The Limits of International Pressure Against Venezuela

By Misión Verdad  –  Oct 10, 2024

After the presidential election on July 28, the United States opted for international pressure against Venezuela. As has been common in other situations, the European Union, through its High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, has joined the attempt to trigger a new destructive episode in Venezuela’s internal affairs.

A month has passed since the former right-wing candidate Edmundo González Urrutia fled to Spain, whose government aligns with Washington’s broader geopolitical interests. Although González Urrutia left Venezuela after requesting political asylum from Pedro Sánchez’s government, he has been engaging in political activities in Europe.

In a letter dated September 7, González Urrutia informed the Venezuelan authorities of his decision to seek asylum in Spain and stated that he would respect the Supreme Court ruling that confirmed President Nicolás Maduro’s re-election. Additionally, he expressed his intention to leave Venezuela “in the interest of consolidating peace and political dialogue,” and also made a commitment to maintaining “limited” public activity.

The former opposition candidate has failed to fulfill any of these commitments.

Last week, he announced his intention to return to Venezuela as soon as possible to assume the presidency during the inauguration ceremony, constitutionally scheduled for January 10, in an attempt to once again stir up expectations around the agenda of regime change and destabilization.

Despite the efforts of Washington, Brussels, and Edmundo González himself, international pressure against Venezuela has proven to be ineffective in catalyzing the overthrow of the Venezuelan government.

United States’ “various tools”
In the wake of María Corina Machado’s recent failed calls for destabilization and González Urrutia’s loss of credibility following his flight from the country, Washington and Brussels have stepped in to bolster the conflict agenda. Their actions respond to various urgent needs, interests, and specific moments in their respective local political landscapes.

In September, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Brian Nichols, stated that his country is considering the application of various tools, “not just sectoral sanctions,” against Venezuela. Nichols specified that these strategies would include “additional sanctions” on top of those already imposed on 16 officials from the electoral and judicial branches, as well as military leaders.

Around the same time, during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken gathered foreign ministers and representatives from 40 countries across Latin America and Europe. He asserted that he has been “exerting pressure” on Venezuela through regional and international efforts.

With less than a month to go before the presidential elections in the US, the Biden administration does not seem to be considering a significant escalation against Venezuela, at least through its official mechanisms.

So far, the White House’s approach has been directed towards the use of sanctions with limited impact, symbolic actions such as the seizure of a Venezuelan plane in the Dominican Republic in early September, and narratives—statements and declarations against President Maduro’s legitimacy—that have had minimal effect on Venezuela’s political and economic reality.

With these measures, the United States appears to be seeking to balance the political cost of not getting more decisively involved, as demanded by María Corina Machado.

Given factors such as migration—a significant issue in the electoral campaign—and the oil market balance, where Venezuela plays an important role, the Biden administration likely prefers to avoid adverse situations that could impact Kamala Harris, who is the face of the Democratic Party .

But avoiding referring to Venezuela is also not an option. The U.S. government’s immediate strategy likely revolves around doing the bare minimum to feign commitment while avoiding taking any significant risks.

In short: support Edmundo González but without bleeding along the way.

But this, obviously, is just one side of the reality. While Washington officially considers oil prices, domestic energy costs and their impact on inflation, and migration flows with their electoral consequences, the considerations within the Deep State are diametrically opposed. There, intelligence services and agencies operate under the radar through covert operations.

In this regard, Venezuela complained before the UN General Assembly about terrorist attacks against President Nicolás Maduro and Venezuelan other officials, attacks that have been conducted with full support from the United States. Moreover, the minister of the Interior, Justice, and Peace, Diosdado Cabello, has highlighted the role of the US intelligence in a terrorist plot dismantled last month, with documented evidence and confessions linking them. Spanish intelligence was also involved.

Thus, Washington’s official stance may go in one direction, while it is simultaneously approving or turning a blind eye to shadow operators whose compass has always pointed towards assassination, mercenary intervention, or large-scale sabotage.

For now, in the realm of formal politics, Washington seems to be leaning towards an approach that minimizes risks.

The strategic concerns of the Biden administration do not include the urgent need for political support for Machado, the power struggle within the Justice First party, or Manuel Rosales’ covert calculations.

Spain Does Not (Yet) Recognize Edmundo González as President of Venezuela

Spain as Edmundo González’s sounding board
On the other hand, the government of Pedro Sánchez of Spain has given extensive spokesperson duties to González Urrutia, which has been condemned by the Venezuelan National Assembly.

The Spanish far right was able to get the European Parliament to declare González “the legitimate and democratically elected president of Venezuela.” They did the same in the Spanish Congress as well. Both motions are not binding, but they seek to impose the narrative of the illegitimacy of President Nicolás Maduro.

Spanish PM Pedro Sánchez’s position has been to support the former opposition candidate in practice, while remaining cautious in narrative, always prioritizing closeness with the White House’s approach.

In response to the rising tensions, the Venezuelan parliament urged President Maduro to sever diplomatic, consular, and commercial relations with Spain. Additionally, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez also urged the government to “immediately cease all commercial activities of Spanish companies in Venezuela.”

Borrell claimed that he was “not very supportive” of potential sanctions on Venezuela that could affect the population, even though he continues to make interventionist remarks about Venezuelan internal affairs and has promised to take actions recognizing the former opposition candidate illegally.

It seems that the EU shares the same calculations as Washington, with only one distinction. In the case of Europe, and Spain in particular, supporting González Urrutia and Machado aims to mitigate the pressures from the far right, without it automatically signifying repeating the experience of the failed Guaidó project.

Superior interests
The US strategy against Venezuela is part of a geopolitical plot aimed at preventing the country’s integration into the emerging multipolar world order.

Despite the situational factors already discussed, this remains the major battlefield where Venezuela finds itself.

For the United States and Spain, escalating pressure against Venezuela—a remake of the Trump-era “maximum pressure” strategy—would risk their energy interests, which are inherently geopolitical.

There are pressures from the US Congress for severing the energy relationship between Venezuela and US and European companies like Chevron, Repsol, ENI, and Maurel & Prom.

However, these companies’ lobbying efforts have proven resilient to such attempts, and they continue to operate under the under the umbrella of specific licenses granted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury.

For its part, Spain knows that breaking relations with Venezuela would expose itself to significant impacts on Repsol’s expansion plans and its overall energy security.

Given these practical considerations, the incentives for escalating international pressure seem unappealing. On one hand, there are the costs associated with precipitating the collapse of energy and economic ties with Venezuela. On the other, there’s the consolidation of economic and social normalcy in Venezuela that continues to marginalize María Corina Machado and Edmundo González while strengthening Maduro’s position.

Both factors compel Washington and Brussels to prioritize a pragmatic approach, in which international pressure could end up becoming a tool to address objectives other than regime change in Venezuela (a.k.a. “democratic transition”).

But the final answer to this will come in mid-November.

 

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/SC/DZ