A person waves the Venezuelan flag in a Caracas street. Photo: Alex Dos Santos/Pexels/file photo.
By Misión Verdad – Jun 12, 2026
Venezuela’s reality after January 3 does not leave room for binary or moralizing interpretations. It is, above all, a scenario of State survival in which power, coercion, and pragmatic adaptation redefine the rules of the game.
To understand this reconfiguration, Hans Morgenthau’s political realism offers an irreplaceable framework: his work argues that realism “is aware of the moral significance of political action… [but] universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation… they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.”
According to this premise, the central obligation of a head of State is to protect the survival and vital interests of their State, which frequently forces them to prioritize pragmatic decisions over ideological postulates. Actions must be calibrated according to threats, available resources, and specific circumstances. Morgenthau formulated it as his third principle of realism: the national interest in preserving sovereignty and continuity of the State is permanent, but its expressions are dynamic and transform with each change of power.
The factors that govern the actions of the Venezuelan government, the reorientation of US strategy, and the retreat of the opposition are manifestations of a classic logic: the national interest in survival is permanent, but its forms change according to the balance of power.
The keys to understanding Venezuela’s complex reality are also being reconfigured in line with the restructuring the country is experiencing following the US military invasion of January 3. The conceptual framework and system of factors that have shaped Acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s government’s decisions have been characterized by elasticity and pragmatism, clearly conditioned by the context. To understand this dynamic, it is necessary to observe not only Caracas but also the actors and forces that interact on the scene.
The US: from maximum pressure to transnational positioning
Between 2014 and 2026, Washington implemented a structured process of economic suffocation on Venezuela at various levels of intensity. However, by 2025, that model of strangulation took on a concrete physical dimension: a de facto naval blockade, secondary sanctions, and military deployment in the Caribbean. At the beginning of 2026, this culminated in an unprecedented operation that included the kidnapping and forced transfer of President Nicolás Maduro to the United States.
The threat was perceived as widespread and of a greater magnitude than the previous decade, which had already claimed thousands of lives due to the collapse of public services and caused immense economic hardships and mass migration. However, the materialization of the military option fundamentally changed expectations from past years. The logic of “maximum pressure” incorporated the criminalization of Chavista leadership under labels such as “Cartel de los Soles” or “Tren de Aragua,” and the characterization of Venezuela as a “hemispheric threat.” These classifications created a case that legitimized, even in its unipolar imprint, a multidimensional siege.
What happened on January 3 represented the most significant military action in the region in a century, due to the scale and the hardware deployed. Venezuela was tactically outmaneuvered. Washington initially informed the Venezuelan government of President Maduro’s death and presented a simple choice: negotiate or face institutional annihilation. Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez, Vladimir Padrino López, and Diosdado Cabello declared themselves willing to face the same fate, but once President Maduro was confirmed alive, the path to negotiation opened.
Since then, the narrative criminalizing the Venezuelan government has faded. Washington sits at the table with the same actors it labeled as “narco-terrorists” just months ago. In terms of facts, it has backpedalled on its own discourse and recognizes Chavismo as an objective reality; it even presents it as a case of successful political management. Venezuelan oil, previously immobilized in anchorages, is once again flowing to the United States and other markets, a fact that helps stabilize a global landscape convulsed by the US-generated crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
There has been no regime change, although Washington has reiterated its desire for “regime change”—two concepts that are not equivalent. For the Trump administration, control of Venezuelan oil serves a threefold purpose: to shape the new political direction in Caracas, to secure a tangible economic return, and to modulate the reaction of extra-hemispheric powers that have been reactive since January.
Far from promoting a conventional democratic transition, a scheme of strategic oversight is emerging in which access, extraction, and commercialization of oil serves as the main mechanism of political pressure. Trump’s statements about Venezuela are largely performative: they are aimed at his electoral base, which feared a “new Iraq” in the Caribbean, and not at the Venezuelan population. The US president uses the case as an example of foreign policy achievements.
