Definitive Collapse of Venezuela's Justice First Opposition Party

By Misión Verdad – Feb 25, 2025

On February 19, the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced the rescheduling of the parliamentary, gubernatorial, and regional legislative council elections in Venezuela, moving the date from April 27 to May 25. Elvis Amoroso, president of the electoral body, explained that this decision responds to requests from various political actors and responds to the need to guarantee the participation of all sectors.

This announcement came at a time of deep crisis within the traditional Venezuelan opposition, especially evident within Justice First (Primero Justicia or PJ), in which the division between its factions has become irreconcilable.

The internal struggle in PJ not only reflects the collapse of the organization but also exposes the absence of a coherent strategy as important elections approach.

The fracture
The crisis in the opposition party worsened on February 21 with the publication of a statement by the National Political Committee, backed by Henrique Capriles, in which the intention to participate in the elections was ratified: “abstention has failed every time it has been attempted as a strategy,” the party stated.

This decision openly confronts the National Directorate, headed by María Beatriz Martínez, who insists on abstention as the only strategy.

According to Martínez, this act did not have the support of the National Directorate of Justice First and “aligns with the strategy of those in power.” In addition, the document maintains that, with this decision, “they have distanced themselves from Unidad (The Democratic Unitary Platform) and Justice First.”

But more than a simple tactical discrepancy, the break exposes the state of a disjointed political faction, caught in internal disputes and dominated by personal interests. The struggle between Capriles and Julio Borges, the latter with close ties to USAID funding, is a reflection of a structure that, after having led a candidate to contest the presidency (Capriles 2012 and 2013), today lacks leadership and real influence capacity, finding itself in free fall, far from the image of a solid alternative power that it once tried to project.

Capriles’ sector, which brings together figures such as Tomás Guanipa and José Guerra, defends electoral participation as a mechanism to preserve political spaces and maintain a presence in the political landscape.

On the opposite side, Borges and María Corina Machado promote absolute rejection of the electoral process and the use of abstention from elections as a way to attempt to delegitimize the Venezuelan state.

In fact, Capriles’ resignation from the board of directors in September 2024, when he complained of a lack of vision and internal cohesion, had already marked a sign of weakness.

His distancing from Borges responds to clear dynamics because, while the former governor seeks to maintain a certain margin of maneuver within the country, Borges has dedicated himself to operating as a key piece in the international pressure strategy against Venezuela.

Borges’ non-transparent financial dealings and his alignment with foreign agendas have led to his loss of support even within his own party. However, Borges does not act alone, since his alignment with María Corina Machado is not fortuitous but part of a coordinated strategy that responds to external interests and counts on total destabilization as the best path forward.

Sabotaging the electoral process is a central axis of their agenda, where abstention is more than a simple political position: it is a calculated instrument that aims to erode institutional legitimacy and justify larger-scale interventions.

In addition, Borges’ history in the administration of Venezuelan assets abroad during the so-called “Guaidó project” makes him a key figure in the architecture of the economic blockade.

The conflict exposes an opposition that, rather than recomposing itself, is diluted in its own incoherence, trapped between the inability to offer a real alternative and the dependence on external factors to sustain its discourse.

On Capriles’ side, the president of the party in question, Beatriz Martínez, affirmed that Capriles and Guanipa were leaving to form a different campaign command focused on the next elections.

Venezuela: Opposition Infighting Intensifies in Runup to Elections

The failed strategy
Far from representing a viable alternative, María Corina Machado’s strategy has plunged her followers into a labyrinth of failures. Her intransigent stance, based on the systematic rejection of any electoral process and the commitment to international pressure, has further weakened a traditional opposition that is already fragmented.

Her insistence on abstention as a political tool has marginalized the opposition forces from institutional spaces.

Recent history shows that the electoral boycott has been a double-edged sword for that sector. The legislative elections of 2005 and 2020 are clear examples of how self-exclusion has only led to political irrelevance.

While more pragmatic sectors insist on the need to rebuild an alternative within the electoral framework, the disqualified party has imposed a strategy that has not only weakened the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) but has also fractured Justice First.

In fact, one must recall that the imposition of Edmundo González as provisional presidential candidate and the refusal to consider other options marked a point of no return in the relationship with the traditional parties. On that occasion, his decision to assume a de facto leadership after the primaries, without opening space for internal debate, aggravated tensions and revealed the lack of a cohesive strategy.

In this context, the fragmentation of the opposition arises both from tactical disputes and from the commitment to a route that has proven to be sterile. The Justice First crisis demonstrates a lack of consensus on a realistic political project.

More than a dilemma between radicalism and pragmatism, what is really at stake is the survival of the opposition as a force capable of influencing the Venezuelan political scene, a possibility that María Corina constantly undermines, since her agenda has never been electoral but rather confrontational and destabilization.

The rules of the game have changed
On January 31, Caracas was the scene of a meeting that would change the rules of the political game in Venezuela. Richard Grenell, Donald Trump’s special envoy, met with President Nicolás Maduro at Miraflores Palace.

What began as a conversation focused on immigration issues (a priority for the Trump administration) ended up becoming a tacit recognition of the Venezuelan government and a hard blow to the opposition, which was relegated to the background.

This meeting not only consolidated a direct channel of dialogue between Caracas and Washington but also revealed the miscalculation of the opposition sectors that waged everything on external pressure and institutional isolation, which ultimately led to a state of political orphanhood.

Justice First, whose leadership was marked by this vision, was caught at a crossroads: while Capriles tries to adapt in some way to the new reality, Borges and his allies remain clinging to a scheme that no longer has a place on the international agenda.

Now, according to Venezuelan journalist Karen Méndez, the Venezuelan president accepted the meeting under the condition of carrying out a “zero agenda,” which allowed for the discussion of sensitive issues such as migration, economic sanctions, and the situation of US citizens detained in Venezuela. This implied an implicit recognition of his legitimacy as an interlocutor, further weakening the opposition.

In an interview with The Epoch Times, the special envoy stated: “I spent the day going to Caracas, I met with Maduro, I tried to have a conversation in which we had a different relationship with him. Donald Trump does not want a regime change; he wants to focus on strengthening and making the American people more prosperous.”

More than a diplomatic anecdote, this statement confirmed a substantial shift in Washington’s policy towards Venezuela: the priority is apparently not directed at overthrowing Maduro but, rather, a pragmatic approach where stability prevails over confrontation.

For the traditional sector of the Venezuelan opposition, especially for those sectors that made total confrontation their only roadmap, this message was a devastating blow.

María Corina Machado and her allies counted on the fact that the White House would never negotiate with President Maduro and that any political solution had to involve his immediate removal.

We recall how Justice First, under Borges’ influence, aligned itself with this strategy, sacrificing any possibility of maneuvering within the country. However, Grenell’s statements suggest that this chapter may have come to an end.

Everything indicates that Washington has reduced the role of the opposition leadership in its agenda on Venezuela, which only deepened PJ’s internal crisis and accelerated its irrelevance on the political stage.

While Capriles and his sector try to stay afloat via electoral participation, Borges’ faction, lacking international support and without a viable strategy, has been reduced to complaints and a lack of practical results.

The Venezuelan opposition has been trapped in a cycle of self-inflicted defeats. In the case of Justice First, it is not only crumbling as a party structure, but it also symbolizes the failure of a paradigm that relied more on external pressure than on building its own solid political base internally.

Its implosion responds to the natural outcome of a protracted crisis, where the absence of leadership, the lack of cohesion, and the dependence on foreign agendas ended up burying the party. In the current scenario, his disappearance is less a surprise than a confirmation: the time of Justice First has passed.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/KW/SL