A small domestic altar or shrine featuring religious statues, framed portraits, and devotional items arranged on a dark wooden surface with a burning red candle. Photo: Center for Economic and Policy Research.
By Pedro Labayen Herrera – Aug 19, 2026
In this edition of the Ecuador News Round-Up:
Authorities erect new road blocks to the opposition’s participation in upcoming elections: After suspending the legal status of Citizens’ Revolution (RC), the country’s largest opposition party, electoral authorities have suspended another party, Amigo, that had agreed to sponsor RC candidates. Both suspensions were based on the same justification: a one-day-old classified money-laundering investigation opened by the Prosecutor General’s Office. A prominent mayor and RC ally was also sentenced to three years in prison.
US-Ecuador security cooperation faces growing scrutiny following joint operations and reports of CIA involvement in boat attacks and disappearances: An anonymous US government source has told the Washington Post that the CIA was behind kinetic attacks on Ecuadorian fishing vessels that appear to include the disappearance of one vessel and its crew of eight. Earlier this summer, reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Drop Site News, and The New York Times provided new and detailed documentation of alleged abuses linked to joint US-Ecuador security operations and strikes on Ecuadorian fishing boats. The cases raise questions about the extent of US military involvement in Ecuador and potential Leahy Law violations.
Noboa’s new security plan could deepen the militarization of law enforcement: The Noboa administration released its first formal security strategy, but security experts say the plan is vague and lacks accountability mechanisms while warning that its continued emphasis on expanding the state’s “coercive powers” could deepen reliance on militarization, states of emergency, and surveillance of civil society.
Freshly signed Ecuador-Canada trade deal raises concerns: Ecuador and Canada have signed a new trade agreement, sparking criticism from civil society and Indigenous organizations. They argue the deal promotes mining and exposes Ecuador to costly international lawsuits by including investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions, despite the country’s constitutional ban on ISDS. They also warn that the agreement could harm Indigenous communities and the environment while raising questions about potential conflicts of interest involving President Daniel Noboa’s family.
Prosecutor General and Electoral Authorities Intensify Effort to Block RC’s Participation in November Elections
The suppression of opposition parties ahead of November’s local elections, by electoral authorities aligned with President Daniel Noboa, has intensified in recent weeks. As reported in the last Ecuador News Round-Up, an Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE) judge suspended the left-wing Citizens’ Revolution (RC) party, Ecuador’s largest opposition force, for nine months in March. The ruling followed a request from Prosecutor General Carlos Alarcón, a government ally, after he launched a classified money-laundering investigation into the RC, broadly alleging that the party received campaign funds “from Venezuela” during the 2023 snap elections. The sole witness in that case is a former RC lawmaker who was convicted on child sexual abuse charges in May and has reportedly received preferential treatment within the prison system.
In ordering the suspension, the judge did not rule on the merits of Alarcón’s investigation or provide the RC an opportunity to defend itself. Instead, he characterized the measure as a temporary action against the party while the investigation proceeds, citing a provision of Ecuadorian law that allows electoral judges to suspend parties if they are under investigation for money laundering. However, experts argue that the law was misapplied. They note that it requires any suspension to be imposed “according to the procedures established for adjudicating electoral offenses,” which include hearings and opportunities for the party to present its defense — procedures that were not followed in this case.
The RC’s suspension set off a scramble to find other parties willing to form alliances and field its candidates. Over time, it reportedly secured agreements with some parties but declined to identify them publicly, fearing retaliation. By late June, however, the RC revealed one such partner: the center-left Amigo party, which agreed to field several of the RC’s most prominent candidates, including incumbent Quito Mayor Pabel Muñoz in his reelection bid and two-time presidential candidate Luisa González in her campaign for prefect of the provincial government of Manabí.
