Stepan Bandera’s Sinister MI6 Alliance Exposed

March 23, 2025 – By Kit Klarenberg

March 17 marked the 80th anniversary of the creation of the Ukrainian National Committee. With the Red Army rapidly advancing on Berlin, Nazi officials released Ukrainian ultranationalist military units from their command, and recognised the Committee – and a newly-formed National Army under its control – as the legitimate government of Ukraine. It was hoped the UNC would continue Hitler’s crusade against the Soviet Union following Berlin’s rapidly impending defeat in World War II, which occurred two months later.

The UNC’s establishment was eagerly supported by notorious Ukrainian ultranationalist Stepan Bandera, founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), two ultranationalist factions heavily complicit in the Holocaust. As the mainstream media has acknowledged, his legacy endures in modern Ukraine, in the form of Neo-Nazi military units such as Azov Regiment, and he remains a much-celebrated figure in certain quarters of the country—much to the chagrin of Kiev’s Eastern European neighbours.

Bandera believed Nazi Germany’s UNC recognition would encourage American and British backing for OUN-B’s anti-Communist crusade, and Ukrainian independence. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), which the OUN-B was instrumental in founding in 1944, was already in covert contact with London and Washington. As it was, no such formal support ever came to pass. Yet, little-known declassified CIA records expose the malign contours of a long-running conspiracy between Bandera and MI6 to destabilize the Soviet Union during the Cold War’s initial years.

This dark handshake only expired because MI6’s fascist asset was resistant to joining forces with other Ukrainian anti-Communist forces, therefore jeopardising plans by Washington and London for all-out war with Moscow in Donbass. That plot, intended to ultimately collapse the entire USSR, has eerie, direct echoes of the current Ukraine proxy war. So too Britain’s willingness, then and now, to go far further than the US in building alliances with the most reactionary, dangerous Ukrainian ultranationalist elements, in service of balkanising Russia.

Bandit type
MI6’s post-war relationship with Bandera began while he was exiled in post-war Munich, West Germany in 1948, via Gerhard von Mende. An ethnic German hailing from Riga, Latvia, von Mende has been described as an “enthusiastic Nazi” who headed Berlin’s Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territory, or Ostministerium. Among other connivances, von Mende was charged with recruiting fifth columnists from the USSR’s Central Asian republics, to undermine and attack Communist authorities. He has been credited with influencing subsequent British and American support for Islamic extremism.

Per a declassified CIA biography, after Nazi Germany’s defeat, von Mende was “interned as a ‘guest’” at the Agency’s Camp King, where Nazi officials and soldiers were interrogated and tortured. In some cases, inmates were unwittingly dosed with LSD under PROJECT BLUEBIRD, a forerunner of the CIA’s notorious MKULTRA mind control program. Subsequently, von Mende became an asset for West Germany’s Nazi-riddled BND, the CIA, and MI6, continuing to recruit anti-Communist assets in the USSR via a front company.

Through this position, von Mende was kept abreast of UPA activities and capabilities, and maintained an intimate personal relationship with Bandera. The Ukrainian fascist ideologue’s thuggish West German network was by then hard at work killing hundreds of local citizens suspected by the CIA and MI6 of harboring Communist sympathies. While the OUN-B chief’s “ask” of British intelligence was initially judged too high, that perspective rapidly changed. By 1949, MI6 was helping Bandera airdrop his chaos agents into Ukraine.

A year later, Britain’s foreign spy agency began formally training these operatives to gather intelligence and carry out sabotage and assassinations on Soviet soil. This sinister compact was established despite stern CIA and State Department opposition. The Agency considered UHVR, which by this point had cut ties with Bandera’s murderous ultranationalist mob, a far more palatable alternative. The group was now led by Ukrainian-Greek Catholic priest Ivan Hrinioch, a “longtime CIA asset”, and former high ranking OUN-B operative Mykola Lebed.

During World War II, Lebed oversaw the UPA’s massacre of tens of thousands of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. However, he subsequently disavowed this genocidal carnage, and led UHVR’s push to unite Ukrainian emigres, who had fractured due to bloody, internecine squabbles towards the conflict’s end. Under the auspices of Operation AERODYNAMIC, for decades the CIA exploited UHVR to foment “nationalist flare-ups” throughout the Soviet Union, “particularly” in Ukraine, and “encourage divisive manifestations among” the population, to “exert pressure on the Soviet regime.”

By this time, Bandera had fallen out of favour with many Ukrainian nationalists more generally, even renounced by what remained of OUN-B’s Kiev-based leadership. This, his genocidal past, and overt anti-US actions and statements due to Washington’s refusal to publicly advocate for Ukrainian independence, all deterred the CIA from employing him. MI6 was unperturbed however, and pushed ahead with its Bandera operations. This created a ludicrous situation, with London and Washington supporting bitterly antagonistic Ukrainian nationalist factions, which frequently undermined and attacked each other.

