'To Be or Not to Be': the Dilemmas Tormenting Venezuela's Opposition in 2025

By Misión Verdad – Jan 15, 2025

On Tuesday, Chavista and opposition political parties convened in the Venezuelan National Assembly (AN) to discuss key issues inherent to the country’s politics for this year. President of the AN, Jorge Rodríguez, invited Chavista and opposition organizations with seats in the assembly, as well as various registered and active political parties in the electoral system, to participate in the convention.

The invitation, extended with a special emphasis on the four right-wing governors who govern in the states of Zulia, Barinas, Cojedes, and Nueva Esparta, aimed to discuss the transformation of electoral laws, suggest elements for a constitutional reform, and collect proposals for the creation of a schedule for elections for open positions.

During 2025, Venezuela expects to carry out various electoral processes, including popular consultations and the election of mayors, governors, and deputies to the AN.

Attendance and debate
“Out of 38 parties, 37 attended,” said Rodriguez in statements to the press.

“Who is not here?” he asked. “Those who want death, those who call for violence, those who ally themselves with drug traffickers who ask for invasion,” said Rodriguez, referring to the MUD-Unidad party, a coalition that represents the goals of the Unitary Platform (PUD).

Opposition governors Sergio Garrido (Barinas) and Alberto Galíndez (Cojedes) personally attended the event, while Morel Rodriguez and Manuel Rosales sent representatives.

Two of the political parties that supported the presidential candidacy of Edmundo Gonzalez, Movement for Venezuela (MPV) and A New Time (UNT), also attended the event.

The debate focused on the order of the elections and on whether they would be held in a mega-event or in separate elections in order to propose a schedule to the National Electoral Council (CNE).

Dilemmas for opposition political actors
A broad spectrum of the opposition and its parties are at a crossroads. Each of them loosely define their situation as “to be or not to be” organizations with ends based on political reality.

In the case of the four governors and more than 100 anti-Chavista mayors in office, they will opt for re-election. This also applies to a group of deputies who today have seats in the AN.

However, there are other active leaders who have worked in the political arena over the years to become eligible and contest positions in the various electoral districts, which are today in the hands of leaders of Chavismo. They have political responsibilities to their voters and followers and understand that any position won by an opposition force will become a political, territorial, and sectoral space to continue building strength against Chavismo.

In some cases, leaders of the so-called new democratic opposition take advantage of the discontent of anti-Chavista voters and the frustration caused by certain leaders who made great promises that failed, such as María Corina Machado, Edmundo González, and other traditional politicians who make up the PUD, for the 9th and 10th of January.

The other opposition parties hope to build new forces and other electoral fronts and to promote their coalitions with the purpose of taking advantage of the leadership crisis and exhaustion of traditional organizations. They also aspire to restore the electoral organizations among the anti-Chavista base, which have been damaged by the intermittent withdrawals and reappearances of the old organizations from the political field.

Venezuela’s National Assembly & Political Parties Propose 2025 Electoral Schedule

In Venezuela, there is no single opposition leadership; various factions are clearly fragmented into blocks and parties; hence, they lack a coordination structure, a situation that creates immense difficulties for the connection of strategies between them, especially to deal with the dilemmas of 2025.

The most extreme opposition, represented at this time by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, calls for a paralysis of politics and not “turning the page” after the 2024 election, with which they intend to pressure other actors by labeling them as “scorpions” for “cohabiting” and “collaborating” with the Maduro government.

This radical wing hopes that other political parties will not validate or participate in new elections without Edmundo González assuming the presidential office (which could only happen through a coup d’état and foreign military intervention). It is not clear if this will occur, or when it could be carried out.

The above is especially serious due to the significance of a new coup or a foreign military or paramilitary intervention and the possibility of catalyzing an internal conflict. In this scenario, an agenda would be imposed upon the political actors of the opposition, and the eternal cycle of dispute between leaders would be reproduced, with some referring to others as “false” while others brand themselves as the “true opposition.”

The dilemma of abstention reappears and, with it, the possibility that anti-Chavista supporters will be prevented from holding positions with influence in national politics, such as the case of the deputies to the AN.

Some parties and leaders in Caracas, more closely linked to the external front and the remnants of Guaidó’s fake interim government—clearly disconnected from regional political dynamics—could impose an electoral boycott that would frustrate the careers of large segments of leaders in the interior of the country.

Some parties understand that there will be elections with or without them, with or without various parties, and they will have to choose between the loss of strategic opportunities or the delegation of their political future to the agendas of Machado, González, worn-out leaders of the PUD, and foreign actors.

Anti-Chavista leaders will face old and new dilemmas. Surely, María Corina Machado, Edmundo González, and other factors in the PUD will allege that there are a “lack of conditions” for new elections for positions in Venezuela, a position that will promote paralysis within the opposition sectors.

Many leaders, especially in the interior of the country, will face the damage—yet to be determined—that Machado and González have caused to the institutional political system by orchestrating multiple attacks for the delegitimization of the CNE, by ignoring the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), and by reviving the harmful narrative of “electoral fraud” that weakens the confidence of voters to go to the polls.

Various politicians of the opposition within the country also continue to face the consequences of the systematic displacement of the opposition abroad and the participation of foreign elements in the internal diatribe. They are at the mercy of what the new government of Donald Trump will do, the tendencies of new pressure against Venezuelan institutions, and the insurrectional initiatives organized from abroad.

These aspects are almost impossible to control for other opposition parties in the country and are the result of the total surrender that the traditional parties made of their leadership and strategic autonomy to US actors years ago.

The opposition is caught between the dilemma of recomposing itself organically, making politics, and competing for positions or of perishing in paralysis, electoral abstentionism, and agendas beyond its control.

The roadmap for preserving political and institutional stability in Venezuela involves developing the normal conditions of national life, which includes holding elections for public posts, building detente, and working the political game.

Some parties understand this; others, on the other hand, need to create disturbances to navigate through them.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/BR/JRE/SL