The White House likely considers that a deepening of direct intervention would jeopardize the current status quo. An occupation or direct administration of Venezuela would be costly and politically unsustainable. It therefore prefers to maneuver the situation and maintain pressure mediated by licenses that, unfortunately for Venezuela, subordinate its foreign trade to the US Treasury Department as an intermediary and supervisor of the flow of resources.
The Venezuelan opposition: fragmentation and loss of agency
For years, the anti-Chavista opposition has remained fragmented into competing blocs, platforms, and leaderships. There is no unified opposition; rather, multiple sectors with divergent agendas and tactics.
Despite representing a significant sector of the opposition, María Corina Machado was one of the first political figures neutralized after January 3, the same day Delcy Rodríguez assumed the interim presidency. The Trump administration marginalized Machado and her platform; neither the Nobel Peace Prize nor her concession to the US president compensated for the loss of operational relevance. The inability of this sector to lead power structures in Venezuela was exposed, as it did not fit Washington’s premise of ensuring institutional stability and governance at a critical moment.
Edmundo González, self-proclaimed president-elect, has withdrawn from the political game. He has renounced his aspiration for a presidential “mandate,” in contradiction with the discourse from his sector since July 2024. The far-right opposition’s trajectory has been complex and contradictory: Machado has repeatedly announced her return to Venezuela, but Washington conditions her movement. She has demanded presidential elections in the short term, yet figures like Marco Rubio have deferred that possibility by outlining an extensive and gradual three-phase process.
Some opposition leaders met in Panama, declared the political end of González, and reaffirmed their support for Machado. They announced a “negotiation” with Chavismo under US sponsorship. However, the Venezuelan government has already ruled out that channel, and United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) Vice President Diosdado Cabello has indicated that no dialogue is currently planned with that sector.
The opposition’s political horizon is diffuse. Today, it is the big loser of the strategic realignment. As the transactional relationship between Caracas and Washington consolidates and the control of oil revenues through licenses and accounts supervised in the US becomes institutionalized, the opposition’s ability to exert power has become null.
This is the direct consequence of the opposition having delegated its leadership, resources, and narrative to the US government for years. External interference, which should have served as a lever for strengthening, instead accelerated systemic, organic, and endogenous weakening of the opposition sectors. They are trapped in a political vacuum, unable to force a transition and forced to accept the rules imposed by actors with territorial and financial control.
Washington views the Venezuelan transition as an ongoing process that involves regaining influence and repositioning its presence in the country, which it has eroded with isolation. From Caracas, there is no subordination but rather tense dynamics, practical and negotiated according to the scenario.
The Venezuelan government understands the transition as a repositioning for survival: managing pressure, building pragmatic agreements on both internal and international fronts, and opening a new political stage. A sector of the opposition views the transition as a change of government that hands power to María Corina Machado. However, it lacks real influence and structure to promote that possibility.
The dissonance between these three visions is enormous. In the short term, actors with the ability to effectively influence power dynamics will prevail. The oppositions are on the table, but as part of the menu.
The Venezuelan government: adaptation, pragmatism, and reconfiguration of Chavismo
The Venezuelan government’s leadership has taken a stance of adaptation and assimilation in the current context. It recognizes the existing economic, political, and military asymmetries and deals with Washington from a disadvantageous but not passive position.
There is a transition, yes, but a transition of Chavismo within itself. It has happened before: in 2006, with the proclamation of the socialist nature of the Bolivarian Revolution; in 2013, after the death of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro’s arrival at the presidency; and in 2018, when the blockade forced structural economic reforms. In 2026, Chavismo is transitioning again, with the fundamental purposes of survival and existence.
The Chavista power structure remains almost intact in its leadership ranks, positions of leadership, and institutional cohesion. It exercises formal power, concentrates the country’s greatest economic weight, and maintains a base of social mobilization. Chavismo governs Venezuela in material and existential dimensions.
