A donkey pulls a cart carrying a man, several children, and their personal belongings. Photo: CEPR/File photo.
By Michael Galant and Pedro Labayen Herrera – May 30, 2025
In this edition of Sanctions Watch, covering May 2025:
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- The US lifts Syria sanctions;
- Trump flip-flops on Venezuela Chevron license extension;
- Trump administration claims Cuba “not fully cooperating” in fight against terrorism;
- Iran talks hit impasse as Trump negotiator moves goalposts;
- EU sanctions Russia while Trump holds off in the name of diplomacy;
- Several papers advocate for engagement over pressure with North Korea
- Organizations warn of famine risk in Gaza as Israel launches controversial aid delivery plan;
- UN reportedly in early stages of drafting Afghanistan engagement plan;
- Trump sanctions Haitian armed groups in what could become a “de facto embargo,” and more.
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Syria (background)
President Trump announced plans to lift all sanctions against Syria at an investment forum in Riyadh this month. The surprise decision, which appears to have come at the request of Turkey’s President Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was met with praise from many organizations and experts that had urged relief for the Syrian people. Noting that “Broad sanctions … have greatly hindered reconstruction efforts and exacerbated the suffering of millions of Syrians,” Human Rights Watch called the move “a critical step toward improving Syrians’ access to fundamental economic rights and encouraging efforts to rebuild a country devastated by years of grueling conflict.” The Council on American-Islamic Relations described it as “an important and welcome step.” The UN Special Envoy for Syria commended the announcement in a post on X, calling the cessation of sanctions “crucial to enabling the delivery of essential services, including health & education, reviving the Syrian economy, unlocking meaningful support from the region, & enabling many Syrians to contribute actively to a national effort to rebuild their country.” And in Congress, the decision garnered “rare bipartisan support,” according to Roll Call.
Yet while praising the decision, some pointed to the tacit admission underlying it: that sanctions had, indeed, been stifling the Syrian economy and indiscriminately harming the Syrian people all along, even if many would only admit it following the Assad government’s fall. Trump himself, while announcing the policy shift, called the sanctions “brutal and crippling” and remarked that the decision was intended to “give [Syria] a chance at greatness.” As Just Foreign Policy’s Erik Sperling pointed out, “Going forward, DC policymakers can no longer credibly pretend to be unaware that these sanctions harm the entire civilian population of a country.”
A few weeks later, the administration issued General License 25, following through on the promise to effectively lift all broad Syria sanctions, while at the same time issuing a waiver for congressionally mandated Caesar Act sanctions. Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-CA), in applauding Trump’s announcement, urged Congress to “do its part and repeal congressionally mandated sanctions too.” The week after Trump’s policy shift, the European Union followed suit, announcing the lifting of broad sanctions, alongside the imposition of individual sanctions for those responsible for recent violence against the Alawite minority.
Read more:
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- Trump Announces Plan to Lift Punishing Sanctions on Syria, CNN
- Syria: US Lifting Sanctions Will Bolster Rights, Recovery, Human Rights Watch
- EU Lifts Economic Sanctions on Syria, Following US Move Last Week, Al Jazeera
- IOM Welcomes EU and US Decisions to Lift Sanctions on Syria, International Organization for Migration
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Venezuela (background)
Confusion surrounded the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy this month. Following recent signs of renewed engagement — the return of a toddler that had been separated from her mother when she was deported from the US to Venezuela in March, and the release of a US citizen from detention in Venezuela following a meeting between Special Envoy Ric Grenell and Venezuelan officials — Bloomberg and other outlets reported that the administration had plans to extend Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela by another 60 days beyond its scheduled May 27 expiration date. The following day, the Miami Herald reported that Grenell had been quietly negotiating an agreement to ease sanctions on Venezuela in exchange for the country’s cooperation in accepting deportation flights. Though Grenell denied the claim, the article appears to have sparked backlash from the Republican party’s anti-negotiation camp, with MAGA influencer Laura Loomer — who supports Grenell’s negotiations — claiming that Florida Republicans were threatening to withdraw support for Trump’s tax and spending bill over the issue. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Rubio posted a tweet contradicting Bloomberg’s claims, writing that the license would be allowed to expire after all. Later reporting by Axios confirmed that, indeed, Trump had reversed plans to extend the Chevron license in order to get his “One Big Beautiful Bill” passed. However, following a vote for the bill in the House, the Trump administration granted Chevron a narrowly tailored license allowing it to “conduct minimal maintenance on equipment but prohibiting it from producing oil” in Venezuela, according to Bloomberg.
