Composition showing Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, members of Palestinian armed resistance groups, and an elderly Palestinian after casting their vote, in the backdrop of Gaza devastated by Zionist aggression. Photo: The Cradle.
By Mohammad al-Ayoubi – Aug 27, 2026
As Palestinians prepare for their first legislative vote in two decades, PA-imposed conditions threaten to exclude resistance factions from a contest that may shape Gaza’s post-war political order.
Twenty years after Palestinians last elected a legislature, Hamas is talking to former Fatah rivals about how to contest the next one. Current contacts could produce a list bringing together Hamas, Mohammed Dahlan’s Fatah Reform Current, and other factions and independents.
As those contacts move into the open, Dr Ali Baraka, head of Hamas’s National Relations Department, revealed details of the internal discussions in an exclusive statement to The Cradle.
He says that “the movement is seeking to form a broad national alliance comprising most or all factions, political forces, and national figures, including the Fatah movement headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.”
He acknowledges, however, that “Fatah does not want to participate in a broad national list that includes Hamas.” Fatah’s refusal has pushed several opposition groups toward participation rather than another boycott.
On 9 July, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree setting 28 November as the date for legislative elections, the first in two decades. That last vote gave Hamas a parliamentary majority, before the Fatah–Hamas rupture of 2007 divided the Palestinian political system between the occupied West Bank and Gaza. It comes amid the genocidal war on Gaza now entering its third year and an unprecedented escalation in the occupied West Bank.
The decree divided those who welcomed a return to the polls from those who questioned its purpose. The amended election law requires candidates to endorse the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) political program and relevant international resolutions—a condition Palestinian factions and rights groups say could be used to exclude forces that uphold armed resistance.
Baraka categorically rejects this, arguing that “these conditions are intended to exclude the resistance factions and contradict the people’s right to choose their representatives.” Critics view those conditions as the price of securing international acceptance and avoiding an Israeli veto.
Even then, will the election take place? Or will it meet the fate of earlier decrees, leaving the factions to relive the shock of 2006 while new alliances decide whether the ballot is worth entering at all?
A ballot that may never arrive
On paper, the decree starts the electoral clock, although two forces could still stop it. The first concerns the PA’s internal calculations. The nightmare of 2006 still hangs over decision-makers, who fear not only Hamas but also opposition currents growing within Fatah itself.
Baraka points to another source of doubt, noting that President Abbas did not consult any of the factions before setting the date, despite the 2021 Cairo agreement.
He questions the credibility of a vote called without prior dialogue, recalling that the decision to cancel the elections on 29 April 2021 also came as a surprise.
The second, more decisive factor is the occupation. Israel in 2026 bears little resemblance to the political order that permitted Palestinian voting in 1996 and 2006.
Its far-right government is advancing the logic of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s “Decisive Plan.” Baraka says that “there are no guarantees from any party that the elections will be conducted freely and fairly, or that candidates will not be arrested by the occupation.”
He recalls the arrest of dozens of deputies elected in 2006 and warns that the occupation can detain candidates before or after they win. In his view, Israel has no interest in allowing Palestinians to rebuild legitimate institutions with a popular mandate.
Rules written to exclude
The timing has divided Palestinian opinion. One camp regards elections as an indefensible “luxury” amid genocide, arguing that the priority should be confronting the war and settlement expansion and forming a national unity government, rather than holding elections that may deepen the division.
Dr Ahmad Majdalani, secretary-general of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) and a member of the PLO Executive Committee, takes the opposite view, treating the vote as a national necessity that can no longer be postponed. Speaking to The Cradle, he says that “postponing democracy indefinitely on the pretext of occupation and division is not the right choice.”
“The erosion of the political system and the obsolescence of its representation make recourse to the people a national necessity. Elections are an entry point for rebuilding the system, renewing its legitimacy, and restoring citizens’ confidence,” says Majdalani.
For Baraka, Gaza and the occupied West Bank remain more urgent than the electoral timetable.
He says the highest priority today is to stop the aggression, lift the siege on Gaza, halt the Judaization of Jerusalem, and end the attacks in the occupied West Bank. He stresses that “the decision to hold elections is the decision of the head of the Authority, not Hamas. We have not boycotted them; we consider them a historic opportunity to unify the ranks, provided that they encompass the Legislative Council, the presidency, and the National Council.”
Researcher Mahmoud Abu Bakr tells The Cradle that Palestinians should proceed on the basis of “working as though they will happen, while taking precautions on the basis that they will not.”
He criticizes amendments that impose a test of “political loyalty” on candidates and briefly raise the legislature from 132 to 200 seats, reducing the PA to an “administration of a population under occupation.”
Baraka echoes that criticism, describing the requirement to accept the PLO’s program and the resolutions of international legitimacy as a pre-emptive “veto” on any list representing the resistance. He says the condition is unlawful and violates previous understandings.
Old rivals, temporary allies
Hamas is discussing a joint list with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Mohammed Dahlan’s Reform Current, and the current led by Nasser al-Qudwa. Baraka says Hamas initiated consultations with several factions in Cairo and Lebanon to form this broad national list.
He insists that “The door is open to Fatah if it wishes to participate, without placing a veto on any faction.” Baraka adds that Hamas is prepared to turn an electoral pact into a broader political alliance and national front that would rebuild the PLO on the basis of partnership and confront the occupation and settlement expansion.
Suleiman Basharat, director of the Yabous Center, is more cautious. “It is far too early to judge whether these alliances have matured,” he says. “Everything taking place is an attempt to test positions and gauge reactions. The parties are driven by interests, and firm convictions have not yet formed. The rapprochement among Hamas, Dahlan, and Qudwa is not mature, but the product of a temporary political need. Hamas recognizes the need to move beyond the ideological project, while Dahlan wants to return through the gateway of alliances. Yet the absence of complete faith in the alliance makes it fragile.”