However, it faces the asymmetry of direct financial pressure: the licenses condition the flow of income in a clear violation of economic sovereignty. Even so, it endures the situation by negotiating more flexible licenses and openly demanding the lifting of sanctions as a guarantee to regain financial autonomy.
The government understands that it can preserve the physical survival of the Bolivarian Republic, protect the country from direct aggression, maintain control of the State, promote national cohesion, sustain internal peace, and avoid definitive collapse through pragmatic management. These premises ultimately protect the population.
From this approach, new margins of maneuver emerge: oil production and associated revenues increase; the economy shows signs of reactivation with greater momentum; new investments come; and an improvement in Venezuela’s international position is projected. The government grants specific oil concessions that operate as incentives and points of alignment with Washington. Sectors such as mining, commercial aviation, financial services, and light industry are regaining relevance or returning to their pre-2017 operations.
The government is also making progress on pending measures that were postponed in recent years due to uncertainty or strategic deferral, including the complex process of reforming the justice system and certain economic decisions.
Caracas is not limiting itself to demanding the end of the sanctions. It is allowing the entry of US and European companies because, once established, they are presumed to become active factors in improving the business climate, even if disrupted by licensing burdens. Chavismo understands that the economic lobby defines a large part of the decisions in Washington.
If the US strategy is to reposition itself in Venezuela through investments, it does so to regain the ground it lost by issuing coercive measures against the country. To avoid failure and ensure that investments are substantial and sustainable, it must gradually dismantle the sanctions framework. The Venezuelan leadership has clarity about this dynamic in the White House.
Part of the Venezuelan leadership’s bet is on regaining full autonomy over the flow of oil resources. The money held in US accounts, subject to US discretion, has become a matter of high political risk. That control mechanism, although auditable—and even audited by a firm contracted by Venezuela—is unsustainable in the medium term, exposing US managers to internal political costs if irregularities are detected. In addition, the oil sector requires timely cash flows to sustain operations and develop activities. Caracas knows this and is managing it with strategic patience.
Phrases used by Chavismo, such as “buying time,” “preserving the republic,” or “resisting,” share a common core: survival. This acquires a concrete quality in the nation-state as a sociocultural entity, its territorial integrity, and its population.
From that cardinal point, decisions must be calibrated according to threats, resources, and current circumstances. They are, in essence, Morgenthau’s premises applied to a high-tension scenario.
However, the horizon is not clear. The future of President Maduro, detained and prosecuted, remains uncertain. Although the Venezuelan government managed to secure Washington approval to fund Maduro’s defense by a top-tier legal team in the United States, the judicial and political outcome is yet to be defined, and it does not seem likely to be resolved in the short term.
The internal scenario is also under scrutiny: Chavismo’s ability to adapt to an unprecedented, difficult-to-read context is being evaluated. In Venezuela, events are outpacing the available analytical frameworks. Therefore, any premature conclusion will be incomplete and vulnerable to errors.
The game involves bets, incentives, risks, and unavoidable costs. The Venezuelan government understands this and continues to identify factors within Washington’s centers of power that threaten its survival and seek to replace it. This has not changed.
The current functional but fragile balance is not permanent. The structure that currently underpins the status quo will evolve in step with each party’s aspirations, errors, and readjustments. It is exposed to shocks and new factors of complexity.
Eventually, Washington will try to push for an electoral calendar and seek an institutional exit for Chavismo, but the transition to that point is also uncertain.
What exists today is an open ending in which each contestant exerts its weight, power, and its ability to administer reality.
For the Venezuelan government, the premises of political realism—according to Morgenthau—take on a meaning of their own. They serve as guidelines for taking extraordinary action in extraordinary circumstances, adapted to the specific conditions of time, place, and available resources.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/SC/SF
Misión Verdad
Misión Verdad is a Venezuelan investigative journalism website with a socialist perspective in defense of the Bolivarian Revolution
