Venezuela: Five Coup Attempts by Opposition Foiled in 2019
By Marco Teruggi – December 30, 2019
Five major violent right-wing operations in Venezuela were put out of commission in 2019. That explains, in part, why the country is ending the year with a tranquility that many find surprising. The last major operation was supposed to take place Dec. 15.
No one could have known at the beginning of 2019 how the year would end. Juan GuaidĂł had proclaimed himself âpresidentâ of Venezuela in an operation created and publicly supported by the U.S. under President Donald Trump. The country appeared to be heading for a violent confrontation with no end in sight.
That forecast was sold to the entire world with a campaign of media engineering by many âanalystsâ whose predictions were full of errors. There are only a few days left until the end of the year, and Venezuela maintains a tranquility on the surface that surprises anyone who walks through the countryâs streets: The opposition is no longer mobilizing. Chavismo has conserved its normal ability to deploy its forces, and a majority of the population is thinking about how to make the holidays a celebration.
Why didnât the plan for a swift GuaidĂł-led coup work out? In large measure, it was because the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and the central core of Chavista political power were not broken.
Another reason is that at least five violent actions that were supposed to bring the coup forces victory failed â two of which had been put in motion and three of which were deactivated before they could take place. The last one was supposed to happen on Dec. 15 with attacks on several military units.
Feb. 23: First coup attempt flopped
The first major action occurred Feb. 23, the day which marked the high point of the accumulation of forces for the national and international bloc of conspirators. GuaidĂł had proclaimed himself âpresidentâ Jan. 23, exactly one month before the so-called âtrucks with humanitarian aidâ were to enter Venezuela by force from the city of CĂșcuta in Colombia.
The coup [presented as a âreality showâ] on the border featured fireworks and a million-dollar concert with singers, including Maluma and Carlos Vives. There was also a meeting attended by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, Colombian President IvĂĄn Duque, Chilean President SebastiĂĄn Piñera and Paraguayan President Mario Abdo BenĂtez.
The operationâs collapse was as great as its buildup. The trucks failed to cross into Venezuela. The shock troops set two semitrailers on fire on one of the cross-border bridges. Everything was captured [on camera] by the corporate media and witnessed by the governments of the region, the U.S. and Europe.
The meeting of the Lima Group in BogotĂĄ that followed the events of Feb. 23 proved that the promise of the Venezuelan right wing had turned out to be a fraud and that no one heeded the speeches of GuaidĂł or Julio Borges, a fugitive from Venezuelan justice who had called for an escalation with international intervention.
April 30: Oppositionâs stunt failed
On the morning of April 30, the country was surprised by a video broadcast by GuaidĂł and Leopoldo LĂłpez, leader of Popular Will, the party of the self-proclaimed âpresident,â and a small group of military personnel with weapons in hand. In the video, they claimed to be at the La Carlota military base in the heart of Caracas and called on the military forces and the people to support them.
It quickly became known that the video was recorded on the outskirts of La Carlota and that, in fact, the military base had never been taken. The impact of the stunt led by LĂłpez, who had recently escaped from house arrest, was short-lived.
The coup perpetrators had two key problems: No sector of the FANB joined them, and the response from their supporters in the streets was small. Without weapons and without people, the attempt at an uprising merely turned into an escape for the protagonists, like LĂłpez. He was received at the Spanish Embassy, where he still remains. Another instigator, Christopher Figuera, head of the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN), escaped to Colombia and then to the U.S.
June 23: Third plot thwarted
The third major action was supposed to take place June 23 to 24. Venezuelaâs Minister of Communication Jorge RodrĂguez unveiled the dismantled plan on national television on June 26. He said, âWe had been monitoring all these operations for 14 months, all of the people involved in conspiratorial acts, riots, bombings and explosions. We had been following them; we had attended all the meetings for planning the coups dâĂ©tat.â
RodrĂguez said the plan included several simultaneous actions: the assassinations of President NicolĂĄs Maduro; Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Constituent Assembly; and other officials. Also planned were assaults on two military battalions and the headquarters of the Military Counter-Intelligence Directorate, the bombing of the La Carlota base and a break-in of the Venezuelan Central Bankâs vaults.
The climax was to be the ultimate seizure of the Miraflores Presidential Palace. As one of the conspirators known by his alias, Marino said, they were going to âBurn everything to save the country.â
Aug. 29: Attacks planned in Colombia derailedÂ
A similar scheme was broken up in August. This time it involved attacks to be carried out with C4 explosives at different key points in Caracas: at the headquarters of the Special Action Forces (FAES), in the â23rd of Januaryâ neighborhood and at the Palace of Justice.
Rodriguez revealed on Aug. 31 on national TV that the plan was being directed from inside Colombia, where three paramilitary training centers were preparing for these actions. Two of the camps â one of which was 2.5 kilometers from the border â were for training in explosives. The third camp was for military training.
Rodriguez stated, âEverything leads to IvĂĄn Duque, Ălvaro Uribe [former president of Colombia], to North Santander [a department of regional government in Colombia], to the paramilitaries who are happily thriving in the sister Republic of Colombia.â He pointed out that the Colombian government had given refuge to a large number of people being sought by the Venezuelan justice system for such actions.
It was not the first time the Venezuelan government denounced the existence of paramilitary training camps in Colombia preparing to attack Venezuela. After the attempted assassination of President Maduro in August 2018, RodrĂguez charged that the training center for the attacks was located on the other side of the border, in the town of ChinĂĄcota.
Dec. 15: Holiday âbloodbathâ prevented
The final action in 2019 was due to take place Sunday, Dec. 15. Part of the plan was to attack two military bases in eastern Sucre, which would be connected to similar actions in the states of Zulia, TĂĄchira, Barinas, Aragua and Caracas.
President Maduro reported: âWe have a conspiracy that was meant to strike several Bolivarian Army and Bolivarian National Guard barracks in various cities of the country to provoke a massive military bloodbath to overshadow and bathe the Christmas season in blood.â He accused LĂłpez and GuaidĂł of being responsible for the actions and stressed the U.S. role.
If Venezuela is calm by the end of the year, it is because, among other things, several of the planned violent actions were disrupted as they happened or before they could happen. The scenario would be profoundly different if one of the plans had succeeded.
That is one reason for the crisis within the opposition. Those forces are approaching January divided and without political initiative. They are embroiled in corruption scandals. Also, the Trump administration is distrustful of the capabilities of the Venezuelan right wing after these obvious fiascos.
The upcoming critical date is Jan. 5. On that day, it will be known if GuaidĂł is to continue as president of the National Assembly and be recognized by the U.S. as the acting president of Venezuela, or if he will be displaced by another faction.
In the meantime, the plans for violent actions have not stopped. For several years, a sector of the opposition has bet on a violent solution only â and that the U.S. will plan covert actions to achieve the overthrow of Maduro.
Marco Teruggi
Argentinian Sociologist. He played in the AnahĂ Association, in HIJOS and in the Popular Front DarĂo SantillĂĄn. Since the beginning of 2013 he lives in Caracas. Author of the books: "I always return to the foot of the tree", "Founded days" and "Chronicles of communes, where ChĂĄvez lives". Currently collaborates in Telesur, Latin American Summary, Notes, Sudestada Magazine, Amphibian, among others.