Baraka counters that Fatah requested a meeting with Hamas, then withdrew on Saturday from the talks scheduled for Monday, 24 August, repeating its earlier retreat from a meeting in Ankara.
He reads the cancellation as evidence that Fatah is resisting genuine national unity and trying to fragment its opponents following the National Alliance’s announcement on 19 August.
Gaza outside the register
The Central Elections Commission, meanwhile, is proceeding as though the political disputes can be settled later. In an exclusive statement to The Cradle, commission spokesperson Farid Taamallah outlines the electoral timetable.
Field registration ran from 15 to 19 August across the occupied West Bank. Gaza was excluded from that registration drive; the commission says residents’ voting rights remain protected and that special arrangements will be announced later. No mechanism has been published for voting inside a territory devastated by war and occupation.
Taamallah nevertheless acknowledges that the strip presents a “politically and logistically complex process.”
For Baraka, the obstacles are both political and logistical, as Israel continues to hinder the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, kill and injure people in Gaza, and prevent the administrative committee from entering the strip. He calls for international guarantees from the UN, EU, and Arab League to protect candidates and campaign gatherings, while stressing that Hamas will not give up its right to participate in elections as part of the Palestinian people’s right to elected institutions.
The law provides for full proportional representation through closed nationwide lists for a 132-seat Legislative Council. Gaza’s voter register, however, remains out of date. Taamallah concedes that “political problems require political, not technical, solutions,” warning that Israel “can obstruct the process” in the absence of political cover.
Ballots on Washington’s terms
Basharat traces the election call to outside pressure, arguing that “the elections did not arise from an internal Palestinian desire, but are a response to US and regional pressure.”
“The leadership was left with no other choice,” he notes. “The move toward elections is being read as one of the requirements of the US plan to produce a new political leadership suited to the next phase, with legitimacy derived from the ballot box.”
Baraka goes further, accusing Abbas of answering to personal calculations and foreign intervention.
He claims that the EU threatened to cut financial support to the PA unless Abbas issued the decree. Abbas has repeatedly changed the composition of the elected bodies. In June, he raised the elected Legislative Council from 132 to 200 seats, then restored it to 132 on 11 August.
A separate plan for the Palestinian National Council allocates 200 places to representatives from inside Palestine: the 132 elected legislators plus 68 members chosen by agreement, alongside 150 representatives from the diaspora.
Baraka accuses the PA of seeking to install presidential loyalists abroad rather than permit free voting among Palestinian communities, a formula Hamas rejects in full.
Who governs Gaza after the war?
Majdalani ties the vote directly to the struggle over who will govern Gaza after the war. He warns that an international and regional track is discussing an end to the war, reconstruction, security arrangements, and a civilian administration for the Gaza Strip, with multiple visions and plans linked to the coming phase.
The danger, he says, lies in who controls that transition. “We reject any attempt to turn Gaza into a political entity separate from the West Bank and Jerusalem, to make reconstruction an entry point for reshaping Palestinian geopolitics, or to use aid and financing to produce a Palestinian political system imposed from abroad,” he states.
Baraka argues that Hamas’s proposed national alliance is a broader political project, not just an electoral one, aimed at preserving national principles and confronting annexation and displacement. He says Israel’s continued violations of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement show that Gaza’s future cannot be settled through external deals, but requires national unity. Fair elections, he argues, could help achieve this unity, while an exclusionary process would serve Washington’s interests.
Fatah closes the door
Majdalani says the visit to Cairo by a Fatah delegation headed by Vice President Hussein al-Sheikh cannot be reduced to a prospective bilateral meeting with Hamas.
He notes that canceling the meeting with Hamas for the second time “sends a negative message, particularly at this stage, when direct Palestinian dialogue is needed—not only over the elections, but over the future of the political system, the unity of institutions, the situation in the Gaza Strip, the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, and the future of the national project as a whole.”
Baraka says Hamas was surprised when Fatah canceled a Monday meeting it had requested, while meetings with Egypt and Dahlan’s Reform Current remained scheduled. He calls the move inappropriate and evidence of a lack of seriousness about unity, arguing that Fatah has become influenced by regional and international pressures to keep Palestinians divided. He stresses that Palestinian dialogue does not require Israeli or US approval and says Hamas will continue seeking the broadest possible national alliance.
The vote beyond the vote
The election remains on the calendar for 28 November, but much can still prevent Palestinians from reaching the ballot box. The factions are still far from a common position capable of renewing political legitimacy or unifying the Palestinian system.
Any vote held under occupation and war, without consensus and under restrictive conditions, remains trapped in the contradiction expressed by Majdalani:
“Do not fear democracy; fear its absence.” He concedes, however, that “what is required is to turn the elections into a stage of reconstruction. Otherwise, we will leave a vacuum for foreign interventions.”
The conditions surrounding the vote leave several questions unanswered. Can ballot boxes function amid genocide? Can technical procedures compensate for the absence of consensus, given Hamas’s insistence on participating and its rejection of the conditions, and Fatah’s hesitation and confusion? Are the elections an avenue for renewing legitimacy, or a tool for deepening the division and advancing plans for liquidation?
The coming months will show whether Palestine is heading toward a ballot or another replay of 2021.
Behind the contest over seats lies a larger argument over “what kind of Palestine do we build after the elections: the united Palestine of resistance described by Hamas, or the Palestine of administration and foreign agendas feared by others?”
