Israeli bombings on Nabi Chit (Lebanon). Photo: Marwan Bou Haidar.
By Ibrahim Al-Amine – MaR 11, 2026
The return of the resistance to the battlefield this swiftly was not, despite elements suggesting otherwise, simply an act of solidarity with Iran. For Hezbollah, the conflict has entered an existential phase, and direct confrontation has become the only way to change the balance of power on the ground.
Understanding this moment requires examining what happened inside the Hezbollah organization since the large-scale war ended in late November 2024. The war was costly. Israel assassinated key figures in the party’s political and military leadership. Yet after absorbing the shock, the organization adopted a deliberate strategy of ambiguity that came to govern its daily operations.
While Hezbollah’s civilian institutions, including its educational, health, and social networks, remained active and visible to the public, the military wing gradually withdrew from view and moved almost entirely underground.
Informal channels that had existed for two decades, through which journalists could gain some insight into the resistance’s activities, were effectively shut down. For reporters, reliable information about the military structure became nearly impossible with no confirmed names, no clear titles, and no meetings or contacts that once existed.
The rules were strictly enforced, and the leadership refused to respond to pressure from supporters who interpreted the silence as weakness.
The last war exposed how deeply Israeli intelligence had penetrated Hezbollah’s internal structure through technology, human sources, and accumulated experience. Yet Israeli officials are now expressing growing concern about the limits of their current knowledge and the real impact of the blows they claim to have inflicted over fifteen months of fighting.
Under these conditions, predicting the resistance’s actions has become difficult.
No state changes its army commander in the middle of a war, and the political leadership will not take steps that would lead to civil conflict.
On the Lebanese political front, senior officials appear to rely largely on the US–Israeli narrative of the regional war. Many within Lebanon’s pro-Western political camp assumed Hezbollah would remain passive. Their calculation was to freeze the question of the party’s weapons until Iran falls, after which, resolving the issue would become straightforward.
Events unfolded differently; Hezbollah chose to open fire.
The Lebanese army, for its part, has made clear it will not be drawn into an internal confrontation. Senior security sources say the army leadership has long warned American and Saudi interlocutors that forcing the military to confront the resistance would lead directly to civil war. With open war now underway with Israel, such a step would amount to political suicide.
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A coordinated campaign, however, has emerged against the army leadership. The “defenders of sovereignty” have launched attacks on the army commander, demanding his dismossal as well as other security chiefs because they refused to implement the government's decision to dissolve the party’s military wing. Washington quickly supported the pressure and reportedly provided Lebanese officials with a shortlist of potential replacements.
A new leadership would be expected to deploy the army against Hezbollah, suppress its supporters by force, and arrest figures linked to the resistance. Some political circles have gone further, discussing dissolving the party and issuing arrest warrants against its secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem.
Even some of the same financial and political figures who oversaw the plundering of depositors’ savings are now proposing to confiscate the assets of Hezbollah-linked institutions, including funds and gold held by the Al-Qard Al-Hassan association, to help repay Lebanon’s banking sector debts.
Until recently, the country appeared close to a dangerous escalation. But according to the latest reports, Lebanese officials say the immediate crisis has been contained. A basic consensus has emerged that no state changes its army commander in the middle of a war, and the political leadership will not take steps that would lead to civil conflict.
The real question confronting Lebanon’s leadership is therefore not what it can do, but what it must avoid doing, particularly steps that would ultimately serve Israel’s interests or ignite civil conflict. The issue is no longer whether the army will confront the resistance, but what role it can realistically play in preventing the situation from spiraling further as the war with Israel intensifies.