As a British intelligence memo on “the crisis over Bandera” noted, by 1950 Ukrainian nationalist leaders had “become aware of the fact that the British and Americans were backing rival groups,” putting the agencies’ joint anti-Soviet projects at risk. It was decided to dispatch a cosigned message to UPA headquarters via Ukrainian CIA and MI6 agents parachuted into Lviv, calling for an end to “present disagreements” between opposing nationalist factions, which London and Washington professed to “deplore” and hoped “may be resolved.”

It signed off with the now-infamous, Bandera-coined nationalist slogan, “Glory to the Ukraine” (“Slava Ukraini”). The memo’s MI6 author moreover recalled an in-person meeting he had with Bandera in London. The spy described him thus:

The MI6 operative cheerfully added that genocidal mass murderer Bandera was “no better and no worse than others of his kind I have had dealings with in the past,” and “genuinely grateful for the help given to him” by British intelligence, “but at the same time is certainly trying to get all he can out of it.” The CIA begged to differ however, commissioning a study of London and Washington’s conflicting positions on the “Ukrainian underground” and Bandera, and how to resolve this divergence.

Political overtones
An ensuing appraisal repeatedly declared Bandera and OUN-B to be “completely unacceptable” to the CIA, “both from the political and the operational standpoints.” It proposed the Agency and MI6 take joint ownership of the UHVR and its anti-Soviet wrecking project in Ukraine, and “exchange political, operational and intelligence data resulting from these operations.” Meanwhile, the CIA would “take independent action to neutralize” OUN-B’s “present leadership”, including Bandera himself. It’s unknown if this was pitched to MI6, although London’s steadfast opposition was inevitable.

The “British position”, as described in the study, was Bandera’s “importance” had been serially “underestimated by the Americans, as a rallying symbol in the Ukraine, as leader of a large emigre group [and] as a leader favored by the homeland headquarters.” This didn’t tally with the reality on-the-ground as detected by the CIA, but MI6 had a vested interest in maintaining the fascist demagogue as an agent. An April 1951 Agency memo summarizing recent “talks” with British intelligence “on operations against the USSR” noted:

By contrast, the CIA observed Soviet authorities “had been successful to a remarkable degree in transforming the mentality of the younger generation” of Ukrainians, resulting in them vehemently rejecting Bandera and his brand of rabid nationalism. While the Agency therefore favoured “political neutralization of Bandera as an individual”, MI6 balked, as this “would lead to a drying up of recruits” and “disrupt British operations.” However, the declassified papertrail shows London eventually tired of their fascist asset.

In February 1954, a senior MI6 official who led liaison with OUN-B for two decades made a “final attempt to bring Bandera to reason” in London, due to the genocidaire’s refusal to reconcile and unite with opposing Ukrainian nationalist elements. The high-ranking British spook offered him “one last chance” to make amends with émigré leaders. Bandera “refused this suggestion with arrogant finality,” thus making “the break” between Bandera and MI6 “complete.”

All British intelligence-run Ukrainian agents who remained loyal to Bandera were duly jettisoned. MI6 informed other nationalist leaders the agency “would not resume” its relationship with him “under any circumstances.” Bandera remained exiled in Munich, and continued to run belligerent cloak-and-dagger operations against the Soviet Union, while ratcheting up his anti-Western rhetoric. The CIA and MI6 viewed these activities as a significant problem, with no obvious solution.

As CIA records of a January 1955 “joint US-UK conference” put it, despite the “unanimous desire” of British and American intelligence to “‘quiet’ Bandera,” it was equally vital the KGB was “not allowed to kidnap or kill him.” This could make Bandera “a martyr” among Ukrainian ultranationalists, a prospect to be avoided if at all possible. Hence, London and Washington kept him alive and well, while permitting West Germany’s BND to run him as an agent. Their old friend Gerhard von Mende was his handler.

West German authorities wished to punish Bandera and his in-country network for crimes including kidnapping, but von Mende consistently intervened to insulate his compatriot from prosecution. A July 1959 CIA report noted the BND’s use of Bandera was such a “closely held” secret within the agency, it wasn’t even formally cleared with the West German government, “due to political overtones.” Despite this omertà, the BND moved to secure Bandera a US visa.

It was hoped he would connect with Ukrainian emigres stateside, while ingratiating himself with the CIA and State Department. Per an October 5th 1959 Agency memo, the BND believed “it should be a simple matter” for the CIA “to influence the issuing of a visa” for Bandera, as “many less desirable and less ‘exploitable’ individuals” had already visited the country via Agency assistance. A formal request was resultantly submitted to Washington. Just 10 days later though, the KGB assassinated Bandera in Munich.

Despite their mutual wish Bandera not be “martyred” by Soviet intelligence, it is likely the CIA and MI6 breathed a collective sigh of relief upon news of his death. The OUN-B and UPA founder’s destabilising, disruptive influence within the Ukrainian anti-Communist underground was a significant impediment to Anglo-American spying agencies implementing a far grander plan than any they had hitherto tried. Namely, fomenting all-out war against the Soviet Union, using Ukrainians as footsoldiers.

This is the first instalment of a two-part investigation. Stay tuned.

 

 

(Kit Klarenberg)