Strategic Importance of the May 25 Elections in Venezuela

By Misión Verdad – Apr 11, 2025

The elections for the National Assembly (AN) and governorships in Venezuela are shaping up to be an important event for determining the balance of power in the political ecosystem and the trends in the country’s governance processes over the coming years.

The process scheduled for May 25 qualifies as a mega-election due to the number of positions up for election and because of its political significance.

Gubernatorial positions will be elected for 24 states, including Guayana Esequiba, and parliamentary seats in the respective legislative councils.

A total of 287 deputies will also be elected through constituencies, regional list voting, and national list voting. They will hold positions in the AN until January 2031.

Political Context of the Oppositions
The framework for the opposition’s tactics with which to attack Chavismo is determined by the opposition’s endemic and structural division. This sector, viewed as a whole, is now facing a significant diatribe based on abstentionism versus the need for parties and leaders to compete for space and remain in the electoral arena.

As is well known, the sector represented by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, with the support of some organizations that make up the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), proposes political abstention under the premise of carrying out regime-change operations in the country in collusion with the United States and its Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

However, other sectors have stepped forward and promoted participation in the electoral process. Among them are the four anti-Chavez governors currently leading the governments in Zulia, Barinas, Cojedes, and Nueva Esparta.

However, alongside them, another group of leaders has emerged who have taken the initiative to form a new coalition or political movement. The Decide Network (Citizen Defense of Democracy), founded on April 2, 2025, according to the Polianalítica website, “marks a strategic shift by a sector of the Venezuelan opposition by prioritizing electoral participation as a tool of democratic resistance, while rejecting international economic sanctions and secondary tariffs linked to Venezuela.”

This movement is led by self-described “moderates” such as Jesús “Chuo” Torrealba—who coordinates the initiative—Henrique Capriles, Henri Falcón, Tomás Guanipa, Andrés Caleca, and Vladimir Villegas, among others.

The Decide Network is the result of the renewed internal fracture of the opposition following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, and the tactical and strategic collapse of the coup and institutional collapse agenda orchestrated by Machado and González on key dates, such as January 10 of this year, when they failed to fulfill the promise that the septuagenarian former candidate would assume power in the country by force.

This group of actors, along with other small parties in the Democratic Alliance coalition, are reportedly in talks to secure united candidacies and form a competitive slate of leaders for governorships and positions in the National Assembly.

However, these leaders and groups face several obstacles.

One of them is the weight of abstentionism, fueled by the impressive communication asymmetry and the dominance of public discourse that the most radical right-wing sector has achieved through social media engineering and high content-ranking by algorithms.

By July 28 of last year, much of the opposition’s electoral muscle—although limited and failing to achieve its objectives—was consolidated around Machado and Magalli Meda, leaders of the ConVzla Command. This weakened the PUD parties, from which the leaders now vying for office in May are derived.

The weakness of the opposition’s electoral organizations is transversal and also a result of intra-party divisions. This is the case of Primero Justicia (the Partido Justicialista Party, without a party card), where Capriles has engaged in an open dispute denouncing the hijacking of his organization by the Vente group, led by Machado.

The split within Acción Democrática (AD) has also had repercussions. This party has won the most seats among the opposition parties in the last 25 years.

Henry Ramos Allup’s party—without a party card—has stayed out of the electoral race; the veteran AD member has only engaged in behind-the-scenes “politics.” Meanwhile, Bernabé Gutiérrez—who holds the party’s colors and cards—has managed to channel his party toward winning certain positions, with a well-established membership.

The abstentionism promoted in recent years, the deployment abroad of many “leaders” to join the resources of the fake interim government of Guaidó, and the organic breakdown due to the divisions between opposition forces have weakened the aspirations of anti-Chavez supporters to win a majority of the electoral vote in May.

However, the results announced in the July elections indicate a significant turnout of opposition voters. These voters could be captivated by effective electoral strategies, and organizations with united candidates could win positions in historic regional strongholds. This remains to be seen.

