US President Donald Trump walks with leaders to the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in the Saudi capital Riyadh, May 14, 2025. Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP.
By Walid Charara – May 16, 2025
The dominant political and media discourse surrounding President Trump’s Gulf tour—punctuated by statements from both him and his hosts, massive trade deals and economic partnerships, and the lifting of sanctions, particularly on Syria—has fostered the impression that the Middle East is undergoing a genuinely “historic” transformation. At the heart of this transformation lies a grand reengineering of the region’s structure and power dynamics, orchestrated by the US and its allies.
This narrative gained further traction with Trump’s reference to the “birth of a modern Middle East,” though he was quick to stress that the change had been driven “by the people of the region themselves.” This calculated distinction was intended to distance his policies from previous failed neoconservative attempts to reshape the region by force and external intervention, which Trump continues to condemn.
Trump appears clearly satisfied with the Israeli blows to resistance forces in Gaza and Lebanon and their broader regional impact, notably the accelerated collapse of Assad’s regime and the perceived reduction of Iran’s regional influence. However, his decision to halt aggression against Yemen in exchange for a commitment from the Yemeni Armed Forces not to target US vessels, while still permitting continued attacks on Israel, underscores Trump’s direct involvement in actively shaping a new regional order.
Trump has effectively granted Netanyahu freedom of action in Gaza, Lebanon, and possibly even Syria. Nevertheless, he draws the line at authorizing a full-scale military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities, knowing that such an escalation would ignite a devastating regional war, that the US would inevitably be dragged into. Major wars contradict Trump’s broader foreign policy shift toward “managing retreat” rather than “restoring greatness”. He believes that the United States no longer has the capacity to wage or engage in prolonged wars or confrontations, particularly against global rivals like Russia and China. So far, the presence of hardliners within his administration has not yet altered this strategic direction.
Trump’s Gulf tour comes amid ongoing global power shifts largely unfavorable to the United States.. More than three years into NATO’s proxy war in Ukraine, it’s evident that Russia has emerged with the upper hand, despite heavy human and material costs. Russia successfully blocked NATO from achieving its primary objectives, notably expelling Russian forces from eastern Ukraine, despite NATO’s direct involvement and extensive military and financial support to Kyiv. Trump has concluded that reaching a settlement with Russia isn’t merely desirable but strategically imperative.
Furthermore, containing China’s rise remains Trump’s top strategic concern, as it has been for his predecessors since Obama’s second term. Yet, Beijing’s rapid expansion across economic, commercial, military, and political domains continues unabated. China’s growing influence and network of partnerships now extend deep into regions once firmly within Washington’s orbit—from the Gulf and Turkey to Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even parts of Europe.
In his first term, Trump placed his bets on the doctrine of “strategic competition” with Russia and China, outlined in the 2018 National Security Strategy, hoping it would enable containment. Recent developments have seriously undermined this assumption. Some observers, including political scientist Stacie Goddard in her Foreign Affairs article “The Rise and Fall of Great Power Competition”, argue Trump has quietly abandoned competition in favor of a revived version of the 19th-century “concert of nations”, a model based on cooperation among major powers. This shift is evident in Trump’s pursuit of settlements with Russia and his recent 90-day tariff agreement with China. Trump’s rhetoric has also evolved from labeling Russia and China as authoritarian threats to engaging with them for mutual interests and the common good.
Of course, none of this suggests that great power competition or its possible resurgence will come to an end in the future. Still,Trump’s current stance indicates a preference to reduce tensions, even if that means informally recognizing rival powers’ spheres of influence, so long as they reciprocate by respecting US’s own.
This approach, reminiscent of colonial-era agreements between European empires two centuries ago, overlooks the reality that today’s so-called spheres of influence are not colonies but possess agency, actively seeking to diversify their partnerships beyond dependence on a single dominant power.
What does this mean for our region? Trump’s priority is clearly deal-making and profit. Redesigning the Middle East isn’t his focus. His easing of sanctions on Syria aims to pull Damascus closer to the US sphere of influence. However, fully lifting severe sanctions, such as those under the Caesar Act, depends on uncertain congressional approval. Moreover, conditions reportedly set for supporting Syria’s new leadership, including normalization with Israel, could have dangerous domestic repercussions if accepted.
Perhaps most troubling is Trump’s failure to recognize that his continued support for Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza and unchecked aggression across the region is deepening tensions, alienating allies, and igniting crises that he and his ill-informed, ill-equipped advisers are wholly unprepared to contain.
