Compilation image showing protestors and Recep Erdoğan. Photo: The Cradle.
By Ceyda Karan – Mar 23, 2025
Facing an unprecedented challenge from popular opposition leader Ekrem Imamoglu, President Erdogan is launching a sweeping crackdown that could determine not just the next election – but the future of democracy in Turkiye.
After years of lacking a charismatic leader, Turkiye’s opposition found one in Ekrem Imamoglu – a sharp orator and tactician whose growing popularity poses a serious threat to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decades-long grip on power. But as Imamoglu’s star rises, so too does the pressure from Erdogan’s government, culminating in a sweeping campaign to derail his political future.
This week, Imamoglu’s university diploma, which is a requirement to qualify for the Turkish presidency, was suddenly revoked by the academic institution. The next day, he was detained in a dramatic dawn raid on controversial ‘corruption and terrorism’ charges along with 105 others. Their assets were frozen, and pro-government media splashed the arrests across headlines in an apparent attempt at public defamation.
Today – 23 March – Imamoglu was formally arrested in the early morning hours. As the accusations against the popular politician slowly unfold, the traces of a tragicomic political revenge operation become visible.
The rapid chain of events has given way to massive protests across the country since the weekend. Turkiye is being shaken in a way it has not experienced for many years. For days, populations in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Antalya, Adana, and other major cities have violated the government’s demonstration ban. And they don’t seem to be leaving the streets.
The Erdogan-Imamoglu fight is no longer just a political rivalry – it is becoming a defining confrontation that could reshape Turkiye’s democratic future.
Imamoglu, Istanbul’s mayor since 2019, is viewed by Erdogan as a palpable political threat to Erdogan, who has ruled Turkiye for 23 years, consolidating power, sidelining institutions, and transforming the country into a presidential system via a controversial 2017 referendum.
A familiar pattern of suppression
For two-thirds of its more than 100-year history, the modern Turkish Republic was accustomed to peaceful transitions of power in a viable parliamentary democracy. Although military interim regimes produced striking results, the army always eventually paved the way for civilian politics in short order.
For the Turkish people, changes in leadership were commonplace in a relatively competitive environment. Things changed with the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its own charismatic leader Erdogan, who came to power in the early 2000s as part of the country’s integration into the western neoliberal model of governance. The Turkish people have not known another ruler since.
Throughout his reign, Erdogan has relied on a mix of political maneuvering, populist rhetoric, institutional control, and favorable international conditions to eliminate rivals and maintain dominance. But Imamoglu represents a different kind of challenge.
The scale and speed of the campaign to sideline Istanbul’s mayor has shocked observers across the political spectrum. Analysts are likening the media spectacle to the notorious “Ergenekon operations” of the 2000s, when alleged coup plotters were swept up in mass arrests led by the Gulenist network within the judiciary – many of whom later turned on Erdogan during a failed 2016 coup to unseat him.
To most, the spate of mass detentions this past week is a clear sign that Erdogan is trying to eliminate his most credible challenger ahead of the next presidential election.
More than just a mayor: Imamoglu’s meteoric rise
Imamoglu’s journey to national prominence has been swift and, for Erdogan, deeply inconvenient.
Originally the mayor of Beylikduzu, a fast-growing district on Istanbul’s western edge, Imamoglu was relatively unknown beyond his constituency. But in 2019, pro-Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu nominated him as the party’s candidate for Istanbul – a surprising choice at the time.
To nearly everyone’s astonishment, Imamoglu won. However, his victory of 23,000 votes was challenged by Erdogan’s AKP, which demanded recounts and ultimately annulled the result. The Supreme Election Council controversially ordered a re-run, citing irregularities despite no concrete evidence.
Rather than weaken Imamoglu’s momentum, the move galvanized public support for him. In the June 2019 re-election, he won by over 800,000 votes, delivering Erdogan his most painful political defeat to date and returning control of Turkiye’s largest city to the opposition after decades.
For Erdogan, the loss was personal. Istanbul is the city where he began his political career as mayor in the 1990s. It is Turkiye’s economic powerhouse, and controlling it has long been central to his party’s political machine.
Imamoglu’s popularity has only grown since those events to scuttle his candidacy. Though a member of the secular, center-left CHP, he hails from a conservative, business-oriented family in Trabzon on the Black Sea coast. He speaks in a language that resonates with a broader audience – including both religious conservatives and nationalists. His appeal cuts across ideological lines in a way few CHP figures have managed.
Calm, humorous, and articulate without a teleprompter, Imamoglu stands in contrast to both Erdogan’s bombast and the staid image of the CHP’s traditional elites. He is also seen as emotionally in tune with voters – a political asset in a country increasingly weary of economic hardship and polarization.
Internationally, Imamoglu has also drawn attention. Western policymakers view him as someone who could restore balance and predictability to Turkiye’s foreign relations – without alienating the electorate.
The painful 2023–2024 election cycle
The stakes were already high when the 2023 presidential election came around. Amid a deepening economic crisis, Erdogan faced a serious challenge from CHP leader Kilicdaroglu, who ran as the joint candidate of the National Alliance. But to secure consensus within the bloc, Kilicdaroglu promised to appoint both Imamoglu and Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas as vice presidents if elected.
Despite the unusual coalition he assembled, Kilicdaroglu lost narrowly in the second round. The National Alliance collapsed soon after, and the CHP descended into internal disputes. Kilicdaroglu was eventually replaced as leader by Ozgur Ozel in November 2023.
