German Elections: The Far Right and Militarism Advance

By Matthew Read and Max Rodermund – Feb 24, 2025

The far-right AfD surges to become the second strongest party in Germany, while anti-militarist voices are pushed out of parliament

In Germany’s federal election on Sunday, the conservative Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) came out on top. While CDU leader Friedrich Merz will likely be the new chancellor, his party recorded its second worst result since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949. With 28.5%, the party is today far less popular than it was during the height of the Merkel years when it received over 40% (2013). The other traditional Volkspartei (“people’s party”), the Social Democrats (SPD), received its worst result in over 130 years, securing only 16.4%. The Greens and the liberal-democratic FDP – both of which had been governing together with the SPD until November 2024 – also suffered significant losses. The FDP did not make it over the 5% hurdle to enter parliament.

Far-right surge
In contrast to the centrist parties, the far right has recorded historic gains. The Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) will now be the second strongest force in parliament, having won over 20% and thus doubling its share of the vote. The party, whose traditional support base is the petty bourgeoisie, was able to draw strength particularly from young people, the working class, and the unemployed. Of the votes cast by 18–24-year-olds, the AfD gained 14% more than it won four years ago. A similar pattern could be seen with 25–34-year-olds. In East Germany, the party was by far the strongest political force, winning every third vote.

The AfD was founded in 2013 by former right-wing CDU members who aspired to create a Eurosceptic and economically liberal party. Since then, it has become a rallying point for far-right and fascist forces while simultaneously being accepted into Germany’s political landscape. In Sunday’s elections, the AfD drew support through slogans for more diplomacy and an end to weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Yet, with their demand to spend over 5% of GDP on the military and to support a tactical pause in the war against Russia, the AfD holds a similar position as Trump regarding Europe’s foreign policy. This was a contributing factor to the electoral support offered to the AfD by the highest circles of the US political establishment (Musk, Vance, and others).

Elections amid crisis
The elections on Sunday took place against the background of Germany’s recession, a massive wave of austerity, and hysteria around Russia and migration. The polarized political landscape drove up voter turnout, which was 83% on Sunday and thus markedly higher than in 2021 (76.4%).

An unexpected result was achieved by Die Linke (“The Left”). Until a few weeks ago, polls were suggesting that the party would not make the 5% hurdle required to enter parliament. With 8.8%, Die Linke was able to increase its share of the vote by almost 4%. This last-minute success is based largely on Die Linke’s ability to profile itself as the only party not explicitly inciting against migrants and asylum seekers. Just three weeks prior to the election, the CDU tabled a bill to clamp down on migrants and controversially relied on support from the AfD for the first time in parliament. Although the SPD and the Greens joined Die Linke in voting against the bill, they have otherwise been competing with the CDU and AfD to prove themselves “tough on migration”. Many in the youth wings of the Greens and SPD turned to Die Linke in response to their party leadership’s racist demagoguery. The pro-asylum image, along with the avert anti-AfD stance, helped Die Linke make significant gains amongst the youth and urban populations. Particularly in university cities in West Germany where the Greens had previously achieved strong results, Die Linke was able to secure marked gains. In East Germany, on the other hand, the party only made slight improvements to its major losses from 2021. This reflects a significant shift in Die Linke’s electoral basis, away from the working class in the East and towards a young liberal generation in the West.

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Anti-militarist voices pushed out of parliament
The Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) – a split from Die Linke – missed the 5% hurdle by just 13.500 votes. After over a decade in parliament, Wagenknecht and her affiliates will thus not return. The new party achieved impressive results in state-level elections in 2024, but lost momentum during the federal elections. The BSW’s campaign was largely based on anti-militarism and a vision of social-democratic market economics. The party had, however, joined the AfD in voting for the CDU’s migration bill and played into the anti-migrant incitement, thereby alienating much of its traditional leftist base.

The failure of BSW will have ramifications for the debate around militarization and Germany’s preparations for war. The BSW was the only remaining party to take a clear stance against NATO and provocations against Russia and China. The new leadership of Die Linke has distanced itself from their party’s previously critical position on NATO, upheld ‘Israel’s’ alleged “right to self-defense” in occupied Palestine, and joined the centrist parties in smearing BSW as a “party of the Kremlin”.

The lack of a strong anti-militarist voice in parliament comes at a particularly dangerous time in Germany. The country’s ruling class is facing numerous challenges on the world stage: China’s rise as an increasingly sophisticated economic rival, Russia’s defiance towards Western expansionism, the instability caused by ‘Israel’s’ ambitions in West Asia, and now the cold shouldering from the opposite side of the Atlantic. In response to these developments, the previous government announced the beginning of a Zeitenwende (an “era shift”) in 2022. The objective is to construct a war-time economy capable of competing in “the race” for “access to raw materials, new technologies and global trade routes”, as Ursula van der Leyen described it at Davos in January 2025. According to this logic, the “new era of harsh geostrategic competition” requires a strong, militarized Germany. Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius – who is likely to return to government – named 2029 as the year by which Germany must be “war ready”. The CDU stands united with the SPD, Greens, and AfD in advancing militarization. The economic crisis is to be overcome by “growth through armaments”, as the business newspaper Handelsblatt put it a few days prior to the election.

A shift to wartime Keysianism
The outgoing “traffic light” coalition government (SPD, Greens, FDP) collapsed in 2024 because of divergent views on how to best carry this Zeitenwende forward. The centrist parties have been squabbling whether the challenges of the day warrant a revision of the hardline zero-debt clause they adopted in 2009. The SPD and Greens are in favour of taking on debt to mitigate the austerity necessitated by the massive increases in military spending. The CDU’s Merz has suggested he is open to discussing this possibility, but not if it will be used to “spend even more money on consumption and social programs”. Ultimately, Germany’s political establishment is shifting away from the austerity-driven “neoliberal” model towards a form of “wartime Keysianism” to meet the challenges of the “new era”.

It is most likely that Germany will now see a return to the coalition of the SPD and CDU. Yet, at the end of the day, the next chancellor’s program was already set before the new government has even been formed. The AfD, meanwhile, is gearing up on the sidelines, getting ready to take an ever more prominent position on the stage.

(Peoples Dispatch)