The policy chaos appears to be the product of clashing factions within the Trump coalition, with the hard-line Florida Cuban-American camp represented by Rubio seeking to broaden sanctions at all costs in pursuit of regime change, and the pragmatic camp embodied by Ric Grenell that appears willing to ease sanctions as a part of a mutually beneficial deal with the Maduro government. During an interview with Steve Bannon, Grenell recently remarked, “President Trump is very clear: sanctions penalize American companies. And if we believe in engagement, if we believe in capitalism — capitalism beats socialism and communist [sic] every single time — we want to put America first and do what’s best for America. This means making sure that the Chinese do not take Venezuelan oil.”
Loomer has sided with the Grenell faction, having penned a long social media post urging Trump to maintain the license, arguing that failing to do so would “undermine America’s strategic position in the global energy market, cede critical influence and power to China, and weaken our nation’s ability to secure affordable, reliable energy for the American people and initiate another migrant crisis at our borders.”
Human Rights Watch Outflanks Trump: Liberal NGO Pushes for Harsher Venezuela Sanctions
Read more:
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- Venezuela Frees American as Chevron Waiver Is Set to Be Extended, Bloomberg
- Why the U.S. Should Engage with Venezuela, Americas Quarterly
- How Trump Saved His Big Bill by Killing a Venezuela Oil Deal, Axios
- US Plans Chevron License for Minimum Upkeep in Venezuela, Bloomberg
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Cuba (background)
The Trump administration returned Cuba to the list of countries “not fully cooperating” in counterterrorism efforts this month — the Biden administration had removed Cuba from the list exactly a year ago. While this designation does not come with major material consequences, it serves to provide legitimacy to the placing of the country (along with Iran, North Korea, and Syria) on the far more consequential State Sponsors of Terrorism list, to which Trump returned Cuba within hours of beginning his second term. The administration has not provided novel evidence for either designation, which have long been criticized as baseless, including by former senior officials from past Republican and Democratic administrations.
On May 21, the US State Department imposed sanctions on four Cuban judicial officials for their allegedly prosecuting and convicting individuals opposed to the Cuban government, barring the officials and their family members from entering the US. Two days later, the head of the US diplomatic mission in Cuba threatened further sanctions, stating that these measures “were just the beginning.”
The Trump administration also continues to threaten sanctions against individuals, including foreign officials and their family members, who engage with Cuba’s medical missions. On May 6, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with the leaders of seven Caribbean countries that benefit from the missions and, according to the State Department, reaffirmed the US commitment to hold these individuals “accountable” for their involvement in “the [Cuban] regime’s forced labor scheme.” Antigua and Barbuda’s OAS ambassador, Ronald Sanders, reported that during the meeting,
Caribbean leaders pushed back firmly but respectfully against any suggestion of human trafficking. They explained that Cuban medical teams are indispensable to their public health systems. These professionals are compensated directly, with governments paying a facilitation fee to Havana — similar to arrangements with other states that deploy medical missions abroad.
Nevertheless, following the meeting with Rubio, the prime minister of the Bahamas announced that his country would pay Cuba’s doctors directly, bypassing the Cuban government.
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Iran (background)
The US and Iran held a fourth and fifth round of indirect talks over the Iranian nuclear program and US sanctions this month. Though both sides said the fourth meeting had been useful, and agreed to continue discussions, the divide between the camps later widened. While the Trump administration had previously focused its messaging on preventing weapons-grade nuclear enrichment and allowing limited enrichment for a civilian program, lead negotiator Steve Witkoff moved the goalposts this month, declaring publicly that any level of nuclear enrichment was off the table. This would cross a major red line for Iran, which asserts that it holds a right to lower-level enrichment for energy purposes under the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Witkoff’s changed position — brought on in part by congressional Republicans’ overwhelming opposition to any Iranian nuclear enrichment — sparked outrage from an already-mistrustful Iran and threatened to derail the negotiations. A recent Responsible Statecraft analysis by Ben Armbruster states that while a total prohibition on enrichment is the preferred demand of Tel Aviv and the Republican establishment, “this anti-Iran deal coalition has no constituency outside Washington and Israel.” Republican voters and high-profile MAGA influencers like Steve Bannon and Marjorie Taylor Greene overwhelmingly want a deal. Whether the administration will hold to its zero-enrichment line, or intends it purely as a hardball negotiation tactic, is unknown, Armbruster argues.
