
People bathing in the ocean against the backdrop of an oil tanker moored at the El Palito refinery complex, in Carabobo state of Venezuela. Photo: JesĂşs Vargas/Getty Images.

Orinoco Tribune – News and opinion pieces about Venezuela and beyond
From Venezuela and made by Venezuelan Chavistas

People bathing in the ocean against the backdrop of an oil tanker moored at the El Palito refinery complex, in Carabobo state of Venezuela. Photo: JesĂşs Vargas/Getty Images.
By MisiĂłn Verdad – Feb 20, 2026
In recent weeks, a narrative has gained traction in certain media spaces: the supposed resumption of direct oil trade by Venezuela to “Israel.” The narrative seeks to plant an image of ideological incoherence shattered by economic interests. However, a detailed analysis of the current dynamics of the oil market, marked by a complex web of licenses, intermediaries, and logistical bottlenecks in the United States, reveals a much more nuanced reality.
The supposed presence of Venezuelan crude in destinations like “Israel” is not the result of a sovereign decision by the Venezuelan state oil company PetrĂłleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), but rather an indirect consequence of the reconfiguration of the global energy market orchestrated by Washington.
Logistical bottleneck and rearrangement in the Gulf of Mexico
The reintegration of Venezuelan oil into the US market has caused an unexpected congestion in the refining infrastructure of the Gulf of Mexico. According to secondary OPEC sources, Venezuelan production stood at 830,000 barrels per day in Januaryâa figure not seen since May 2024 and representing a drop from the 917,000 barrels per day in Decemberâbegan to shift toward US refineries that had not processed Venezuelan heavy crude for years due to sanctions imposed by Trump himself between 2017 and 2019.
Valero Energy Corporation has emerged as the most aggressive player in this scenario. The company, which owns the second-largest US refining network capable of processing Venezuelan heavy crude, plans to import 6.5 million barrels in March, equivalent to approximately 210,000 barrels per day. This figure would represent the largest volume processed by the company since the beginning of the US oil sanctions against Venezuela, and could position Valero above Chevron as the leading refiner of Venezuelan crude in US territory.
During the company’s fourth quarter 2025 earnings call, Valero’s vice president of Crude Supply and Trading, Randy Hawkins, confirmed that the company was in negotiations with authorized Venezuelan crude sellers, anticipating that this would constitute a “pretty large part” of its heavy crude purchases during February and March. The company has taken advantage of reported discounts close to $9 per barrel compared to Brent, boosting refining margins that were already showing a significant recovery: in the fourth quarter of 2025, Valero reported operating income of $1.6 billion, compared to $348 million the previous year.
However, this sudden influx of heavy crude has saturated the region’s logistical capacities. The Gulf Coast refineries, designed to process a diversity of crudes, now face an imbalance between the available supply and their internal storage and transportation capacities. Canadian heavy crude, which traditionally competed with Venezuelan crude for space in these facilities, began trading at discounts of $11-11.50 below Brent on the Gulf Coast, approximately $4 cheaper than the average for the fourth quarter of 2025.
This logistical pressure has forced trading companies to diversify their export destinations, not by PDVSA’s decision, but due to the physical impossibility of absorbing additional volumes in the US market.
Vitol and Trafigura, the two main trading companies that obtained special licenses from the US Treasury to market Venezuelan crude, after the meeting with Trump at the White House, have begun offering shipments to refiners in China and India for deliveries in March. Trafigura CEO Richard Holtum told Trump during a meeting at the White House that the company was working “to bring that Venezuelan oil to the United States,” adding that the first ship “should load next week.”
Other giants like Phillips 66 and Citgo have also applied for authorizations to buy crude oil directly from Venezuela, trying to secure raw materials for their refining complexes.
Diversification of clients versus disinformation
The mechanism imposed by Washington for the marketing of Venezuelan crude oil has transferred operational control from PDVSA to private intermediaries under US supervision. Vitol and Trafigura not only facilitate logistics but also determine the final destinations of the shipments.
This structure has generated a complex network of resales that disconnects the Venezuelan State from the final commercial decisions. US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright confirmed during his visit to Caracas on February 11 that “China has already purchased part of the crude oil that has been sold by the US government,” without specifying volumes or commercial conditions. This statement shows that Venezuelan crude is being redirected to Asian markets as a result of the authorized commercial strategy for the trading houses.
