This Monday, US President-elect Donald Trump announced that the United States will impose tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China until the “invasion” of drugs and “illegal immigrants” is stopped.
“This tariff will remain in effect until drugs, particularly fentanyl, and all illegal immigrants stop this invasion of our country,” Trump wrote via Truth Social on November 25.
He said that if his demands are not met by January 20, 2025, he will impose a 25% tariff on all imports to the US from Mexico and Canada and 10% on those from China.
This highlights the key areas of the dynamic that could mark the relationship between Trump and Latin America during his second term: trade, migration, and security.
Considering the significant influence that the United States exerts on Latin America, it is essential to examine the implications that this first delimitation of priorities would have for the region less than a month before Trump officially assumes the White House.
“Mexico is at the epicenter of Trump’s policies,” says academic Lisdey Espinoza in an article published in Modern Diplomacy, with trade and migration being the fundamental issues.
The author points out that migration has been a source of discord, especially with Trump’s past measures, such as Title 42 and the “Remain in Mexico” policy, that forced Mexico to act as a “buffer zone.”
In the economic sphere, Espinoza explains that the treaty between Mexico, the United States, and Canada (T-MEC) is crucial for the former, but Trump’s protectionism raises concerns about future renegotiations. Mexico’s dependence on 80% of its exports to the US highlights the need to diversify its trade relations with Europe and Asia, she says.
Trump Slaps Mexico with 5% Tariffs on Everything Until the Immigration Issue is Solved
In terms of security, Trump’s rhetoric against crime and drug trafficking during his electoral campaign is reminiscent of the aggressive strategy he implemented in his first term. On that occasion, a “maximum pressure” campaign was carried out against governments in the region considered “hostile,” especially those of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, using these pretexts to attack them forcefully.
The team that is being formed for the new Trump administration includes personalities who have consistently promoted sanctions and confrontational agendas against these countries, particularly against Venezuela.
These characters also were active in pressuring the Biden administration to adopt a more aggressive policy in the region. Cases such as that of Marco Rubio, who will be the new secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, who will occupy the position of national security advisor, are the most relevant in the configuration of the high-level team of the North American magnate.
The recent approval of the BOLIVAR Law in the US House of Representatives illustrates how tools are already being configured that will allow Washington to adjust sanctions at its discretion, aligning them with its strategic interests and geopolitical needs.
While it is still premature to predict the intensity of potential coercive actions, particularly in the oil sector, the possibility of an escalation, supported by a strategy similar to that promoted by the “Guaidó project” in 2019, is on the radar of the extremist sector of the Venezuelan opposition, represented by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia.
The triumphalist expectation is also growing among sectors of the extreme right in the region, who await strong support from the Trump administration on the economic front. A notable example of this dynamic is observed in Argentina, under the government of Javier Milei, the first foreign ruler to travel to Florida to meet with Trump at his Mar-a-Lago residence.
However, these expectations may be overstated. Trump’s first administration was expected to have greater economic influence in the region that would displace Chinese investments, but that “did not materialize or its results were very scarce,” noted Argentinean journalist Germán Mangione, director of the Observatory of Chinese Capital Activities in Argentina and Latin America, in an article published in Sputnik.
Instead, he argues that Washington “will concentrate on reducing its trade deficits,” which could actually harm Argentine and Brazilian exporters who face direct competition with US products.
The geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry with Beijing suggests that the Trump administration could try again to exert pressure on Latin American countries to adopt a defined position between alignment or confrontation. According to Mangione, Brazil is one of the countries that could be most affected.
“The Trump White House will seek to ‘exert greater pressure on Brazil to limit its partnership with China,’ something that may also have repercussions in Mercosur,” the text reads.
This approach could, paradoxically, have the opposite effect. An analysis in Foreign Policy by Oliver Stuenkel, associate professor at the School of International Relations of the Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil, warns that a return to the rhetoric of the Monroe Doctrine could result in a greater rapprochement with China by Latin American countries.
“The more aggressive Trump’s strategy is toward Latin America, the more quickly governments can be expected to counter Washington by fostering closer ties with Beijing,” it notes.
The Asian country has been consolidating a relevant position in South American economies, as well as among close US trading partners such as Mexico. According to an article in the Global Times, in the first 10 months of this year, “bilateral trade grew 11.7 percent year-on-year to 652.82 billion yuan (90.13 billion dollars).”
In a scenario where Washington seeks to restrict trade relations in the region with actors that, for their part, offer mutually beneficial strategic partnerships, Latin America should respond to this situation by seeking to balance the pressure through the strengthening of mechanisms and platforms for cooperation with those who, like Beijing, provide support for the paradigm of regional strategic autonomy.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/BR/SL
