endure prolonged conflict, recover from systemic shocks, and maintain their position within the global economic order.
Without it, every development project, every city, and every economic vision risks collapse at the first sustained strike.
