
Compilation image featuring Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Photo: MintPress News.

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Compilation image featuring Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Photo: MintPress News.
By Kit KlarenbergĀ –Ā Sep 27, 2023
Throughout August and September, anti-government protests have rocked Syrian cities. While the crowds are typically small, numbering only a few hundred, they show little sign of abating. Demonstrators are motivated byĀ increasingly unlivableĀ economic conditions spurred by crippling U.S.-led international sanctions against Damascus. These have produced hyperinflation, mass food insecurity, and many daily hardships for the population. They also preventĀ vital humanitarian aidĀ from entering the country.
The media has given the unrest blanket coverage. No reference to Washingtonās central role in imposing the misery under which average Syrians suffer today, let alone that several key figures in the protests are former opposition fighters who laid down their arms under a government-approvedĀ reconciliation dealĀ in 2018, can be found in the reporting.
By contrast, mainstream news outlets appearĀ positivelyĀ exuberant at the prospect of a new Syrian ārevolutionā erupting, and many comparisons have been drawn to the protests in March 2011 that turned into an all-out war by the yearās end. In the process, the long-standing, indomitably established narrative that those demonstrations were initially peaceful and only turned violent after many months in response to brutal repression by authorities has been endlessly reiterated.
This is despite the reality of what happened during that fateful time being spelled out in the Syrian governmentās own internal documents. Namely, records of the Central Crisis Management Cell, created in March 2011 by Damascus to manage responses to the rioting that began a few weeks earlier.
While mainstream outlets haveĀ previously reportedĀ on this trove,Ā dubbing themĀ āThe Assad Files,ā they have universally misrepresented, distorted or simply falsified the contents to wrongfully convict Syrian officials of horrific crimes. In some instances, quite literally. The documents show that Assad and his ministers struggled valiantly to prevent the upheaval from escalating into violence on either side, protect demonstrators, and keep the situation under control.
Meanwhile, sinister, unseen forces systematically murdered security service officials, pro-government figures, and protesters to foment catastrophe in a manner similar to many CIA regime change operations old and new. This shocking story has never before been told. Now, with dark insurrectionary clouds again pullulating over Damascus, it must be.
For the most part, the streets of Syria remained stubbornly calm.
This was despite relentless calls for upheaval by local opposition elements.Ā Repeated demandsĀ for a āday of rageā against the government of Bashar al-Assad were widely publicized in the Western media but locally unheeded. As āAl JazeeraāĀ explained in FebruaryĀ of that year, Syrians had no appetite for regime change. For one, the countryās ethnically and religiously diverse population cherished their stateās secularism and feared unrest would create potentially violent tensions between them all.
Inconveniently, too, Assad was extremely popular, particularly with younger Syrians. He was widely perceived as a reformer who encouraged and protected diversity and inclusion and oversaw a system that, while far from perfect, deliveredĀ extremely high standardsĀ of education, healthcare, and much else. Unlike many other leaders in the region, his refusal to accommodate Israel was also greatly respected.
Peace in Damascus finally shattered in mid-March when massive demonstrations broke out in several major cities following weeks of sporadic, small-scale bursts of public disobedience across the country. Reports of thousands arrested and an uncertain number of protesters killedĀ spread widely. This was the spark that ignited the Westās proxy war in Syria. Ominously, mere days earlier, a truck carrying vast quantities of grenades and gunsĀ was interceptedĀ at Syriaās border with Iraq.

Pater Frans was aĀ Jesuit priestĀ from the Netherlands who, in 1980, established a community center and farm near Homs where he preached harmony between faiths and cared for people with disabilities. When the crisis erupted, he began publishingĀ regular observationsĀ of events that were deeply critical of both the government and the opposition.
Along the way, Frans repeatedly noted that āfrom the start,ā he witnessed armed demonstrators fire on police. āVery often,ā he once recorded, āthe violence of the security forces has been a reaction to the brutal violence of the armed rebels.ā In September 2011,Ā he wrote:
From the start there has been the problem of the armed groups, which are also part of the oppositionā¦The opposition of the street is much stronger than any other opposition. And this opposition is armed and frequently employs brutality and violence, only in order then to blame the government.ā
It is unknown whether such problematic insights motivated Fransā murder by armed militantsĀ in April 2014, not long after he refused an offer of UN evacuation.
āNO DROP OF BLOODā
If peaceful protesters were killed in the initial stages of the failed ārevolution,ā the question of who was responsible remains unanswered. The Central Crisis Management Cell records indicate that in the days leading up to the mid-March protests, government officials issued explicit instructions to security forces that citizens āshould not be provokedā:
In order to avoid the consequences of continued incitementā¦and foil the attempts of inciters to exploit any pretext, civil police and security agents are requested not to provoke citizens.ā
Similarly, on April 18, the Cell ordered the military to only ācounter with weapons those who carry weapons against the state, while ensuring that civilians are not harmed.ā Four days later, though, āat leastā 72 protesters wereĀ allegedly shot deadĀ by authorities in Daraa and Douma, the highest reported daily death toll since the demonstrations began. Condemnation from rights groups and Western leaders was fiery.
Three months later, a number of Syrian Arab Army officers defected and formed the Free Syrian Army. Claiming to have become disaffected, they threw their weight behind the opposition due to the April 18 slaughter and alleged the shooting was expressly ordered by their superiors, which they refused to fulfill. However, if orders to execute protesters were given, they evidently werenāt approved by Assad or his ministers.
Contemporary Cell records show that the highest echelons of the Syrian government were extremely unhappy about the killings in Daraa and Douma, with one official cautioning this ādifficult dayā had ācreated a new situationā¦pushing us into circumstances we are better off without.ā They went on to lament, āIf the directives previously issued had been adhered to, we would have prevented bloodshed, and matters would not have come to this culmination.ā
An obvious suspicion is that the use of lethal force was directed by Army commanders planning to defect who wanted to concoct a valiant pretext while creating significant problems for the government. This interpretation is amply reinforced by the defectors who claimed that soldiers who refused the order to kill civilians wereĀ themselves executed.