Two weeks later, just hours before the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) deadline to register party alliances, Amigo was suspended under nearly identical circumstances. Prosecutor General Carlos Alarcón again petitioned the TCE, informing a judge that he had opened a classified money-laundering investigation into the party the previous day. Amigo was subsequently handed a nine-month suspension on July 18. But unlike the earlier action against the RC, Alarcón has not disclosed the broad allegations behind this investigation except for a statement asserting that it was triggered by an anonymous phone call to a crime tip line.
Amigo’s suspension triggered a wave of criticism, most notably from a coalition of more than a dozen local human rights and civil society organizations who said the move marked the “consolidation of Ecuador’s authoritarian path.” In a joint statement, the groups also expressed “deep concern and rejection of the executive’s instrumentalization of electoral justice and the prosecutor general’s office to restrict or exclude the political participation of sectors that oppose the government in power.” Alarcón responded by insisting that he was not acting on behalf of the Noboa administration and that he was obligated to open an investigation into Amigo after his office received a complaint.
President Noboa defended Amigo’s suspension on a radio show, saying, “It’s as if four thieves got into a car. They got out of that car and got into another one. They haven’t stopped being thieves, nor have they stopped committing crimes. They’ve just changed vehicles.” Noboa also proclaimed that the RC was free to seek new alliances provided that its partner party had not engaged in money laundering and had conducted internal primaries. José Julio Neira, Secretary General of Public Administration, also appeared on the radio program. He claimed that the investigation into Amigo relates to authorities’ inability to determine the origin of certain party funds.
Noboa’s and Neira’s statements prompted questions from some analysts, including Mauricio Alarcón (no relation), head of Transparency International’s chapter in Ecuador. Mauricio Alarcón noted that Neira appeared to have access to supposedly classified information that the concerned parties themselves had not seen. He said that the executive branch appeared to have influenced the proceedings, particularly given the timing of the suspension ahead of the elections. “These remarks are deeply concerning,” he stated, “because they suggest that the institutions are in the hands of a single person.”
Following Amigo’s suspension, the RC turned to the Ecuadorian Socialist Party and the Popular Unity Party — which was itself recently reinstated after a legal battle over the CNE’s April order to dissolve it — to field some of its candidates for the mayoralties of Guayaquil, Quito, and other major races. However, the RC’s running of candidates under other parties’ banners, combined with its suspension, is likely to hurt its electoral performance by severely limiting its ability to campaign and, where campaigning remains possible, present a unified and easily recognizable ticket. It also creates logistical constraints on the number of candidates the party can field.
In another blow to the opposition, Aquiles Álvarez, a prominent, RC-aligned Noboa critic and mayor of Guayaquil — Ecuador’s largest city — was sentenced to three years in prison on August 3. Álvarez has been held in a maximum-security prison for months while three separate cases against him filed by Prosecutor General Alarcón, criticized for irregularities (see previous editions of the Ecuador News Round-up), move forward. The sentence stems from Álvarez’s failure to wear a court-ordered ankle monitor at home, a condition tied to one of those cases, the “Triple A” investigation. Police claim he was not wearing the device during a raid on his residence. A judge granted prosecutors’ request for the maximum three-year sentence despite acknowledging there was insufficient evidence that Álvarez had tampered with the monitor or intended to flee, as prosecutors alleged. The ruling came one day after Álvarez’s defense had significantly undermined the prosecution’s case in the Triple A proceedings. Six other mayors have been targeted with raids, investigations, and suspensions.
Electoral authorities have also taken action against Pachakutik, a party that serves as the political arm of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the country’s largest Indigenous organization. CONAIE has been one of the Noboa administration’s most prominent opponents even though the majority of Pachakutik legislators have supported his legislative agenda, creating a rift within the party. Nevertheless, on July 28, CNE President José Cabrera filed a complaint with the TCE against Pachakutik’s leader, claiming the party failed to submit financial reports relating to its campaign against a Noboa-backed national referendum in 2024. If upheld, the complaint could result in sanctions, possibly including the party’s deregistration. In a statement, Pachakutik denied any wrongdoing and questioned why the complaint was filed two years after the alleged infraction and just days before the August 2–17 candidate registration period for the elections. Despite the complaint, Pachakutik announced on August 14 that Luisa González will run under its banner.