The fifth round of talks took place on May 23. Although details remain undisclosed, reports indicate that Iran again rejected fully suspending uranium enrichment. Despite this and other differences, statements from both capitals and mediator Oman pointed to signs of “limited progress,” according to Reuters. President Trump described the talks as “very good” and expressed optimism that a deal may be near. Both sides agreed to meet again, though no date has been set.
In the meantime, Trump has sought to strengthen his negotiating hand by further tightening sanctions. In a message likely intended for China, Trump threatened secondary sanctions against any country importing Iranian oil or petrochemicals. Later in the month, Trump sanctioned a handful of individuals and entities in Iran and China allegedly tied to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. And at a Gulf Cooperation Council meeting, Trump urged Gulf countries to impose and maximally enforce Iran sanctions. Iran described these and other recent sanctions as incompatible with successful negotiations.
Read more:
Russia (background)
On May 20, the European Union and the United Kingdom imposed a new round of sanctions on Russia after Moscow refused to agree to demands for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire with Ukraine. For the EU, this marked its 17th sanctions package, targeting 189 vessels in Russia’s so-called shadow fleet that transports sanctioned Russian oil exports and 74 individuals and entities linked to the country’s oil and military-industrial sectors. Even before these sanctions were announced, reports indicated that the EU was already working on an 18th package. The UK, meanwhile, had sanctioned 100 “shadow fleet” vessels on May 9, and its May 20 measures hit an additional 100 targets in sectors similar to those covered by the EU sanctions, as well as financial institutions.
The US had initially supported the EU’s ceasefire demand and threatened to impose sanctions of its own, but President Trump backed down following a call with President Putin on May 19. When questioned about this decision the following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “[If] you start threatening sanctions, the Russians will stop talking. And there’s value in us being able to talk to them and drive them to get to the table.”
This engagement-focused stance marks a sharp departure from the US’s usual approach to sanctioned countries, which has typically involved escalating pressure rather than pursuing dialogue (notably, during his first term, Trump took the opposite approach when he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed harsh sanctions on Tehran). Nevertheless, Rubio added that the US is still considering sanctions — reportedly already drafted — if no progress is made toward peace. On May 25, Trump said he was considering new sanctions against Moscow following a series of Russian drone attacks on Ukraine, a move that Senate Republicans are pushing for.
Fearing a potential Hungarian veto of Russia sanctions in an upcoming July vote, EU officials are reportedly working to shield 200 billion euros in frozen Russian assets from being released if the veto occurs. According to the Financial Times, the funds “could be moved on to a different legal basis to circumvent Budapest’s veto,” along with other protections in the form of trade measures and capital controls. Meanwhile, pressure is growing to authorize the outright seizure of the assets. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has signaled openness to the idea, marking a shift from the more cautious stance of his predecessor.
Read more:
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- G7 Threatens Further Sanctions If Russia Fails to Agree Ukraine Ceasefire, Al Jazeera
- Seizing Almost €200-billion in Russian State Assets at Euroclear Could Trigger Ugly Repercussions, The Globe and Mail
- UK Wants More Say Over Fate of €200B in Frozen Russian Assets, POLITICO
- Graham Says He Has Broad Senate Support for New Russia Sanctions, Bloomberg
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North Korea (background)
Frank Aum, a North Korea expert, and Ankit Panda, a nuclear policy expert, coauthored a paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on May 6, advocating for “stable coexistence” with a nuclear-armed North Korea — at least in the near term. They write:
The United States continues its approach of denuclearization through pressure despite consensus among U.S. intelligence that North Korea will not disarm and despite empirical evidence that suggests U.S. diplomatic engagement can mitigate North Korea’s provocative behavior. It is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint; rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. This clash between analysis and goals has promoted policy incoherence.
