The image shows the flag of Morocco alongside a map of South America, symbolizing Morocco’s relationship and ties with the Latin American region. Photo: Internationalist 360°.
By Victoria G. Corera – Aug 26, 2026
Something is changing in Latin America regarding Western Sahara. It is not a uniform movement, nor can it be explained solely by the old left-right divide, but Morocco is making significant diplomatic progress in a region where, for decades, the Sahrawi cause found some of its strongest international support.
Colombia has just provided the most striking example. Barely had Abelardo de la Espriella’s government taken office when Bogotá froze its relations with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and went even further: it expressly recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This shift reverses the policy of Gustavo Petro’s government and is accompanied by a declared commitment to expanding cooperation with Morocco in trade, investment, food security, port infrastructure, and transatlantic connectivity.
It would be a mistake to consider Colombia an exception. Ecuador suspended its recognition of the SADR in 2024; Bolivia suspended its relations with the Sahrawi Republic in February 2026 while fully restoring its ties with Rabat; Honduras announced a similar move in April, and the new Peruvian government has openly expressed its support for Morocco’s position on the territory.
There’s no need to imagine conspiracies or search for a secret contract exchanging fertilizer for diplomatic recognition. International politics usually operates in a far less rudimentary way. What does warrant attention, however, is the coincidence between these developments and a Moroccan strategy that offers economic cooperation, investments, markets, logistical connections, and trade opportunities while placing Western Sahara at the heart of its foreign relations.
What today appears to be a series of national shifts had been brewing for years in Latin American regional spaces as well. In June 2022, the Latin American and Caribbean Platform of Solidarity with the Sahrawi People (PLACSO) was already warning the Andean Parliament of Morocco’s attempts to garner institutional support for its position on Western Sahara. This warning is particularly significant when viewed from the perspective of 2026: among the countries that at that time maintained relations, recognition, or were engaged in rapprochement processes with the Sahrawi Republic were precisely Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Honduras—several of which have since modified their position in favor of Rabat.
Three years later, in 2025, a plenary session of the Andean Parliament was held in Morocco, and its president presented the kingdom as a “strategic bridge between Africa, Europe, and Latin America.” A parliamentary delegation also traveled to El Aaiún on a visit organized within the Moroccan political and administrative framework. This alone does not demonstrate a coordinated strategy behind each change of government, but it does reveal a continuity: Morocco is not simply reacting to new Latin American political scenarios. For years, it has been building relationships, occupying institutional spaces, and associating its territorial claim with a much more attractive offer for its interlocutors: trade, cooperation, and access to Africa.
Chile demonstrates the extent to which this narrative has taken hold. Santiago is rapidly deepening its economic ties with Rabat and has begun talks toward what would be its first trade agreement with an African country. In justifying this rapprochement, the Chilean government has resorted to virtually the same idea that emerged a year earlier in the Andean Parliament: Morocco as a “gateway” to the African continent.
The commercial logic is understandable. Morocco has ports, international connections, business networks, and a growing economic presence in various African countries. But accepting this logistical advantage doesn’t mean accepting the accompanying political narrative.
Morocco is in Africa, but Morocco is not Africa.
Africa comprises dozens of states, diverse interests, political projects, and societies. And there’s something particularly inconvenient for Rabat’s narrative: the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is also in Africa and is a full member of the African Union, just like Morocco. Presenting Rabat as a natural intermediary between Latin America and Africa risks reducing an entire continent to the foreign interests of one of its states.
Chile also offers another clue. A significant portion of its imports from Morocco are linked to phosphate fertilizers, a strategic product for an export-oriented agricultural economy. This doesn’t imply that Chilean policy on Western Sahara is bought with phosphates, nor that these fertilizers necessarily come from mines in the occupied territory. But it does serve as a reminder that diplomatic positions are never formed in an economic vacuum.
Despite Morocco’s advance, another Latin America continues to exist. Mexico maintains relations with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and continues to defend the right to self-determination at the United Nations; Venezuela even maintains an ambassador accredited to the SADR; Cuba reiterated its support for self-determination this year, and Uruguay maintains a clear political tradition of solidarity with the Sahrawi people.
