Four Key Points About Venezuela's July 27 Municipal Elections

By Misión Verdad – Jun 13, 2025

Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) has scheduled a new electoral process for July 27 to elect mayors and municipal council members in 335 jurisdictions across the country.

These elections will be carried out following the May 25 elections in which Chavistas won 23 of 24 governorships and an overwhelming parliamentary majority.

The upcoming election brings with it a host of challenges, especially considering the country’s overall political context and the issues inherent to the competing political forces.

Characteristics of municipal elections
Municipal elections in Venezuela tend to be those with the lowest turnout. This has been especially true in events where other positions are not being elected, such as those for governors or national parliamentarians.

However, the selection of municipal authorities is very important, as these officials have capacity to manage key daily activities that affect everyone’s day-to-day life.

Certain groups of voters in various municipalities tend to participate in these elections, given the closeness and relevance that the positions of mayor and councilor have for their daily lives.

Mayors and councilors are elected executive and legislative positions that require greater connection with the people and their demands.

However, the forms of government and co-governance have been profoundly transformed in Venezuela, creating opportunities for participation and public policy implementation that, in many instances, have diminished the relevance of traditional municipal institutions.

The electoral factors as a whole
During the May 25 elections, candidates of the PSUV (Venezuela’s United Socialist Party—the party of President Nicolás Maduro, formed under Hugo Chávez) won overwhelmingly over various opposition groups that entered the race in a divided manner and with a strong abstentionist line among their followers.

The May election and its results will influence the trends seen next July. For example, the PSUV and Chavistas has maintained their organizational strength in the territories and municipalities, which gives it greater powers to engage in politics, campaign, and promote its leadership.

Meanwhile during the 2021 regional and municipal elections, the PSUV achieved a political majority in 212 municipalities. Meanwhile, leaders from parties within the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) won 61 mayoral positions, while the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition won 39, and the Neighborhood Force (FV) party won 10.

Currently, the opposition is in power in nearly 32% of the country’s municipalities. This data indicates that opposition parties tend to perform better in municipal offices than in gubernatorial positions.

This is explained by specific territorial dynamics.

One example is the case of municipalities in the metropolitan area of Caracas and Miranda state, such as Chacao, Baruta, and El Hatillo, considered opposition electoral strongholds where Chavismo has never won. This phenomenon is also noticeable in states such as Táchira, Carabobo, Zulia, Mérida, and Anzoátegui, where certain municipalities, by “tradition,” tend to lean toward opposition leaders.

On the other hand, many of the country’s mayoralties tend to be swing electorates, and this depends largely on the political context of the country and the municipalities themselves.

In these territories, government bodies are located where, due to their proximity to the people, leaders are more susceptible to being “rewarded” or “punished” depending on the general perception of their management. This explains why municipalities often change their “political color” between one election and the next.

The outlook for the upcoming July election is entirely different. Nearly all of the 110 opposition mayors elected in 2021 will seek reelection; some will be stronger, others weaker.

For their part, many Chavista mayors will be up for reelection, which will put their administrations to the test, and it’s likely that some will fail.

However, the most important factor to consider today lies not in the specific dynamics of the regions; in fact, the overall context of the country and the opposition ecosystem will create additional pressure for anti-Chavista leaders seeking reelection or hoping to be elected to office.

Abstentionism, division, and organizational weaknesses of the opposition
Chavismo‘s electoral victory in May is largely explained by the high level of abstention and divisions among the opposition candidates.

This factor remains latent; it persists for the July election. The proximity of the two dates has prevented—if that is possible today—a recomposition of the opposition forces to build alliances and a rebuilding of electoral sentiment among their supporters.

The abstention factor must be analyzed in detail. According to data from the last municipal election, held in 2018, in which neither governors nor national deputies were elected, turnout was extremely low, with only 27% of voters in the Permanent Electoral Register (REP) exercising their right to vote.

Clearly, without electing governors or representatives to the national parliament, many voters are not motivated to participate.

In addition, there are chronic electoral abstentionists, or groups of voters who rarely participate in elections of any kind, who represent approximately 20% of the registered voters.

