China Is Gradually Playing an Important Counterweight Role in the Region, as in the World.

By Tim Anderson – Aug 30, 2024

With the US in decline worldwide, and most obviously in West Asia, questions must arise about the role of Washington’s key rival China. Leaving aside many of the jealous myths promoted by Washington, there must be a view that China has, so far, relied on its huge economic capacity to extend its own interests and, to some extent, cooperation for mutual benefit. But what leadership role does one expect of a big power, that is, in terms of resolving conflicts and building new structures of cooperation?

Does China want to assume any such leadership functions? According to President Xi Jinping, the answer is yes. In a 2015 speech to the CPC’s Central Committee, he said that the party’s commitment to people-centered development and the socialist market economy system must be supplemented by a new strategic role in global governance, that is, to “actively participate in global economic governance, and push the global economic order in a more just, equitable, cooperative, and mutually beneficial direction.” (Xi Jinping 2020).

How such participation might be seen is conditioned by competing perspectives on China, which we could characterize in three ways: (1) an amorphous, lazy capitalist expansion, (2) some form of new imperialism with characteristics of Euro-American imperialism; or (3) a strategic facilitator of Global South aspirations.

The first notion is seen in the many Western media and think tank depictions of the Chinese “miracle” as unraveling, in decline, and facing crisis. The second, of Chinese imperialism, borrows from some ahistoric, infantile left versions of Lenin’s 1916 pamphlet, arguing that the export of capital determines imperial status. However, in his 2023 book The East is Still Red, Carlos Martinez convincingly discounts this, arguing that China’s development is historically contingent, state-centered, and not driven by a financial oligarchy but rather based on the supremacy of law and the party, for whom unrestrained accumulation and domination are not the primary goals. Capitalism in China has remained subordinate to social planning, as illustrated by Beijing’s 2020 blocking of Alibaba’s planned massive stock offering and by the often severe penalties imposed on wealthy Chinese businesspeople for breaches of the law.

Xi Jinping has consistently argued for socialism with Chinese characteristics, a continuity of revolutionary ideals through the socialist market economy, people-based development, and the maintenance of history and culture. Martinez concludes that, notwithstanding strong measures at its borders with neighbors, China is far from becoming an aggressive military power, akin to the USA with its 800+ military bases. Even US bodies like the Rand Corporation recognize that China has nothing like the US foreign military reach, which can be used to bully and dominate other countries.

Certainly, in the initial reform period of the 1980s and 1990s, the CPC’s attitude toward its Global South friends “shifted to being more economically oriented … China cut aid … while on the other hand recognizing Global South countries as potential markets and providers of needed resources” (Sun Wei 2020). Then, as part of its Going Global Strategy (2000), China moved into the WTO with its universal (but twisted) principles – massively expanding its participation in global trade and investment, before deciding to create (with Russia and others) the BRICS, the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and its own mega-infrastructure project – the Belt and Road Initiative – marking a return to strategic cooperation with the Global South. Almost seven decades after the 1955 Bandung conference, Chinese media say that “the Bandung Spirit [“self-determination, solidarity, non-intervention, friendship and cooperation”] remains alive in the Global South.”

Western propagandists speak of a Chinese “debt trap” for Global South countries accepting BRI infrastructure investment. They try to replicate the anger aimed at the hated US “structural adjustment” programs (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s. Yet even some US sources reject such a parallel. Chinese investment involves much softer loans than those facilitated by the US-dominated World Bank and without the hated political conditions of SAPs, except simple adherence to the one-China policy.

China clearly has tremendous economic and investment potential but has not (or not yet) converted these strengths into a project of imperial domination. In this context, what Global South leadership measures has China managed in West Asia, and what more might be on the way?

A. China’s West Asian initiatives
Beijing has taken several important steps in recent years.

1. Countered US unilateral coercive measures with strategic partnerships and counter-hegemonic blocs
China not only verbally opposes the Unilateral Coercive Measures (unilateral “sanctions”) on independent countries like Iran, Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but it has also set up strategic relations and economic groups – especially the BRICS and the SCO – to include nations that were under siege by Washington and the Europeans. In 2021, China signed a strategic partnership with Iran (a statement of “Comprehensive Cooperation between Iran and China”), which was then the subject of “maximum pressure” sanctions from Washington. In 2024, China, Russia, and Iran carried out joint naval drills near the Gulf of Oman. China is gradually playing an important counterweight role in the region, as in the world.

2. Brought together rivals from different camps, joined them in BRICS
China ended up playing the key role in bringing together Iran (the lead independent state in West Asia) and US subordinate allies Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. The Iran-Saudi deal alone was said to have led to a “wave of reconciliation” in the region, including the readmission of Syria to the Saudi-dominated Arab League. All four (Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt) subsequently joined the BRICS community in January 2024. Iranian and Egyptian rapprochement began in mid-2023, some months before their BRICS accession. China’s role in reconciling tensions in West Asia is widely recognized.

3. Recognized the Palestinian nation-state and the Palestinian right to resist occupation, apartheid, and genocide
Along with most of the international community, China has recognized Palestinian statehood and also the Palestinian right to resist occupation. In February 2024, China’s representative Ma Xinmin told the International Court of Justice that the Palestinian “use of force to resist oppression is an inalienable right” and cannot be equated with terrorism. This is an important step, as it helps undermine the Anglo-American propaganda wars of Palestinian “terrorism” and fosters an inclusive basis for all the Palestinian Resistance factions in a potentially democratic outcome for all the peoples of Palestine. It also helps educate the international community on “rights” established by Global South countries, in particular the right of a people to self-determination, first put up in the Declaration on Decolonization, as it relates to the people of Palestine and the consequent right to resist any denial of that right to self-determination. Self-determination is not a posthumous medal for helpless victims; it must be fought for. Western perspectives on rights typically focus only on individual rights and hegemonic prerogatives. Chinese contributions to global rights culture should be recognized.

