Lebanon: What Does a Cabinet Decision to Disarm the Resistance Really Mean?

By Ibrahim Al-Amine  –  Aug 5, 2025

No one in Lebanon’s official or diplomatic circles seriously believes that a cabinet decision could dismantle a resistance movement as old as the Israeli occupation itself. Nor does anyone among them truly have the capacity, or the courage, to take responsibility for such a move, let alone confront the deeper question: is this goal even achievable?

This truth is not confined to political circles in Beirut. It is equally acknowledged by the real patrons of this policy, in Washington, in Riyadh, and behind them, in Tel Aviv.

There’s little point in questioning the position of local factions that long ago chose to act as mere instruments of foreign influence. Whether they once aligned with the Syrian-Saudi axis or later joined the US-European-Saudi bloc, today they all operate under the heaviest form of tutelage yet: that of US and Saudi control.

The real question concerns those who claim to represent substantial segments of the Lebanese public, those whose decisions today will have immediate consequences on their base. A base shaped not only by political identity, but by sect, region, and communal affiliation. It is that very base that will bear the cost of their decisions.

It is a question that should haunt anyone who believes that submission to foreign diktats today will shield them from accountability tomorrow, or guarantee them immunity from the very powers they now serve. If in doubt, look at how the US and Saudi Arabia have treated their “partners” in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, or the new authorities in Damascus.

For those currently holding office, President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Speaker Nabih Berri, the scenario is different. Aoun and Salam’s recent maneuvering around the issue of resistance arms makes one thing clear: the grace period granted by the foreign powers who facilitated their rise to power has ended. They now face a final test, with no room left for ambiguity. And they know better than anyone that their political authority stems from external backing and any misstep risks forfeiting it.

As for Speaker Berri, the question returns with urgency: how will he manage ties with foreign powers and his domestic partners? And where has his long-standing flexibility, bordering on dangerous accommodation, led Lebanon? This isn’t just about how he’s dealt with foreign envoys; it’s about his dealings with the actual sponsors of this campaign. And the question becomes more pressing because Berri knows full well what’s unfolding today, particularly from Riyadh, and then Washington, is part of a broader project to contain and marginalize Shiite influence across all sectors: state institutions, the economy, society, politics, and media.

He also knows the campaign to disarm the resistance goes far beyond neutralizing a military threat to Israel. It serves foreign powers and their local allies who view the resistance’s arms as the last obstacle to regaining full control of the Lebanese state, and to restoring the political order that existed before February 6, 1984.

Berri bears a responsibility arguably greater than even that of Hezbollah’s leadership. The party has already made its position clear, along with detailed justifications: the resistance’s weapons are not up for negotiation and will not be traded for political favors.

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So why persist in this reckless, disgraceful course?

Some may argue that any cabinet decision to disarm the resistance would be unenforceable. That’s no revelation, everyone knows it: those who would vote for it, the Americans and Saudis pushing it, even the Israeli enemy itself. But no one sees this decision as an end in itself. It is a starting gun for a longer campaign whose consequences cannot be fully predicted.

For those underestimating the stakes, here’s what such a move would trigger:

First, the current government claims to embody constitutional legitimacy. So a decision to disarm the resistance would not merely be bureaucratic; it would be a declaration stripping the resistance of national legitimacy. It would rebrand a state-backed liberation movement into an outlaw organization to be hunted, criminalized, and eradicated.

Second, such a move would mark the beginning of a calculated escalation: stripping legal status from any institution believed to support the resistance, directly or indirectly. Just look at Ramallah, Amman, or Damascus today, and the conditions imposed on their leadership. We may soon hear calls to shut down the Qard al-Hassan Association, the Martyr Foundation, as well as their affiliated hospitals, clinics, and schools. Then it will be any institutions funded by so-called “rogue actors.” Eventually, calls will emerge to revoke licenses of every civil entity associated with the resistance. And one day, not far off, even public praise, donations, or moral support for resistance fighters could be criminalized. This isn’t just about disarming the resistance, it’s about erasing it from national life.

Third, the already suffocating financial blockade on the resistance’s support base will deepen. Ministers and officials, many little more than agents of US and Saudi agendas, would begin openly advocating for the seizure of any funds suspected of aiding the resistance, labeling it a “criminal gang.”

Fourth, legitimizing such a cabinet decision would pave the way for criminalizing even symbolic expressions of solidarity. Naming a street after a martyr, quoting a resistance figure, raising a flag, any of it could be deemed a punishable offense. Lebanon would become the frontline of a new doctrine: the doctrine of anti-resistance. And don’t be surprised when they call to abolish Resistance and Liberation Day on May 25. Haven’t we already seen how the state treated the case of Georges Abdallah? Where are the “officials” now?

Fifth, declaring the resistance’s weapons unconstitutional would give foreign patrons, especially the US and Saudi Arabia, a pretext to blacklist anyone who cooperates, engages, or even shares ideas with Hezbollah. The goal is clear: isolate the resistance before the parliamentary elections. Those who voluntarily accepted representation in Nawaf Salam’s government may soon find their electoral lists hand-picked by Fadlo Khuri, the AUB president, closely tied to US diplomatic circles.

The resistance itself, its fighters and leadership, are not panicked. Even now, as their base is provoked and tested, they remain steadfast in rejecting the US–Saudi–Israeli trap of civil strife by proxy.

But the real challenges lie elsewhere: halting Israeli aggression, securing the release of Lebanese hostages, and forcing this state to begin reconstruction. These are the stakes that may soon compel the resistance to reconsider its policy of openness and collaboration since the ceasefire was declared.

This is an edited translation of an article originally published in Arabic.