The experts suggest reducing risk and improving relations through various means, including partial sanctions relief following initial confidence-building measures.
In light of recent reports that President Trump is considering renewed dialogue with North Korea, several think tanks — including the Stimson Center and the Quincy Institute — have published papers advocating for engagement over pressure. At the same time, the US has signaled that it plans to seek further North Korea-related sanctions at the UN.
Read more:
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- Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- US Names North Korea as a Country Not Cooperating with Counterterrorism Efforts, NK News
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Gaza
Gaza marked 80 days without humanitarian assistance in May, following Israel’s March 2 ban on all aid entering the Strip. The move was supposedly aimed at pressuring Hamas to accept revisions to a ceasefire agreement that was already in the process of being implemented. As a result of the siege and wider Israeli bombardment, the UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), which monitors global food insecurity, warned that “the Gaza Strip is still confronted with a critical risk of famine. … The entire population is facing high levels of acute food insecurity, with half a million people (one in five) facing starvation.” Since March 2, the World Health Organization has reported the deaths of 57 children from malnutrition, as UN experts and officials condemned the blockade as Israel’s use of starvation as a weapon of war.
On May 5, Israel faced renewed condemnation after announcing a US-backed plan to distribute aid solely through a newly established, Swiss-based “aid organization” called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). According to documents obtained by news outlets, aid would be available only at select GHF distribution points in southern Gaza, with US contractors reportedly providing security. The UN, aid organizations, and other countries widely rejected the plan and refused to participate, alleging that the scheme would cut most people off from aid. Senior UN official Tom Fletcher said:
the Israeli-designed distribution modality is not the answer. It practically excludes many, including people with disabilities, women, children, the elderly, the wounded. … It restricts aid to only one part of Gaza, while leaving other dire needs unmet. It makes aid conditional on political and military aims. It makes starvation a bargaining chip. It is [sic] cynical sideshow. A deliberate distraction. A fig leaf for further violence and displacement.
On May 19, ahead of the plan’s implementation, Israel announced an expansion of military operations in Gaza, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating the goal was to “take control of the entire Gaza Strip.” Simultaneously, the Israeli government began allowing limited aid into the territory. UN officials described this as a mere “drop in the ocean of what is urgently needed,” and Doctors Without Borders said it was “ridiculously inadequate.” Two days after the announcement, the UN said that the aid supposedly cleared for entry had yet to be distributed, as the Israeli military had not authorized its release. Some aid, however, began trickling in on May 22. The UK, Canada, and France criticized the limited entry of aid as “wholly inadequate” in a joint statement and warned of possible “concrete actions” against Israel if the military offensive continues and humanitarian access remains restricted. Shortly thereafter, the UK suspended trade talks with Israel and imposed sanctions on West Bank settlers, while the EU announced it would review its political and economic agreements with Israel. Moreover, Spain’s lower house approved a nonbinding resolution calling for an arms embargo on Israel.
The GHF announced that it had begun operations on May 26, despite the resignation of its head a day earlier. In a statement, the former head said, “It is clear that it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, which I will not abandon.” Reuters reported that concerns over biometric and security checks initially kept people away from GHF distribution points on May 26. However, growing desperation for food drove many to return the next day, resulting in a chaotic scene in which crowds overwhelmed the sites, reportedly leading to three deaths and dozens injured from Israeli military gunshots.
Read more:
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- The Gaza Strip Is Still Confronted With a Critical Risk of Famine Amid Ongoing Conflict, Aid Blockade, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
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Afghanistan (background)
Early this month, media outlets began reporting on the “Mosaic Plan” — a broad framework for multilateral engagement with Afghanistan being developed by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). While the plan is still under consultation with stakeholders, early reports suggest it may open a path toward conditional sanctions relief, which the Taliban hopes to secure as part of the engagement process.
On May 12, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced it would terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghans, a designation that had allowed them to remain in the US on humanitarian grounds. DHS cited Afghanistan’s “stabilizing economy” as a reason for ending the program, despite recent reports from news outlets and human rights organizations highlighting the severe economic conditions that an influx of Afghans expelled from Pakistan are facing — conditions partly driven by international sanctions.
