By Tamjid Kobaissy – Mar 27, 2025
Border violence and coastal massacres have reignited tensions between Lebanon and Syria, amid concerns that hidden actors are stoking Sunni–Shia sedition to benefit Israel.
The collapse of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad in December and the takeover by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, marked a turning point for Lebanon’s security institutions.
With celebratory gunfire in parts of Lebanon and armed factions aligning themselves with the new order in Damascus, the appearance of extremist groups – and a flow of weapons into the hands of extremist Sunni militants hostile to Hezbollah – sparked immediate alarm.
These fears were laid bare during the first official meeting between Sharaa and former Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati, attended by Lebanon’s security brass, a little over a month after the Assad government fell.
A failed transition and manufactured chaos
While the new Syrian officials gave the usual reassurances about border control and distanced themselves from any intention to repeat the chaos of previous years, Sharaa issued his own warnings – chiefly about ISIS cells forming in northern Lebanon.
But what followed painted a different picture: a series of escalating incidents that suggested Sharaa’s diminishing authority over the very factions with which he was once aligned.
Inside Syria, the transitional president’s failure was even starker. Minorities, particularly Alawites and Shia, voiced mounting fears as HTS forces secured Damascus. Around 50,000 fled to Lebanon in the first week alone, seeking refuge in the east, north, and Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Their fears would soon prove valid. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 1,383 civilians – mostly Alawites – were killed in coastal massacres. The spillover into Lebanon was immediate: sectarian tremors shook the fragile north and the Shia-populated eastern border villages. The Lebanese tribes who had long settled in Syrian border towns found themselves forced out amid growing violence and suspicion.
A second wave of displacement followed. This time, an estimated additional 90,000 Syrians crossed into Lebanon in the wake of the coastal bloodshed and HTS’s rise. Most entered through informal crossings, making accurate counts nearly impossible. By contrast, 10,000 to 15,000 Syrians – mainly supporters of the new order – returned home through legal channels.
Sectarian sedition as strategy
On the security front, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have moved to prevent broader escalation, and largely succeeded – aside from sporadic clashes. But the coastal massacres quickly became fodder for the larger, ongoing, decades-long western project: Sunni–Shia sedition.
That narrative was picked up and amplified by regional media – an attempt to rekindle sectarian hostilities that Hezbollah’s late Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had warned about shortly before his assassination:
“Intelligence agencies may seek to revive sectarian strife after the Al-Aqsa flood subsides, to suppress one of its outcomes– Muslim unity in facing the Zionist project.”
This sectarian project is not new – it evolves with context. Its aim is the internal destruction of Muslim societies across West Asia and North Africa, steering resistance efforts away from confronting Israel by drowning the region in infighting.
The ultimate beneficiaries are the west’s economic interests. Exploiting fault lines – sectarian, ethnic, ideological – is the fuel, and once lit, the descent is total. Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, with their complex sectarian tapestries and strategic value, sit at the top of the list.
This time, the sedition narrative found its entry through Syria. The violence quickly spilled over into Lebanese border towns, further poisoning inter-communal relations and sowing resentment between Syrians and Lebanese.
Attempts to manipulate public perception were overt: deliberate media disinformation campaigns tried to implicate Hezbollah in the clashes. Even Sharaa’s government pushed that line.
Yet sources speaking to The Cradle confirm Hezbollah has played no direct or indirect role. Lebanese involvement was limited to Beqaa tribal residents and the national army. It is clear that there are parties leveraging the conflict to serve a seditionist agenda.
Fifth-column provocations
Leaked reports now hint at what that broader plan may be: the deployment of international forces along the entire Lebanese–Syrian frontier, from Arida in the north to Masnaa in the east. The stated goal is border control – to prevent arms transfers to resistance groups.
But this would necessitate HTS escalating attacks and blaming Hezbollah – thus giving the occupation state pretexts to strike and inviting “international stabilization forces” under the guise of peacekeeping.
Meanwhile, the disinformation machine has shifted into high gear. Fake statements appeared on social media under the names of municipalities affiliated with Amal and Hezbollah, warning Syrians of imminent attacks.
These were quickly countered by fake responses from Sunni-majority towns, warning Shia residents not to target Syrians. Several real-world attacks followed. In Beirut’s southern suburb of Bir al-Abed, three individuals assaulted Syrian residents. In Chiyah, six men stopped Syrians, searched their phones, and forced them out – until local residents intervened to stop the aggression.
In response, the Amal Movement’s Municipal Affairs Office and Hezbollah’s Municipal Work Unit issued a joint statement urging the public not to fall into the trap of domestic strife in the service of foreign agendas. They called on Lebanese authorities to immediately investigate and prosecute those behind the incitement.
Speaking to The Cradle, Ghobeiry Mayor Ma’n al-Khalil likened the fake statements to the “suspicious [unattributed] rockets” allegedly launched from Lebanese soil, designed to destabilize internal security at a sensitive moment. He said a fifth column had initiated the campaign, with opportunists following suit. The matter, he added, now rests with the Lebanese government and the agencies overseeing the Syrian refugee presence.
Arms keep flowing to extremist groups
Despite increased border scrutiny, The Cradle has learned that weapons are still entering Lebanon – albeit in smaller quantities than before. Light and medium arms continue to trickle in, finding their way to extremist groups and arms traffickers.
Now, due to the recent border clashes and tighter Lebanese enforcement, smuggling operations have become more discreet. Yet with demand rising in the black market, prices are expected to climb again, which will motivate smugglers to experiment with new routes and methods.
Following the Syrian government’s collapse, the market was flooded with weapons, and prices dropped. For months, rates remained stable: Russian Kalashnikovs sold for $550–$650 (down from $1,000), Chinese rifles fell from $700 to $450, and the AKS dropped from $3,500 to $2,500. The Makarov pistol, once carried by Syrian army officers, now sells for $650 – down from $1,000. Prices, however, vary by region, with northern and eastern border areas seeing sharper declines.
Sources say two weapons shipments entered Beirut’s Sabra and Shatila camps in February and March. The smuggler – known as J.H. – is a Salafi with ties to the notorious sectarian Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, who was arrested by military intelligence last month, but released soon after, and went on to deliver another shipment.
When The Cradle contacted Lebanese military intelligence, the response was telling:
“J.H. isn’t the mastermind. Someone higher up – close to Assir – is behind it, and we’re closing in on him.”
When sectarianism becomes statecraft
In Tripoli, army intelligence dismantled a cell aligned with ISIS. The group had been buying weapons for planned attacks and was actively recruiting. Meanwhile, intelligence suggests fugitive Shadi al-Mawlawi is trying to activate dormant cells in northern Lebanon.
Former prime minister Mikati recently hosted a security summit at his home with Tripoli’s key figures to address the arms issue, rising sectarian incidents, and the influx of displaced Alawite families from Syria’s coast to Jabal Mohsen.
Security agencies are also monitoring Syrian building janitors entrenched in neighborhoods across the country – some under suspicion of espionage or links to extremist groups. One was arrested last month in Beirut’s southern suburbs. During the recent Israeli assault, Hezbollah detained around 50 Syrians on suspicion of spying or belonging to militant factions like HTS or ISIS. Others were held for theft or drug-related crimes.
In the end, any descent into sectarian or ideological conflict serves only one power: the US. The question is whether the tide in West Asia can continue to turn against Washington’s designs – as it did with the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement, the increased independence of OPEC+, and the region’s masses demonstrating growing support for Palestine.