In this context, Bloomberg’s report on February 10 about a supposed shipment of Venezuelan crude oil to Israel should be analyzed with caution. The information, attributed to anonymous “people with knowledge of the agreement”, suggested that approximately 200,000 barrels of the cargo transported by the ship Poliegos (IMO 9746621)âinitially destined for the port of Sarroch in Sardinia, Italyâhad been redirected to the Haifa refinery operated by the Bazan group.
The Venezuelan government, through the Minister of Communication Miguel Ăngel PĂŠrez Pirela, called the report “false” and “manufactured disinformation.” The official denial is framed within the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, made in 2009 under the presidency of Commander Hugo ChĂĄvez, and is part of the history of Venezuelan solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Sources consulted by Telesur emphasized that there are no official shipping records or government confirmations to support the Bloomberg story.
The ambiguity of the case lies in the inherent opacity of maritime oil trade. “Israel” does not publicly disclose its crude suppliers, and tankers frequently disappear from digital tracking systems near Israeli ports, as acknowledged by Bloomberg itself. The Bazan group declined to comment on the alleged shipment, while the Israeli Ministry of Energy maintained its policy of not revealing supply sources, according to Latin Times.
What is evident is that, if the shipment to “Israel” really took place, the decision did not emanate from PDVSA or the Venezuelan state, but from the commercial chain controlled by Vitolâmajority shareholder of the Sarroch refineryâand subject to the authorization of the US Department of the Treasury. General License 48, issued on February 10 by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), explicitly prohibits transactions with Russian, Iranian, North Korean, Cuban, and Chinese entities, but does not impose restrictions on shipments to “Israel,” allowing trading houses the freedom to determine destinations within the Western bloc.
Perspectives and changes in the dynamics of the global oil market
The reconfiguration of Venezuelan oil trade “under US supervision” raises fundamental questions about Venezuela’s energy sovereignty and commercial autonomy. Wright has declared that US control over Venezuelan oil exports will be maintained for an “indefinite” period, conditioning the access of Venezuelan authorities to oil revenues on the submission of “budget requests” subject to Washington’s approval.
To date, the revenues generated by this scheme show a significant gap compared to the initial projections. While President Trump announced in January a landmark deal for $2 billion corresponding to 30-50 million barrels, US officials confirmed only $500 million deposited in accounts controlled by the US Treasury in Qatar, with an additional $300 million expected in February. Trump has publicly declared that the United States “will keep a part” of this income, without specifying percentages or distribution mechanisms.
PDVSA, for its part, has adopted a defensive stance toward the new commercial architecture. Some sources indicate that the state-owned company refuses to sell directly to companies that do not possess individual licenses from the US Treasury, maintaining a cautious position amid regulatory uncertainty. This, however, is marginal in a context where marketing decisions have effectively been outsourced to Vitol and Trafigura.
The underlying US geopolitical strategy aims to contain Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. Some analysts, such as Igor Collazos, interpret OFAC’s License 48 as a “territory marking” operation by Washington, designed to consolidate areas of influence in a “final phase of the game to confine China outside the Western Hemisphere.” During his visit to the Orinoco Oil Belt, Wright said that the cooperation between US companies and Venezuelan resources has no limits, in a statement that underscores the strategic nature of the oil relationship.
For global markets, the partial reintegration of Venezuelan crude represents both an opportunity and a source of uncertainty. India has emerged as a potential beneficiary of the redirection of flows, with state companies like Indian Oil and Hindustan Petroleum joining the private Reliance Industries to acquire 2 million barrels of Merey crude in the coming weeks. This realignment could put pressure on the markets for Russian heavy crude and West Asian crude, traditional suppliers to the Indian refining industry.
Venezuelan production, which reached one million barrels per day in February according to Wright’s statements, still faces severe structural limitations. Despite legislative reforms that reduce taxes and royalties for private investors, the oil infrastructure requires massive investments that US corporations, according to ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods, consider premature as long as the country remains “uninvestable” from a political risk perspective.
In this scenario, the narrative about direct exports from Venezuela to Israel serves as disinformation for an agenda of political destabilization agenda rather than a trade reality. The absence of Venezuelan control over the final destinations of crude oil, the deliberate opacity of maritime trade, and the mandatory intermediation through trading houses authorized by Washington shape a market where destination decisions obey calculations of corporate margins and US geopolitical strategies, not sovereign foreign policies of countries.
The Venezuelan government’s denunciation of Bloomberg’s report as a “fabricated news” should be understood not only as a factual assertion but also as a reaffirmation of diplomatic principles that the new externally imposed trade structure puts at risk.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/SC/DZ