It is also worth mentioning that there is a significant group of registered voters outside the country who may account for another 20% of the REP.

These three groups, who are unlikely to vote next July, could account for almost 50% of the voter registration. Therefore, the actual number of voters who are subject to and susceptible to political campaigns and who need to be targeted to encourage their participation is considerably limited. This affects all opposition groupings.

It should be added that there are calls for abstention from certain extremist opposition groups. María Corina Machado and Edmundo González promoted electoral abstention in the May elections, which greatly affected the opposition’s chances in some states.

Now, the political situation places anti-Chavista leaders in the regions and municipalities at a new crossroads. The margins of abstention could allow Chavismo to secure mayoralties it has never won before, such as Chacao, Baruta, and El Hatillo in Miranda state—all insurmountable right-wing strongholds for the past 26 years.

This possibility has raised alarms, and some anti-Chavista groups have tried to escape the paralyzing tendencies to channel and mobilize support for their leaders.

However, the division among the opposition political forces remains significant. At least three coalitions are competing against each other and against Chavismo.

On this occasion, without the formal participation of the PUD (Unitary Platform), the parties Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT), Movimiento por Venezuela (MPV), and the Decide platform—led by Henrique Capriles—have formed a new group to welcome leaders from the PUD. This group has entered the fray without the endorsement of its parties of origin.

This does not resolve the significant problems caused by the loss of organizational capacity at the territorial and sectoral levels by the various opposition elements.

Persistent electoral abstention in recent years, in addition to other factors such as the movement of leaders abroad to seek favors—illegal resources—from the then “interim government” of Juan Guaidó, have for years undermined the opposition’s ability to carry out politics from within the country.

Municipalities are precisely the most important territorial bodies in party structures. At this level, and further downstream, the disconnect between leaders and their bases has become profound and complex because the vehicles for organization have been lost.

By 2024, much of the remaining organizational capacity of the PUD was hijacked, packaged, and rebranded by María Corina Machado, who added thousands of community leaders to the informal organization Vente Venezuela through her “Comanditos” structure.

The change of leadership was open and visible and has proven to be clearly detrimental, as many of these individuals who were involved in regional politics now follow the abstentionist line and have withdrawn from the political arena.

Machado’s theft of what little remained of the opposition’s organization resulted in the paralysis and disabling of the parties’ capabilities; this translates into direct harm to all leaders of all other opposition groups.

Chavismo versus context
So far, the PSUV has consulted its grassroots assemblies to nominate potential candidates for mayor and council member.

This process is moving into a next phase of review and discussion by the National Directorate of the PSUV, where the names of those who will form its electoral campaign for July will be finally announced, in accordance with agreements with other related parties.

Time is running out, even for the Chavistas. Although the electoral context of the opposition ecosystem favors the chances of the PSUV and allied parties, there are no guarantees of automatic reelection options for most Bolivarian mayors. There will be a review, and therefore, there will be changes.

As was the case with the Chavista electoral campaign in May, young cadres, leaders with strong leadership positions, female candidates, and traditional leaders with emerging careers could dominate the nominations of the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP) coalition on July 27.

The country’s political and economic context is a relevant factor. The national government demands municipal governments that are fully aligned with central strategies, in the face of an adverse context of economic and political pressures. In this regard, the vectors and components of governance will be crucial.

PSUV Announces Partial List of Mayoral Candidates for July 27 Elections

On the other hand, President Maduro has pointed the way toward a “communalization” of politics at new levels. He has promoted the creation and consolidation of Communal Self-Government Cabinets with the goal of strengthening self-management and popular power in the territories.

He also highlighted the importance of these forums as a mechanism for localities to manage their own projects and resources, which contributes to building a more democratic and participatory state. This year, the national government has already organized several “Popular Consultations” in which the population has voted to prioritize projects to be implemented in their territories.

These methods, by the very nature of the functioning of power, could clash with traditional municipal bodies. Therefore, Chavismo will demand the fullest cooperation of its new wave of mayors so as not to hinder the new processes of organization, management, and co-governance.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/JRE/SL