President of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, is observed surrounded by supporters, celebrating the election of governors and deputies at a government event early Monday, in Caracas, Venezuela. Photo: Presidential Press.
By Misión Verdad – May 26, 2025
On the evening of May 25, following the election of governors and National Assembly deputies in Venezuela, Vice President of the National Electoral Council (CNE) Carlos Quintero announced the initial results, with 93.01% of the votes counted.
• Voter turnout was 42.63%.
Without a doubt, the most significant news is that the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) has won the governorships, securing 23 of 24 governorships. Only Cojedes state will once again be governed by an opposition politician, Alberto Galíndez.
This is what the political map looked like:
Rector Quintero announced the preliminary results of the elected representatives to the National Assembly (the national lists):
• Great Simón Bolívar Patriotic Pole (GPPSB): 4,553,484 votes (82.68%)
• Democratic Alliance: 344,422 votes (6.25%)
• UNTC-Unique Alliance: 285,501 votes (5.18%)
• Neighborhood Force: 141,526 votes (2.57%)
• Others (valid and invalid votes): 182,351 votes (3.31%)
He also reported the names of the deputies already elected (40 of 50 positions), with 21 for the GPPSB, including notable figures such as Jorge Rodríguez, Cilia Flores, Iris Varela, Hermann Escarrá Malavé, Jorge Arreaza, and Desirée Santos Amaral.
Three representatives were elected for the Democratic Alliance: Bernabé Gutiérrez, Timoteo Zambrano, and Alfonso Campos. Three representatives were also elected for the UNTC-Unique Alliance: Henrique Capriles Radonski, Luis Emilio Rondón, and Stalin González.
There are still 10 positions pending.
Typical historical participation and opposition abstention
The overall turnout was 42.6% of those registered in the Permanent Electoral Registry (REP). This margin aligns with the voter turnout recorded in regional elections in 2004 (45%) and 2021 (42%).
Similarly, the percentage is in line with other parliamentary election records, specifically in the years 1999 (56%), 2005 (25%), and 2020 (31%).
For this type of event, the participation rate is not extraordinarily high or low. However, this figure needs to be reviewed considering other factors.
One of them is the absence, according to opposition estimates, of over four million registered voters outside Venezuela who did not participate on Sunday, May 25. This represents at least 20% of Venezuelans eligible to vote.
As usual in Venezuelan elections, there is a structural abstentionist group that rarely votes in any election, no matter how important. This group represents at least 15% of the National Electoral Council (REP).
Added to this are some four million voters (20% of the REP) who would have heeded the call to abstain or who, due to the situation following July 28, 2024, and the narratives promoted by the extremist opposition, have sunk into electoral distrust.
The data on Chavismo’s overwhelming lead in almost every state in the country is above the usual percentage range in recent years. With favorable results of 70, 80, and even over 90% of the vote (in Apure state), it is clear that large segments of opposition voters did not participate.
Meanwhile, data from various states suggests that Chavismo maintained its vote count, consistent with the type of election and similar to 2021.
Everything suggests that the May 25 elections were determined by factors intrinsic to the opposition system.
Basically, two opposition coalitions ran: the Democratic Alliance and the UNT-UPV, along with Henrique Capriles’s Decide Network party. In addition, multiple independent candidates ran, weakening the chances of the most popular opposition candidates. The dispersion of the field created a strong sense of division.
The electoral abstentionism promoted by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia did have an impact. However, the real scope of this specific call, specifically in the last 10 months, must be analyzed separately from the accumulated processes of electoral delegitimization promoted by extremist opposition sectors over the past 25 years.
Electoral distrust is a factor present in every election. It existed long before Machado’s rise to power. In this election, it reappeared strongly, as it is a political symptom with its own unique qualities. In other words, some voters adhere to distrust, but this does not mean obeying the “mandate” of those who promote it.
Machado’s strategy and its effects on the ground must be considered limited in scope. Certainly, many opposition members would have heeded her call not to vote, but it is also a fact that many opposition voters distrust the CNE and were not attracted to the candidates.
The opposition campaigns were weak and disjointed. At this point, it is necessary to point out the endemic organizational and political weaknesses of the opposition. Their lack of cohesion, lack of a unified strategy, dispersion, and loss of contact with their constituents due to their repeated withdrawal from the electoral arena have taken their toll on the leaders who ran for office on May 25. The opposition coalitions this time found themselves weakened and unable to secure the vote and support of the mass of anti-Chavista supporters.
The abstentionist strategy and the inertia of distrust regarding the CNE intended to paralyze Chavismo and the May 25 elections. However, it instead numbed a considerable segment of the opposition, imposing an inertia that affected only the opposition and its followers.
In other words, the political careers and aspirations of many right-wing leaders were lost. The four-year term of regional governments and the five-year term of parliamentary office in the National Assembly have been defined, and many opposition candidates for office have lost their opportunity.
In terms strictly related to the vote, Machado and the sector she represents worked hard to thwart other opposition groups as part of the dispute for primacy and leadership within the anti-Chavista macrosector.
In reality, opposition politicians lose, as do opposition supporters.
It must be noted that Machado’s ouster agenda continues without achieving the expected results. Consequently, the opposition as a whole is settling into waiting, uncertainty, and dislodging in the daily political arena. The others aren’t making progress, but neither is Machado.
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On the other hand, in concrete and practical terms, Chavismo has an absolute majority of elected officials.
Chavismo also retains a parliamentary majority, which guarantees a new cycle of institutional governance. Furthermore, it strengthens its position in the regions and creates a near-absolute correlation for projecting central (executive) power to the states.
Under these conditions, President Nicolás Maduro’s leadership acquires the power to address an ongoing cycle of external pressures and coercive measures, which demand greater cohesion from all levels of government.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/JRE/SF