Kursk Nuclear Power Plant with a Russian flag in front. Photo: Maksim Blinov/Sputnik International.
Ukraine’s attempts to attack the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant and “the fact that hostilities are taking place a few kilometers from the nuclear power plant raises great concern,” International Atomic Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said after visiting the facility on Tuesday.
Dr. Chris Busby, a renowned physical chemist, scientific secretary of the European Committee on Radiation Risk and former member of the UK Defense Ministry’s Oversight Committee on Depleted Uranium, shares his concerns about the situation around the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant with Sputnik.
The recent major Ukrainian military incursion across the Russia border in the Kursk oblast has left everyone scratching their heads in puzzlement. What possible advantage is gained in this war by invading an area of no apparent strategic importance? When it is clear that full-on defense is necessary in the East. But from the beginning, a number of commentators identified the obvious target in the area: the Kursk nuclear power station.
I will share some thoughts about the serious dangers associated with targeting nuclear power stations. Or the existence of NPPs in war zones in time of war. In a previous article I wrote about the Ukraine attacks on the Zaporozhye Nuclear Plant, I mentioned the Samson option. Like [the Biblical hero] Samson, who pulled the pillars down and killed everyone including himself, it is all you have left when everything is lost. Although here it may have a more strategic component.
A nuclear disaster in Zaporozhye with a melt-down or an explosion releasing fission-products like Chernobyl to Europe and the world would invite the invasion of the area by Europe (by NATO) to ‘save’ the Europeans from the downstream effects of any exacerbation. It seems that Ukraine continues to shoot missiles and drones at the Zaporozhye plant. But that plant itself is a pressurized water reactor with thick concrete walls that would be pretty hard to penetrate. Of course, the spent fuel pools are easy to hit, and the supplementary control systems, the cooling, and those things are vulnerable.
But Kursk is another matter. This nuclear site has the RBMK reactors like Chernobyl, and these have no thick concrete shielding. They are therefore vulnerable to missile and drone attacks which could damage the reactor systems directly. Unlike Zaporozhye, where the reactors are in shutdown, in Kursk, one of these is apparently operating. And it appears that Ukraine is shooting missiles and drones at the Kursk plant.
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As with Zaporozhye, the Russians have sent for the cavalry, in the form of IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. He has visited and agreed that there is indeed danger of a nuclear incident. That he was shown evidence of military activity near the plant and agreed that this was a bad thing. Well, what else could he say? He is apparently going to Kiev to talk to President Zelensky.
There are two things I think about this. First, following all the arguments about who blew up the Nord Stream pipelines, it seems clear that Ukraine is not one organization, but many. There are inputs from a range of actors in the West and also different ideas about what to do held by actors and groups inside Ukraine itself.
Who is in charge? It seems to me that no-one really has control of everything that happens and that there are independent chaotic elements in play here with aims and strategies that are hard to fathom. The possibilities in this new Kursk theater are therefore scary. For example, it is an obvious Great Game strategy to pop a cruise missile into the critical Kursk reactor, cause a nuclear explosion and then call in NATO to ‘save’ Europe. That’s the one [thing] I fear. And having Grossi visit Kiev seems to me to have no real value except to keep the issue on the front pages for a while. Grossi is not a policeman. We do not need Grossi to tell everyone that there are serious downstream effects associated with firing missiles at a vulnerable and operating nuclear reactor.
What is the solution? It is to do whatever it takes to stop Ukraine or those actors inside (or outside) Ukraine from arranging attacks on either of the nuclear plants. If one of those reactors goes up, Europe is in deep trouble.