That narrative wasĀ eagerly seized uponĀ by Western media, rights groups, and the Syrian opposition as proof of Assadās maniacal bloodlust. Yet, even the pro-opposition Syrian Observatory of Human Rights has dismissed it asĀ entirely falseĀ āpropagandaā intended to create divisions within government forces and encourage further defections. More sinisterly, it also provided a convenient explanation for why Syrian security operatives were dying in large numbers after the āpeacefulā protests began.
From late March onwards, targeted killings of security operatives and soldiers by unknown assailants became routine before the military was formally deployed in Syria. By early May, the Cell requested daily updates on casualties among āour own forces.ā Publicly, though, the government initially remained silent on the slaughter. The Cell records suggest officials were afraid of showing weakness, inflaming tensions, and encouraging further violence.
It was notĀ until June, with the slaughter of at least 120 security forces by armed militants whoād taken over the town of Jisr al-Shughour, that Damascus ā and the Western media ā acknowledged the killing spree. Cell records show that by this time, government supporters were being abducted, tortured, and murdered by opposition actors. This led to the formal deployment of the military to handle the crisis, which subsequently became even more deadly. Despite the carnage, the Cellās instructions remained unambiguous.
āEnsure that no drop of blood is shed when confronting and dispersing peaceful demonstrations,ā an August memo states. The following month, an order to āprohibit harming any detaineeā was issued. āIf there is evidenceā that any security official āfell short in carrying out any mission,ā the Cell dictated, āany officer, head of branch or field commanderā implicated would have to explain themselves to the government āto hold them accountable.ā
āTOPPLING DOWN THE REGIMEā
Some of the most compelling passages in the Cell documents refer to unidentified snipers lurking on rooftops and buildings adjacent to protests from the upheavalās beginning, firing on crowds below. One memo records that in late April 2011, a sniper near an Aleppo mosque āshot demonstrators, killing one and injuring 43,ā and āthe situation of some injured is still delicate.ā
As such, āfocusing on arresting inciters, especially those shooting at demonstrators,ā was considered a core priority for the Assad government for much of that year. Around this time, the Cell also hit upon the idea of capturing āa sniper, inciter or infiltratorā and presenting them publicly in a āconvincingā manner. One official suggested that āsurrounding and catching a sniper alive or injured and exposing him in the media is not impossibleā and would ārestore public trust in security agencies and the police.ā
But this never came to pass. Damascus also neglected to publicly present a bombshell document circulated among āthe so-called Syrian opposition in Lebanonā that its intelligence services intercepted in May 2011. The remarkable file, reproduced in full in the Cell records, lays bare the oppositionās insurrectionary plans, providing a clear blueprint for precisely what had happened since March, and what was to come.