A May 9 report published by the Afghanistan Analysts Network examined the impact of the end of US aid to Afghanistan, noting, “The cuts to US and other aid, and the cuts to public sector jobs, will be a double blow to millions of Afghan families. … For the economy as a whole, the obstacles that followed the Taliban capture of power in 2021 – frozen assets and UN and US sanctions (despite waivers, international banking is still deeply problematic) – are all still in place.”
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Other
The Trump administration designated Haitian armed groups Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” and “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” this month, a move that The New York Times notes would likely “worsen an already dire humanitarian crisis in Haiti … since gangs control much of the country’s economy and infrastructure, including ports and major roads.” CEPR’s Jake Johnston told the Associated Press that the designation “could function as a de facto embargo,” because the groups “exercise tremendous control over the commerce of the country. Doing any kind of business with Haiti or in Haiti is going to carry much greater risk.” The New York Times also quoted Johnston noting that “Humanitarian access programs would also likely cease,” as organizations “Can’t enter a community to disperse aid without negotiations” with the groups. The designation also makes the possibility of peace negotiations or transitional justice programming more difficult.
A new article in the prestigious medical journal The Lancet reveals the devastating human toll of “aid sanctions” — sanctions imposed to restrict the flow of development assistance. The study found that such sanctions decreased Official Development Assistance to target countries by over $200 million per year, on average, with Development Assistance for Health specifically falling by 17 percent. The result: an increase of 129 infant deaths, 47 under-five deaths, and 11 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, per year. “Aid sanctions thus increased infant, under-5, and maternal mortality rates by 3.1%, 3.6%, and 6.4%, respectively, on an annual basis.”
As Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visited Beijing this month, China used the opportunity to decry US “bullying,” indicating that China sees US unilateral sanctions as a winning rhetorical point in the competition for influence in the Western Hemisphere. “Latin American and Caribbean countries have suffered greatly from unilateral sanctions and hegemonic bullying,” noted Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “severely affecting their economic development and people’s livelihood.”
On May 28, the US State Department issued “a new visa restriction policy that will apply to foreign nationals who are responsible for censorship of protected expression in the United States.” Although no individuals were explicitly named, it is widely believed that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is eyeing Brazilian officials — particularly Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. De Moraes has clashed with Elon Musk and briefly ordered the shutdown of Musk’s social media platform, X, in Brazil last August after the billionaire refused to comply with court orders to remove posts containing disinformation. The judge is also overseeing a case involving charges that former Brazilian president and Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro plotted a coup d’etat following his 2022 electoral defeat.
And finally, a CEPR thank you to France’s storied, 120-year-old newspaper L’Humanité for running a special series on the Sanctions Watch newsletter, available for francophones ici, ici et ici.
Read more:
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- The Second Trump Administration’s Indiscriminate Economic Sanctions, Le Monde diplomatique
- Sullivan, Merkley, Curtis Condemn CCP’s Transnational Repression, Press for Sanctions on Hong Kong Judiciary Officials, Senator Jeff Merkley
- Trump Administration Moves to Block the U.S. Travel of Mexican Politicians Who It Says Are Linked to the Drug Trade, ProPublica
- Trump’s Sanctions on ICC Prosecutor Have Halted Tribunal’s Work, AP
- H.R.3190 – BRAVE Burma Act, Congress.gov
- US Moves to Ban Cambodia’s Huione Over Alleged Money Laundering, Reuters
- US Sanctions Sudan After Ruling Chemical Weapons Used During Civil War, Al Jazeera
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About Sanctions Watch
Economic sanctions have become one of the main tools of US foreign policy despite widespread evidence that they can cause severe harm to civilian populations (which may, in fact, be the point). Though now a defining feature of the global economic order, sanctions and their human costs receive relatively little attention in most US media outlets.
CEPR’s Sanctions Watch news bulletin aims to generate more awareness on the use and impact of sanctions through monthly round-ups of news and analysis on US sanctions policy.
Previous editions of the Sanctions Watch can be found here. CEPR’s US Sanctions Policy FAQ can be found here.
(CEPR)