Shortly before the Pachakutik complaint, Cabrera filed one against Amigo, alleging it also had failed to meet financial reporting requirements. Meanwhile, the CNE rejected two civil society initiatives seeking to launch a recall process against President Noboa — whose approval rating has fallen from 31 percent in April to 21 percent in July — preventing organizers from collecting the signatures required to begin the process. Separately, a leader of the recall effort had his bank accounts frozen — without a judicial warrant — by the Ecuadorian government.
Ecuadorian Environmental Defender Found Dead After Reporting Corruption and Threats
US-Ecuador Security Cooperation: New Documentation of Human Rights Abuses and Reports of CIA Involvement in Boat Attacks
The US-Ecuador security partnership has faced growing international scrutiny in recent weeks, driven largely by reports of alleged human rights abuses and enforced disappearances linked to security cooperation. This month, The Washington Post and The New York Times published investigations into drone strikes on Ecuadorian fishing vessels, with the former reporting that the attacks were part of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation and the latter suggesting that private military contractors may have been involved.
The incidents in question involve three Ecuadorian fishing vessels. In March, US drones appear to have struck two of these — the Don Maca and Negra Francisca Duarte II. Their crews say vessels staffed by US flag-bearing personnel detained them before transferring them to the Salvadoran Navy, which later repatriated them to Ecuador. A third boat, the Fiorella, disappeared on January 20 and the whereabouts of the vessel and its eight crew members remain unknown. No government or other entity has claimed responsibility for the incidents, raising concerns about possible US involvement. Further details about these cases can be found in the last edition of the Ecuador News Round-Up.
Citing an anonymous government source, The Washington Post reported on August 13 that the attacks were part of a CIA “covert action” program under which the agency is authorized to conduct operations abroad without publicly acknowledging US involvement. The article states that the program is separate from the Pentagon’s ongoing bombing campaign in the Caribbean and the Pacific which has killed at least 220 people who the administration claims, without evidence, are drug traffickers. The Pentagon’s campaign has been heavily publicized, with the administration releasing graphic footage of kinetic strikes against boats, while the US military has denied knowledge of the three Ecuadorian boat incidents. The Post notes that the attacks come as the Trump administration has expanded the CIA’s covert action authorities and the agency has intensified its activities in Mexico and Venezuela.
The Post also provided flight data showing that a surveillance plane flew from a former CIA staging ground in El Salvador toward the Ecuadorian fishing vessels in the days leading up to the incidents. The aircraft has a US registration number that does not appear in Federal Aviation Administration records and was staffed by a pilot who spoke English with a US accent. The aircraft, which the Post reported “may be linked to the secret CIA program,” is registered to a UPS mailbox in Virginia and was flown from Tennessee to El Salvador in November.
The New York Times was the first outlet to publish a report on the surveillance plane and the monitoring of the Ecuadorian fishing vessels, on August 12. The Times stated: “as the boats moved through the ocean, the plane’s course also shifted to remain pointed at each of them over several days,” including the day the Fiorella disappeared. The article suggested that the attacks on the vessels may have been carried out by private military contractors, citing the US government’s refusal to acknowledge involvement in the incidents, the plane’s mysterious registration, the active involvement of Erik Prince — the former head of the notorious private military contractor Blackwater — in the region, and the Trump administration’s discussions of “letters of marque,” which would allow it to contract private military companies to conduct operations at sea.
The Ecuadorian government has not yet commented on either The Post’s or The Times’ reporting. When contacted by Ecuadorian outlet Ecuavisa, neither Ecuador’s foreign and defense ministries nor the US Embassy in Quito responded. However, a legislator from Noboa’s party said the government should have been aware of the CIA’s alleged involvement in such an operation. Opposition lawmakers, meanwhile, expressed concern about the reports, arguing that, if confirmed, the operation would violate international agreements and Ecuadorian sovereignty.