The opposition proposed convening mass demonstrations so that security forces āwill lose control of all regions,ā be ātaken unaware,ā and become āexhausted and distracted.ā This, along with āhonest officers and soldiersā joining āthe ranks of the revolution,ā would make ātoppling down the regimeā all the more straightforward, particularly as any crackdown on these protests would encourage a Western āmilitary strike,ā ala Libya. They foresaw mainstream news outlets playing a significant role in making this happen:
Everyone should be confident that with the continuation of demonstrations today, media channels will have no choice but to cover the eventsā¦Al Jazeera will be late due to considerations of mutual interests. But we have Al Arabiya and Western media channels who will come forward, and we will all see the change of tone in covering the events and demonstrations will be aired on all channels and they will have wide coverage.ā
The document is the most palpable evidence to date that the entire Syrian ārevolutionā unfolded according to a pre-prepared, well-honed script. Whether this was drawn up in direct collusion with Western powers remains to be proven. Still, the presence of snipers picking off protesters is a strong indication among many that this was the case.
Unidentified snipers are a frequent fixture of U.S.-orchestrated ācolor revolutionsā and CIA coups, such as theĀ attempted overthrowĀ of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez in 2002 and the 2014 Ukrainian ārevolution.ā In both cases, the shooting of unarmed protesters by snipers was pivotal in unseating the targeted government. In Kiev, demonstrations that began months earlier started running out of steam when 70 protesters were abruptly slain by sniper fire.
This turned the entire crowd violent while triggering an avalanche of international condemnation, which made President Viktor Yanukovychās downfall a fait accompli. In the years since, three Georgian mercenaries have claimed they wereĀ expressly orderedĀ by nationalist opposition actors and a U.S. military veteran embedded with them to carry out a massacre āto sow some chaos.ā Officially, the crime remains unsolved today.
āBURN ENORMOUS SUMSā
The Central Crisis Management Cell documents would have forever remained a Syrian government secret were it not for the enterprising work of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA). This shadowy organization was founded in May 2011 by Western military and intelligence veterans to prosecute Syrian officials for war crimes. Its first act was to train Syrian investigators āin basic international criminal and humanitarian lawā in service of a ādomestic justice process in a future transitional Syria.ā
For years, CIJA enjoyed glowing profiles in major news outlets and connected journalists and rights groups with material that formed the basis of severalĀ hard-hitting investigationsĀ exposing purported Syrian government atrocities. At no point was any concern raised about the Commissionās collaboration with dangerous armed groups to smuggle sensitive documentation out of abandoned government buildings in opposition-occupied areas of the country.
CIJA chief Bill WileyĀ claimed in 2014Ā that his organization worked with every Syrian opposition group āup to but excluding Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.ā However,Ā an investigationĀ by āThe Grayzoneā indicates that the Commissionās staff in Syria were frequently in extremely close quarters with both groups and, in fact, paid them handsomely for their assistance in securing documentation. This included material seized in the city of Raqqa after its January 2014 capture by ISIS, when the terrorist group was massacring Alawites and Christians.
āWe burn enormous sums of money moving this stuff,āĀ Wiley toldĀ The āNew Yorkerā in 2016. Accordingly, CIJA received tens of millions of dollars for these efforts from a number of Western governments, including states at the forefront of the Syrian proxy war.
The Commissionās work produced no prosecutions for many years. This changed in late 2019 when Anwar Raslan and Eyad al-Gharib, two former Damacusā General Intelligence Directorate members,Ā were indictedĀ in Germany for crimes against humanity.

Raslan headed the Directorateās domestic security unit, while al-Gharib was one of his departmental lackeys. The pair defected in December 2012, with Raslan and his family fleeing to Jordan, where he would playĀ āan active and visible role in the Syrian opposition.ā He was part of the opposition delegation to the Geneva II conference on Syria in January 2014. In July of that year, he was granted asylum in Germany.
Following his escape, Raslan told numerous tales of abuse and atrocities perpetrated by his unit and the Syrian government during his 20 years of state service. He claimed his defection was spurred after learning of an apparent opposition attack in Damascus that he was investigating was, in fact, staged by security forces.Ā Significant doubtsĀ about his accounts and whether his defection was principled or just cynical opportunism have been raised.
In a bitter irony, Raslanās loudmouth tendencies were his undoing. His assorted claims provided grounds for his arrest by German authorities and were used against him in his prosecution, which heavily relied on documents seized by CIJA, including the Cell records. AnĀ expert statementĀ submitted to the court by Commission operative Ewan Brown, a British Army veteran, falsely frames these as indicative that Assadās government sanctioned and encouraged brutality and repression against peaceful protesters.
Al-Gharib wasĀ found guiltyĀ of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity and received four-and-a-half years in prison in February 2021. A year later, Raslan was givenĀ life imprisonmentĀ for crimes including mass torture, rape, and murder. The pair were convicted not for personally perpetrating these horrors but for serving in the General Intelligence Directorate when they were allegedly committed. Details of these purported crimes were, inĀ some cases, provided to the court byĀ highly unreliableĀ witnesses.
The conclusion that Al-Gharib and Raslan were prosecuted because they were within easy reach, and CIJA and its Western backers neededĀ somethingĀ to show for all their efforts, is ineluctable. The Commission had good reason to be nervous about failing to fulfill its founding objective. In March 2020, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)Ā formally accusedĀ the organization of āsubmission of false documents, irregular invoicing, and profiteeringā in connection with an EU āRule of Lawā project it ran in Syria.
CIJAās crusade to punish Syrian officials could only succeed in the event of regime change. Its launch in May 2011 shows that foreign actors were laying the foundations for that eventuality from the earliest days of the āpeaceful revolution.ā The recent protests may indicate that Western powers havenāt given up on the objective yet.

Kit Klarenberg is an investigative journalist exploring the role of intelligence services in shaping politics and perceptions.
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