Henrique Capriles at a political-electoral rally ahead of the May 25 elections. File photo.
Henrique Capriles’ qualification to run for public office after eight years of disqualification brings to the fore, once again, two factors that are successively linked: the opposition’s repeated loop of abstention versus pursuing the electoral route and, therefore, the deep division of the political and electoral organizations in the opposition.
However, perhaps the most important among these variables has to do with the vacuum in leadership in the opposition. The deflation of María Corina Machado after months of inoperativeness and the lack of ability to impose her abstentionist line on others in the opposition has left an abyss that continues to haunt the opposition’s approach. This begs the question: will anyone be able to fill this void?
Divisions and subdivisions
According to Capriles himself, after his disqualification expires, he will be a candidate for the National Assembly for the May 25 elections. In this way, he ratified Juan Requesens as candidate for the governorship of Miranda, both under a new party banner: Union and Change.
In mid-February, the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) demanded “conditions” for electoral participation, including the illegal and unconstitutional assumption of Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia as “president.”
The proposal caused a diatribe to break out among the oppositions, since the abstentionist side of Machado and Gonzalez prevailed against the inclinations of Capriles and the parties Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) and Movimiento por Venezuela (MPV) towards electoral participation.
Thus, some of the parties that are part of the “unitary” platform, such as UNT and MPV, opened the way to the electoral route with the possibility that other traditional parties such as Primero Justicia (PJ) and, above all, Acción Democrática (AD) join the caravan, both of which have electoral cards.
Recently, several leaders have manifested themselves in favor of the electoral option, including the following: Luis Eduardo Martinez, Antonio Ecarri, David Uzcátegui, Manuel Rosales, Henri Falcón, Luis Florido, Jesús “Chúo” Torrealba, and Omar Barboza.
The list continues, in disagreement with the abstentionist path promoted by Machado.
For this very reason, and now with the former governor of Miranda as candidate for deputy, the deep divergence existing among the political tendencies of the opposition is exposed, even in leadership subdivisions. This also shows that its leaders are driven to consolidate their authority in regional contexts.
Preserving the status quo
Among the oppositions, there are regional leaderships but no national leaderships in sight.
We can highlight the figures of Rosales in Zulia and Morel Rodriguez in Nueva Esparta, where they have consolidated their bases in a deep-rooted manner.
Facing the political-electoral hegemony of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), together with the support of the groups that comprise the Great Simon Bolivar Patriotic Pole—sustained by a solid unity, first around Chávez and then Maduro—many have tried to cultivate themselves in a state or region in order to maintain themselves in the necessary margins of relevance.
Capriles did so in Miranda, before and after his presidential candidacies that culminated in failures. His instinct of political preservation led him to move, after 2012 and 2013, towards a definitive regionalization of his leadership, where he could keep himself with a certain amount of public management—until his disqualification in 2017.
But undoubtedly, the examples of Rosales and Rodriguez are characteristic of this type of leadership, which usually asserts itself among the opposition. On a national scale, there is no one who has even a hint of authority, much less leadership, among the opposition leaders.
Therefore, there is a remarkable awareness of these politicians to safeguard the status quo in their own regional domains. The call to vote by governors up for re-election and other leaders has much to do with the politics of regionalization that distinguishes these candidates.
However, there may be some emerging candidates hoping to capitalize on the next elections with a view towards a national horizon, such as Ecarri or Capriles himself (these from a less influential position than a governorship). This would also put them in an active discussion—in the legislative forum—and grant them public significance in the dynamics of the country.
There may be some variables in favor of a scenario that, at least, intends to unify the oppositions; but for the time being, none of this seems feasible.
Possible change of game in the opposition chessboard
It is possible that Capriles is willing to apply a game changer within the political ecosystem of the oppositions, taking into account his expertise in electoral contests, especially regional ones.
This could indicate that he is trying to present himself as an alternative to the abstentionism of the extremist factors. In a recent interview he categorically said: “I believe in the path of electoral participation” and “abstention is a mistake.”
Furthermore, he is the only candidate who is speaking in national terms, of a supposed “fight for democracy.” This is in contradiction with Machado, who recently accused him of being a “traitor.”
So far, Capriles’ strategy seems to be aimed at becoming a unifying figure on May 25, under the projection that abstention will lead Machado to an even more marginal position. From there, he would seek to establish himself as the consensus opposition leader, with the required charisma, to rule over the ashes of the extremist factions, constituting himself as an “alternative.”
In another recent interview, the former governor affirmed that “the way not to give up is to express yourself and make use of your rights.” The disagreement between these positions shows that Capriles is using a discourse of polarization with María Corina [Machado], in spite of the electoral nature of May 25.
On the other hand, and at the same time, he would try to capitalize with Requesens on the recovery of the influence lost in the Mirandino bastion. In both senses, both his electoral discourse, as well as his support for his underling Requesens, place him as a sort of “campaign manager,” that is to say, one who provides the guidelines and calls plays in the Venezuelan political scenario.
May 25 Venezuela Elections: Justice First Expels Henrique Capriles
Thus, Capriles’ calculation would consist in emerging as a post-electoral authority figure, waging everything on strong participation in the regional and legislative elections to, subsequently, demonstrate Machado’s failure and generate a new, clean opposition board upon which he will stand out.
A risky move where everything could go wrong—very badly. After all, he is Capriles.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
SL