The attacks on the Ecuadorian fishing boats and related abuses were also documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in July. On July 23, Drop Site News’ Camila Lourdes Galarza reported on a prosecutor who was killed while investigating the Don Maca, Negra Francisca Duarte II, and Fiorella incidents. The prosecutor, Alexandra Bravo, was shot dead in June in the city of Manta. According to the article, she was pressured by superiors not to investigate possible US involvement in the cases, received little cooperation from other agencies, was recently removed from the investigations, and was provided inadequate personal security.
On July 20, Amnesty International published a report calling for an investigation into the Fiorella’s disappearance. After reconstructing the vessel’s route and speaking with crew members’ families, the report stated, “the indications are that the United States may have assaulted the boat as part of its latest ‘Southern Spear’ counter narcotics operation.” The report further noted that “the Fiorella was allegedly subjected to sustained monitoring by aircraft, patrol boats and drones bearing United States markings.” Amnesty International added that Ecuadorian authorities have failed to adequately investigate the incident or cooperate with the victims’ families.
The following day, HRW released a 94-page report examining the boat attacks and a joint US-Ecuadorian operation near the Colombian border in March during which Ecuadorian forces allegedly tortured civilians. The report corroborates allegations previously documented by human rights organizations and provides a comprehensive account of the incidents and alleged abuses. It concludes that “each of these incidents either implicates the US-Ecuador security partnership or surfaces questions about responsibility that neither government has adequately addressed.” HRW suggests that US security assistance to Ecuador may have violated the Leahy Laws.
Despite the mounting scrutiny, Ecuador’s Defense Ministry announced on August 7 that US and Ecuadorian forces had conducted another joint operation. According to a ministry statement, the forces identified a “hidden clandestine stash … allegedly used to store illicit substances” along a riverbank in northern Ecuador, which was “destroyed through a controlled explosion.” No further information about the operation has been made available at this time. The statement was accompanied by photographs showing a burning structure and US and Ecuadorian forces aboard military riverboats. The following week, at an Americas Counter Cartel Coalition forum, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth praised Ecuador for its “regional leadership” as the first country in the hemisphere to carry out joint operations with the US. At the same event, he announced that Honduras and Colombia would also be conducting joint operations, while Guatemala agreed to do so in May.
Noboa’s New Security Plan Doubles Down on Militarization
For the first time since taking office, the Noboa administration published what it described as a “comprehensive” security plan on July 14. Until then, the government’s security strategy had been referred to as Plan Fénix (Phoenix Plan). Although announced in late 2023, the administration never released a document detailing the plan’s specific components and has largely stopped referring to it altogether, leading many experts to question whether Plan Fénix existed in any meaningful form. While the government has not formally declared Plan Fénix defunct, the publication of a new security plan that makes no mention of it has been interpreted as a sign that Plan Fénix has been replaced.
The new strategy identifies a number of core threats to Ecuador’s national security: organized crime, violent extremism, foreign interference, illegal mining, drug trafficking, terrorism, subversion, corruption, and cyberattacks. It also outlines the government’s proposed response, including expanding international cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening its cybersecurity systems, improving coordination among state institutions, complementing security operations with greater state presence and public services, and placing greater emphasis on disrupting criminal financial networks.
Security experts have criticized the plan, saying that it remains vague and lacks concrete metrics to measure success as well as mechanisms for oversight and accountability. They also argue that the strategy continues to prioritize reinforcing what the document calls the “state’s coercive power,” suggesting that the Noboa administration will maintain its reliance on states of emergency, curfews, and the deployment of the military to carry out police functions. This approach has failed to improve Ecuador’s security while leading to widespread human rights abuses. The plan also refers to combating “violent extremism” and “strengthening intelligence efforts to prevent and neutralize the radicalization of social protests and subversion,” raising concerns among civil society organizations that they could become targets of further increased surveillance and government action, as they have already experienced. Indeed, the US tech giant Apple recently alerted Ecuadorian anti-corruption activist Gabriela Panchana that her phone was targeted by sophisticated spyware typically available exclusively to state actors. And on August 14, a judge ordered pretrial detention for Guido Perugachi, head of the Indigenous organization FENOCIN, in a case alleging that he participated in the “paralyzation of public services” during Indigenous-led protests against fuel subsidy cuts in September and October.