But in the 2024 local elections, the CHP rebounded. Imamoglu was re-elected mayor of Istanbul with a record margin, defeating Erdogan-backed candidate Murat Kurum by over a million votes. The CHP retained the mayorship of Ankara and also won several other provinces, dealing a humiliating blow to Erdogan.
The victory also cemented Imamoglu’s place as the leading opposition figure – and, for many, the natural presidential candidate for 2028.
Erdogan’s candidacy for the presidency in the last election was also problematic due to the constitutional limit of two 5-year terms. He ran for a third term in 2023. His first term in office in the parliamentary system before the transition to the Turkish-type presidential system did not ‘count.’
That momentum may be why the government’s legal offensive has intensified. Imamoglu already faced a suspended prison sentence and a political ban over a flippant comment in 2019, when he called the annulment of the Istanbul election “stupid” – a remark deemed insulting to the election board.
In 2024, attention turned to supposed irregularities in his university transfer from Northern Cyprus to Istanbul in the early 1990s. Then, this month, Istanbul University suddenly invalidated his degree – effectively disqualifying him from running for president.
This was followed by the mass detention operation in which city officials and businesspeople linked to the municipality were arrested. Some of the charges leveled against them were simply bizarre. For example, the head of Istanbul’s Planning Agency, Bugra Gokce, was accused of “contradicting state statistics” by publishing cost-of-living data more aligned with the Chamber of Commerce than the state-run statistics agency, TUIK.
The government’s allegations of ‘corruption’ contain few details, and include charges such as concert fees paid to artists at municipal events and tenders to public relations companies. Furthermore, it appears that most of the accusations are based on secret witnesses and mere rumors.
Pro-government media tried to frame the arrests as a blow against elite corruption. For the detained developer businessman Ali Nuhoglu, it was stated that ‘Nuhoglu, who sold cheap houses to Imamoglu, was caught while fleeing with 40 million TL’. However, a video of Nuhoglu accompanying the police to his office, entering the password of his safe, and handing over his money and documents was later published – debunking the government’s dramatic narrative.
Erdogan insists the judiciary is independent. Yet he admitted in a speech that many of the case files were initiated based on information provided by members of Imamoglu’s own party – undermining the government’s claims of neutrality.
The ‘Terror’ card and the Kurdish question
The most explosive accusation against Imamoglu thus far is that he “collaborated with terrorism” by forming an election alliance in 2019 with the HDP (now DEM), the party representing Kurdish interests. Prosecutors now claim the agreement led to municipal jobs for Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-linked individuals – despite security clearances being the Interior Ministry’s responsibility.
The timing of Ergodan’s latest offensive is critical. Since late 2023, the Turkish president has launched a “second Kurdish opening” aimed at reducing armed conflict and possibly engaging with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. This shift, driven by his nationalist coalition partner Devlet Bahceli, could create a new political alliance with DEM.
Some analysts believe Erdogan hopes to trade constitutional reform for DEM’s political support. Columnist Mehmet Ali Guller argues that removing Imamoglu from the scene is central to this strategy:
“Erdogan wants to gain the right to be elected again, and this time without limits, with a new constitution. This is the ‘internal reason’ for the process of agreement with Ocalan , which was initiated under Bahceli ’s leadership. Erdogan hopes to first change the constitution by getting DEM votes under Ocalan’s instructions, and then win the election.”
Turkish political analyst Aydin Sezer agrees:
“This has put Erdoğan on a path of no return. In the short term, he is trying to ensure that he becomes a candidate through elections and that Imamoglu cannot be a candidate, while he is working on a position that involves the design of the politics after him. For Erdogan, there is no other way but to conclude this successfully. He took a serious risk.”
Guller draws attention to the irony of accusing Imamoglu of supporting ‘terrorism’ due to his alliance with DEM:
“In other words, the Palace is both trying to get Kurdish votes and to liquidate Imamoglu, who has the potential to get Kurdish votes. At the same time, he is trying to convict the CHP of collaborating with terrorism in order to weaken the nationalist votes of the possible new candidate who may be nominated to replace Imamoglu. They used to say ‘there are many games in the Ottoman Empire’, ‘there are many games in the Neo-Ottoman Empire’ too.”
Can elections be trusted anymore?
Inside the CHP, Imamoglu continues to build support as the party’s likely next presidential candidate. Although Ozgur Ozel currently holds the leadership position, Imamoglu is seen as the one with national recognition and cross-ideological backing. His recent countrywide tour was widely interpreted as the first step toward a presidential bid.
Associate Professor Fatih Yasli believes Turkiye is already transitioning into what he calls a “de-electionized” system, where elections are held, but genuine competition is stifled. The legal system, media, and even electoral boards can be weaponized, while opposition parties are reduced to controlled alternatives.
Yasli also sees Erdogan’s recent overtures to the EU – framed around regional diplomacy and peacekeeping in Ukraine – as a bid to legitimize his increasingly authoritarian governance model on the global stage.
“Erdogan’s goal,” Yasli says, “is to be leader for as long as his lifespan allows.”
The campaign against Imamoglu is a turning point for Turkiye. For years, Erdogan thrived on a narrative of popular victimhood, pointing to past injustices to justify his rule. But now, he risks turning his most dangerous opponent into the same kind of martyr he once was.
With economic pain worsening and democratic safeguards eroding, the battle over Imamoglu’s fate is not just about one man. It is about the future of political change in Turkiye – whether it can still happen at the ballot box, or whether the system has already closed in on itself.