The Price of Peace

Political Context of Chavismo
The United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the organizations that form part of the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP) have developed an electoral slate that has been presented for gubernatorial and national parliamentary positions.

The first vice president of the PSUV, Diosdado Cabello, has released lists of the organization’s leaders which reveal certain common characteristics in the candidates’ campaigns for the positions up for election.

There is an increase in female leaders, many young candidates, and a significant presence of figures with solid experience who have been confirmed as eligible.

The PSUV conducted a consultation process with its base to nominate its candidates. The method used was simultaneous assemblies held in communities across the country.

The political moment of Chavismo is also marked by significant challenges, such as the adverse economic context, which has worsened due to the imposition of new economic attacks and the cancellation of oil licenses. However, the international economy will also suffer from trade policies emanating from the White House, with their respective repercussions in Venezuela.

The multifactorial external pressures tend to unite forces supporting President Maduro’s government. However, the combination of the generally uncertain economic context, abstentionist tendencies, and organizational weaknesses among the opposition, as well as the types of positions up for election, could limit overall participation levels.

The legitimacy factor based on voter turnout will be key for the month of May.

The GPP will develop its strategy by promoting the vote, urging the cohesion of its membership, and promoting its leadership in a campaign that will be completely territorialized and focused on the base.

Political Ecosystem and Governance
For the opposition parties participating in the electoral process, there is a significant challenge in reconfiguring the trends among the macro-sector that rejects Chavismo.

These groups, referred to as “non-radical” and “democratic,” seek to displace other sectors they consider erratic by leading their followers and forces on a long path of missteps: the loss of strategic autonomy by delegating their leadership to bureaucrats in Washington, promoting Guaidó’s fake interim government, disengaging from the population by requesting illegal sanctions, relapsing into abstentionism by breaking the territorial and sectoral powers of the parties, and deepening divisions due to new caudillismos, such as the one represented by María Corina Machado.

These groups aim to rebuild the opposition ecosystem from the ruins created by the collapse of the strategy after July 28th. Therefore, they are turning to their grassroots, using a vector-based maneuver to gain new support, rebuild the organization of the vote, and launch an opposition from the positions won in May.

This process could once again alter the opposition’s political landscape and give rise to forms of organization based on traditional, historical, and non-abstentionist leadership.

Jesus “Chuo” Torrealba, who was the main driver of the strategy that gave the opposition victory in 2015, has stated that the intention of the Decide Network is to “re-enchant and mobilize a society exhausted by years of crisis and frustration.” He has also suggested that it is necessary to redefine the opposition’s leadership relationships as a step toward overcoming its structural crisis of representation.

As for Chavismo, political alignment between the Executive Branch and Parliament is crucial for the country’s institutional functioning.

It is well known that the 2015 parliamentary elections were disastrous for Chavismo and the country, not only because of the adverse outcome but also because of the opposition’s dominance in Parliament. This led to power clashes, attempts at institutional collapse, and a intensification of regime-change operations, with illicit sanctions and the creation of a failed parastatal project at the service of Washington.

Since 2020, the GPP forces have managed to regain a parliamentary majority, which has translated into a normalization of institutional life and the functioning of the state.

This factor will be key this year. With a new adverse economic situation, President Nicolás Maduro has relaunched his strategy of maneuvering the situation through a new Economic Emergency Decree.

The leadership of his administration will need an AN that supports his initiatives. However, he will also need governorships and mayoralties that adapt to the new realities of tax collection and budget reform, which are yet to come and which have been outlined in the new decree.

The extraordinary and exceptional framework imposed by the situation resulting from decisions by the US government will require an increase in state effectiveness, a unified governance framework, and the promotion of profound economic recovery strategies.

Furthermore, given the multi-sectoral threats against Venezuela, the Chavista leadership is obligated to safeguard the country’s comprehensive security by strengthening national institutions beyond the plurality of parties and actors that make up the AN or the regional power.

This will require additional efforts in dialogue, work, and agreements among the various political forces with representative positions.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/KW/SL