Israel Views Sudan Conflict Through the Lens of Red Sea Strategy

By Sondoss Al Asaad – Oct 29, 2025

Beirut— In a shocking escalation, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reportedly massacred over 2,000 civilians in El Fasher, western Sudan, on October 26–27.

Victims included women, children, and the elderly, with satellite imagery revealing the scale of the atrocity and documenting what the Sudanese army’s allied forces describe as horrific violations of human rights.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in one of Africa’s bloodiest conflicts. The war between the Sudanese army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), has turned the country into a hub of destruction and regional maneuvering.

As of late 2025, the war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced over 12.6 million Sudanese, making it the world’s largest displacement crisis today.

The health and economic systems have completely collapsed, and the capital, Khartoum, remains divided between rival forces. Militias dominate Darfur and Kordofan, while the army struggles to maintain control in the east and the Red Sea ports.

Behind this grim domestic scene, regional and international threads intertwine, extending beyond Sudan’s borders to reshape the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Israel’s ambitions in Sudan
In the shadows of this turmoil, the Zionist regime of Israel is maneuvering within a broader project to control the Red Sea corridors, under the familiar pretext of “combating Iranian arms smuggling” toward Gaza and Yemen.

Since Sudan’s signing of the so-called Abraham Accords in 2020, Israel has intensified its political and security footprint in Khartoum and surrounding areas.

For Tel Aviv, Sudan is far from peripheral—it is a geographical bridge into Africa and a strategic anchor on the Red Sea, securing one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries between the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

A 2024 study published in the Israeli Army Journal by Lieutenant Colonel Gal Assil emphasized that “relations with Sudan represent a supreme strategic interest, as they enable Israel to monitor routes used to smuggle Iranian weapons to Gaza and Yemen and to establish intelligence networks in the southern Red Sea.”

This security ambition soon took tangible form. In May 2025, Israel’s Channel 14 broadcast a lengthy report on “Iran’s covert expansion in Africa,” highlighting Libya and Sudan as logistical hubs in the arms-smuggling network to Gaza.

The report claimed Sudan was being used as a “supplementary land route” for transporting Iranian missiles and drones through the Sudanese-Egyptian border.
Although no official confirmation has been issued, Reuters reported in June 2025 on diplomatic leaks indicating that Tel Aviv had provided “limited technical support” to the Sudanese army—specifically in communications and aerial surveillance—in coordination with the United States and the UAE.

In contrast, Haaretz argued in August 2025 that Israel was exploiting Sudan’s war to justify military expansion in the Red Sea under the banner of “protecting global shipping lanes from Houthi threats.”

Haaretz also noted that the Sudanese crisis offered Israel a chance to deepen alliances with Ethiopia and Eritrea, as part of its broader plan to contain Iranian influence extending from Tehran to Sana’a and Khartoum.

Growing Israeli concern on Yemen
Tel Aviv’s growing engagement in Sudan cannot be separated from its mounting anxiety over Yemen. Since the Ansarallah movement seized control of Yemen’s western coast, the balance of deterrence in the Red Sea has shifted decisively.

According to Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait since 2021 has “redefined the Israeli maritime threat,” as Yemeni missiles and drones are now capable of striking Eilat and potentially disrupting shipping routes to the Suez Canal.

In response, Israel has begun treating the Red Sea as a primary national security arena, second only to the Mediterranean. Within this evolving strategy, Sudan functions as a forward buffer zone.

Jane’s Defence Weekly reported in October 2025 that Israel, together with its Western allies, is working on a maritime surveillance network stretching from Eilat to the Gulf of Aden—passing through the Sudanese coast—to ensure control over these critical sea lanes.

Thus, Israel’s interest in Sudan is directly tied to securing the flank opposite Yemen.

With the U.S. and UAE active in East Africa, Tel Aviv has found a convenient pretext for expansion, cloaking its military buildup in the rhetoric of international maritime security. The chaos in Sudan has become both a justification and a cover for Israel’s growing Red Sea presence.

UAE Supplied Sudan’s RSF Militants With UK-Made Weapons: Report

From the Horn of Africa to Gaza: A new geopolitical landscape
It is becoming clear that Sudan’s war is not merely an internal civil conflict—it is part of a larger geopolitical confrontation between the Axis of Resistance on one side and the American-Israeli axis on the other.

Sudan offers Tel Aviv significant security advantages, notably in monitoring arms shipments and intercepting resistance networks extending toward Gaza and Yemen.

Foreign policy analysts in September 2025 describe Israel’s approach as a “long-range strategy,” designed to secure regional depth before facing internal or direct regional challenges.

In this context, Sudan’s and Yemen’s coastlines form a unified maritime buffer, reinforcing Israel’s deterrence architecture against the Axis of Resistance.

By controlling—or at least surveilling—these corridors, Tel Aviv ensures early warning and containment capabilities against any escalation.

All indications suggest that Israel views the Sudanese conflict as a rare strategic opportunity to reshape the balance of power along the Red Sea.

While global attention remains absorbed by the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, Tel Aviv continues to quietly build a security infrastructure stretching from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden, passing through Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

However, this expansion carries serious risks. The deepening chaos in Sudan may eventually backfire, offering Tehran or Sana’a new footholds for alternative supply lines or asymmetric retaliation.

With the Ansarallah movement intensifying their operations in the Red Sea, Israel’s anxiety grows over the potential fusion of the Yemeni and Sudanese fronts into a single theater of resistance.

Sudan today stands as more than a battleground for local power struggles—it is a geopolitical linchpin in a wider conflict extending from Gaza to Sana’a, where Israeli security objectives intersect with African instability.

The struggle for the Red Sea has evolved into a contest not only over maritime control but also over who will define the strategic geography of the next decade.

(Tehran Times)