Russia Invites Venezuela to BRICS+ Summit in October

B. What is yet to come?
There are signs that China is likely to move ahead with other important initiatives.

1. Create new financial architecture
Perhaps the most important pending initiative is the creation of a new financial architecture that can provide a viable alternative to the dollar-SWIFT system, and so break Washington’s weaponized dollar used against dozens of countries. The idea of a BRICS currency has already been floated and, in the interim, currency swaps have reduced reliance on the dollar in exchange. The Chinese digital Yuan, a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), has been trialed domestically and may soon attract greater international use, including for oil purchases. That, of course, would challenge the institution of the petro-dollar which has for long propped up the much-resented US financial power. This new financial architecture will shake up global power relations.

2. Facilitate a democratic state in Palestine and help dismantle the apartheid regime
Contrary to the recalcitrant role of the US, China has repeatedly backed the need to admit Palestine to the United Nations, as a means of correcting historical injustice. While the form of this admission is yet to be seen, it seems likely that China will review its earlier commitment to a concrete roadmap toward a so-called “two-state solution”. That road faces many difficulties in view of the genocidal actions of the Israeli regime and the repeated designation of “Israel” as an “apartheid state”, a crime against humanity that international law says must be dismantled and not recognized. A single democratic state in historic Palestine, with equal rights for all, not unlike the South African road of the late 1980s, seems a superior objective. In short, the series of UNSC resolutions since 1967, referring to a return to 1967 borders and “two states”, have become obsolete. When this is fully considered, China may well contemplate the Iranian leader’s proposal for a referendum on a single democratic state involving all the people of historic Palestine.

3. Normalize with the revolutionary government in Yemen
In early 2024, both China and Russia made a deal with the de facto Yemeni government, often called “Houthi rebels”, to allow Red Sea shipping that was not destined for the Israeli regime. This is a step toward overturning a series of bad UNSC resolutions (from 2014), which have subjected most of Yemen to war and siege, for the UNSC’s failure to recognize the Revolutionary government (an Ansar Allah-led coalition called the National Salvation Government) established in early 2015. The basis for UN sanctions against Yemen was the Western branding of the so-called “Houthi rebels” as a threat to peace; when in fact they were fighting US and Saudi-backed al-Qaeda-aligned groups in the Arabian peninsula. Since 2015, the Ansar Allah-led coalition has controlled more than 70% of the populated areas of Yemen. The UNSC sanctions are a terrible betrayal of the people of Yemen. China normalizing with Yemen would properly include the people of that besieged but brave nation and help extend China’s BRI infrastructure initiatives through the Red Sea.

4. Extend the strategic relationship with Iran to the West Asian region
China’s strategic relations with Iran and the development of the BRICS community have important implications for the other independent and besieged nations of West Asia: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. It remains to be seen whether Chinese initiatives will proceed through bilateral measures or agreements with a West Asian bloc, led by Iran. It may be, for example, that new financial channels will pass to the region through Iran, but there remains the question of oil, gas, transport, and communication corridors through to the Mediterranean. When the US occupation of Syria and Iraq is removed, important possibilities will be opened up, and China may well have a role to play here, in line with its BRI strategy.

China is cautiously filling gaps left by the trail of disastrous invasions and hybrid wars initiated by Washington. Of course, Beijing has its own interests but, in general, it advances mutual interest without political demands and is opening up new forms of coercion-free international cooperation far more amendable to the needs of Global South countries. Even those countries not under siege by the US and EU will find benefit in these new relations. Combined with the strategic influence of Russia, Iran, and BRICS, China seems set to help build a prosperous and more independent West Asia.

References:
BRP (2024) Belt and Road Portal, online: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn

Chan, Peter (2022) Is China Imperialist? China Worker, 14 January, online: https://chinaworker.info/en/2022/01/14/33092/

Garrick, John and Yan Chang Bennett (2018) “Xi Jinping Thought”: Realisation of the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation? China Perspectives, No. 1-2 (113) (2018), pp. 99-106, online: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26531916

Martinez, Carlos (2023) The East is Still Red, Praxis Press, Glasgow

Sun Wei (2020) ‘Internationalism in China: A Historical Snapshot: From proletarian internationalism to the “Going Global Strategy”’, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Beijing, 2 March, online: https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/41634/internationalism-in-china-a-historical-snapshot

Wang, H., Miao, L. (2016). “Going Global Strategy” and Global Talent. In: China Goes Global. Palgrave Macmillan Asian Business Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-57813-6_6

Xi Jinping (2020) ‘Opening Up New Frontiers for Marxist Political Economy in Contemporary China’, Qiushi Journal, 8 November, online: http://en.qstheory.cn/2020-11/08/c_560906.htm

Xi Jinping (2022) ‘Regarding the Construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (2013), Red Sails, 11 April, online: https://redsails.org/regarding-swcc-construction/

Xinhua (2024) ‘Feature: 69 years on, the Bandung Spirit remains alive in the Global South’, 21 April, online: https://english.news.cn/20240421/35920b944fcf45db8a2940b7d425849e/c.html

(Al Mayadeen)