Brazil is perhaps the clearest example of this middle ground. It does not recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, maintains a significant economic relationship with Morocco, and has increasingly used language favorable to Moroccan “efforts” and its autonomy proposal, but continues to formally place the solution within the United Nations process. Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference compared to other Latin American countries: Brazil has had its own African policy for decades, direct relations with numerous capitals on the continent, and ambitions of becoming a power in the Global South. It may consider Morocco a trading partner and a useful platform—the Brazilian administration itself emphasizes its economic connection with Europe and the rest of Africa—but it hardly needs to accept Rabat as its gateway to a continent that Brasília has long been entering through many other doors.
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Argentina presents a different paradox. A government ideologically close to some of the forces currently supporting Morocco might be tempted to join that movement, but the Falklands/Malvinas issue introduces a structural constraint that extends far beyond the current administration. For decades, Buenos Aires has built a significant part of its foreign policy around the United Nations, decolonization, and the defense of its territorial claim against the United Kingdom. This does not mean that Argentina considers the Falklands/Malvinas and Western Sahara cases identical—in fact, it expressly maintains that the principle of self-determination is not applicable to the Falklands/Malvinas due to the particular characteristics of that dispute—but it does make it politically delicate to simply endorse a state unilaterally declaring a territorial issue still on the United Nations’ decolonization agenda resolved. Argentine diplomacy has traditionally advocated for a negotiated solution to the Sahara within the framework of the UN.
Chile presents a third contradiction. It has never formally recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), although for years there have been very favorable positions in Parliament, political parties, and civil society regarding Sahrawi self-determination. At the same time, its economic relations with Morocco are growing rapidly: in 2025, bilateral trade reached $80.2 million, with Chilean imports far exceeding its exports, and phosphate fertilizers playing a central role. In 2026, both governments also took the first step toward what could become Chile’s first trade agreement with an African country. Rabat offers fertilizers, markets, and the promise of serving as a platform to Africa. This combination does not demonstrate that Morocco dictates Chilean policy on the Sahara, but it helps to explain why Santiago proceeds with a caution that contrasts sharply with the strength that the Sahrawi cause maintains within a segment of society and its institutions.
But this complexity shouldn’t obscure the essential point: Morocco is actively vying for Latin American space with the Sahrawi solidarity movement and the Sahrawi Republic’s own diplomacy. And it seems to have grasped very well what it can offer: business, cooperation, fertilizers, markets, ports, and the promise of access to Africa.
The problem begins when that diplomatic exchange requires forgetting what Western Sahara is. No trade agreement can erase the fact that it remains a territory awaiting decolonization.
No change of Latin American government alters the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. And no unilateral recognition transforms occupation into sovereignty.
Morocco can win over governments. It can secure declarations, freezes on relations, and new trading partners. It can even get some Latin American countries to look to Africa from Rabat.
But a series of diplomatic victories should not be mistaken for a definitive defeat of the Sahrawi cause in Latin America. There are still states that recognize the Sahrawi Republic, governments that defend self-determination, parliaments, political parties, unions, universities, and social movements where solidarity with the Sahrawi people remains deeply rooted. And there is something more: governments change. Diplomatic decisions that bring a country closer to Rabat today can be revised tomorrow, as Latin America’s own history of recognitions, suspensions, and restorations of relations with the SADR demonstrates.
Moroccan diplomacy now possesses far greater economic and political resources, but it has not yet achieved the essential goal: to ensure that Western Sahara ceases to be an unresolved issue of decolonization and that the international legitimacy of the Sahrawi claim disappears. Despite all the setbacks, this remains the main limitation to its progress.
Africa doesn’t begin or end in Morocco. And Western Sahara won’t disappear just because it’s inconvenient for doing business.
After fifty years of occupation, perhaps the question is no longer just what Morocco is offering in Latin America. We must also ask what some governments are willing to give up in order to accept the offer.