Meanwhile, violence continues to escalate. According to Ecuador’s Childhood, Adolescence, and Youth Observatory, which analyzed data from January to June 2026, Ecuador’s child homicide rate has reached its highest level on record, with 305 homicides recorded during the first half of the year, up from 23 during the same period in 2017. At the same time, detentions of children and adolescents have increased by 3 percent compared with the first half of 2025, including a 24 percent increase among those between 12 and 17 years old. Human rights organizations have raised concerns about the conditions of these detentions, with Ecuador recently appearing for the first time as a “high risk” country in the Global Torture Index. The index cited torture, arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial executions linked to “the militarisation of public security and the expansion of powers granted to the armed forces without effective civilian oversight,” which disproportionately impact “people of African descent, indigenous peoples, those experiencing poverty, and children and adolescents.”
Ecuador and Canada Sign a Controversial and Potentially Unconstitutional Free Trade Agreement
The Ecuadorian and Canadian governments announced on July 24 that they had signed a “free trade” agreement. While both governments have promoted the deal as a means to boost bilateral trade, investment, and both countries’ economies overall, various civil society organizations — including CONAIE, Amnesty International Canada, MiningWatch Canada, and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) — have campaigned against it since negotiations were announced in April 2024.
The agreement’s overarching purpose is to encourage Canadian corporations, particularly those in the mining sector, to expand extractive activities in Ecuador. Canada is already one of Ecuador’s largest foreign investors, with mining accounting for the lion’s share of Canadian investment in the country. With the Ecuadorian state’s backing, Canada-based companies also hold some of Ecuador’s most controversial mining concessions. As legal expert Ladan Mehranvar noted in a recent article, “Ecuador’s government has used its security strategy to advance mining projects owned and operated by Canadian companies” amid widespread public opposition, much of it from Indigenous communities. Many of these communities argue that mining projects have frequently moved forward without an adequate implementation of the legally required prior consultation process and have caused significant environmental and social harm.
Another controversial point of the agreement is its inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. These grant foreign companies and individual investors the right to sue countries in secretive international forums for alleged violations of international investment agreements or trade agreements. These often result in ISDS cases being brought against states that seek to strengthen or implement laws and regulations around environmental protection, workers’ rights, or tax evasion, among other supposed threats to current or future investor profits. For this reason, and given the country’s negative experience with ISDS, Ecuador’s 2008 constitution prohibits the mechanism — a ban that nearly 65 percent of voters reaffirmed in an April 2024 referendum.
Nevertheless, reentry into the ISDS system has been a key priority of Noboa’s agenda. He has pursued this goal through various means, including pressure and threats against judges. In April, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court handed him a victory by ruling that ISDS provisions in an investment treaty with the United Arab Emirates are permissible, provided they apply only to investment disputes and not disputes of a contractual or commercial nature. Legal experts contend that this distinction is inaccurate, inadequate, and largely semantic. Stuart Trew, director of the Trade and Investment Research Project at CCPA, said of the deal:
It is a slap in the face to democracy to put an investor-state dispute process in this free trade deal when the Ecuadorian constitution and the people of Ecuador are clearly opposed. This trade deal will give Canadian mining companies a coercive tool to steamroll over local opposition to their projects and avoid accountability for rights violations.
This agreement has also caused concern due to the conflict of interest involving President Noboa. The president’s aunt holds significant stakes in Canadian mining companies and stands to significantly benefit from the agreement. If the trade deal is ratified by the Ecuadorian congress and any of these companies sue the Ecuadorian state, she would stand to gain further from a successful lawsuit. Indeed, Canada-based mining companies have made frequent use
