Explaining Washington's Venezuela Game

By Misión Verdad – Sep 9, 2024

“I am willing to put on the maximum pressure,” said María Corina Machado during a press conference last Thursday, September 5, repeating a Trump-era ritornello that seems to come at the wrong time given the circumstances.

The United States is at its own political and electoral crossroads at a time when the extremist sector of the Venezuelan opposition is demanding greater support for regime change in Venezuela. Machado herself warned international journalists, “We need more commitment from President Biden to the crisis in Venezuela.”

So, it is worth asking and analyzing: How is the United States operating in the post-28J context? What has it done so far? And what could it do in the coming weeks in relation to the Venezuelan issue?

The recent developments
Since the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced the victory of President Nicolás Maduro in the early hours of July 29, the US State Department has published nine communiqués and statements from the Office of the Spokesperson:

A special briefing on July 29 with senior State Department officials where it questions the results issued by the CNE—”we are concerned that democratic norms have not been respected”—and demand the publication of the “minutes.”
A statement by the G7 foreign ministers on August 1 in which it issues “a call for maximum moderation in the country and for a peaceful, democratic, and Venezuelan-led solution.”
Another statement, this time by Antony Blinken, on August 1, in which he takes for granted the victory of Edmundo González Urrutia with the “minutes” published by the Machado sector.
On August 2, it reported that Secretary Blinken spoke with Machado and González Urrutia, when the senior official “reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to supporting the process of restoring democratic norms in Venezuela.”
A joint statement from 28 countries, including the United States, and from the European Union, which, in addition to not recognizing President Maduro’s re-election, concludes that “the current situation demands a broad, inclusive, and good-faith dialogue to facilitate a political agreement that promotes national reconciliation, peace, public security, and democracy in Venezuela” was published on August 16.
An August 23 press release stated that the Supreme Court of Justice’s (TSJ) ruling confirming President Maduro’s victory “lacks all credibility,” citing the argument of the opposition “records,” and ends with “we are ready to support an inclusive process led by Venezuela to restore democratic norms.”
In the following press release, dated September 3, the US State Department condemned an arrest warrant for Edmundo González and insisted that “the path forward must be a peaceful, transparent, and inclusive democratic transition process that puts the well-being of Venezuelans at the center.”
A statement was issued at a joint press conference by Secretary Blinken and Dominican President Luis Abinader on September 6, where Blinken said they were working with other countries in the region with “determination to see Venezuela clearly return to a democratic path that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.”
In a press release dated September 8, Secretary Blinken expressed the State Department’s view on Edmundo González Urrutia’s departure from Venezuela in addition to stressing that “the United States will continue to work with our international partners to defend democratic freedoms in Venezuela and ensure that Maduro and his representatives are held accountable for their actions.”

Added to the above is the constant publication of posts on the digital network X by Brian A. Nichols, undersecretary for Western Hemisphere affairs, who incessantly demands that the CNE and the TSJ “be accountable” and “take responsibility” in recognizing what—he reiterates—is the “will of the people,” always supported by the narrative of the “minutes”.

In their declarations, US officials reject the electoral results of July 28, support a “democratic transition” with María Corina Machado and Edmundo González at the head, and demand “accountability” from Venezuelan institutions in favor of opposition demands.

On the other hand, political actors in US Congress such as Republican senators from Florida, Marco Rubio and Rick Scott, have demanded a more aggressive approach to Venezuela, even advocating the overthrow of the government and conveniently criticizing the Biden administration for the lack of substance of its actions.

Machado has echoed the demands of this Republican sector, along with her promoters of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, even as she intersperses hopeful language with that of insurrection and violence—symbolic and political.

With Blinken taking on a greater role in the field of spokespersons during the last week, one could also expect a diplomatic hardening of the countries summoned by the United States on Venezuela.

Venezuelans voted for change. Maduro’s post-election repression has killed or jailed thousands, and winning candidate @EdmundoGU remains the best hope for democracy. We must not let Maduro and his representatives cling to power by force. The will of the people must be respected.
— Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken) September 9, 2024

However, so far, the Biden administration has not issued any statement or communiqué that corresponds to the proposal of greater measures of force—nor are there prospects of them being implemented in the immediate future—both economically and militarily, despite the fact that there is pressure from the Republican sectors and extremist Venezuelan opposition for them to occur.

In the field of sanctions
The mechanisms of coercion and persecution through the sanctions regime continue to be active, despite the limited relaxation by the management of general and specific licenses by the Treasury Department for the Venezuelan energy sector.

However, the US’s sphere of influence is sufficiently extensive that the US has carried out the theft of the Dassault Falcon 900EX aircraft, illegally seized in the Dominican Republic and transferred to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on September 2. This has been, so far, the only significant measure taken by the US government in response to the events after the elections.

A Bloomberg article on September 2 reported the United States’ intention to issue new sanctions, this time individually, to 15 people with public positions in Venezuela. Francisco Palmieri, head of the so-called United States Foreign Office Mission for Venezuela and the North American country’s chargé d’affaires in Colombia, stated in an interview on Friday, September 6, that there would be more than 15.

This intention, although it falls within the realm of sanctions, does not correspond to the “commitment” that Machado demands from Biden to achieve a change of regime.

For this to happen, there should be a lifting of the general and specific licenses that allow US and European companies to invest, operate, and market in the Venezuelan oil and gas sector, a twist to the energy policy of that the Biden administration itself, a few months before the elections in the United States, does not plan to execute.

In addition, an exclusive report from the Wall Street Journal published on September 5 says that in the days following the presidential election, Chevron’s lobbying to continue operating in Venezuela was active in Washington, DC:

“In meetings with White House and State Department officials days after the election, Chevron executives said their presence in Venezuela bolsters global oil supplies and US energy security, according to people familiar with the conversations. The executives said Chevron also serves US interests as a bulwark there against geopolitical adversaries gaining additional footholds in the country.”

According to the New York newspaper, Chevron’s message “has carried weight with the administration, people familiar with the matter say,” given that the second-largest oil company in the United States—the first being ExxonMobil—has traditionally had a dominant voice in shaping federal government energy policies for at least a century.

This statement is in line with what was published by the WSJ: “‘Chevron regularly engages on energy policy issues with stakeholders in Washington, DC, and around the world,” said Chevron spokesman Bill Turenne. ‘We have had a constructive presence in Venezuela for more than a century, where we have dedicated investments and a large workforce.'”

Chevron was the only US oil company that stayed in Venezuela and participated in the joint venture scheme in 2007. Relations with this company have been maintained since then under the framework enacted during the government of Hugo Chávez, except for a hiatus due to illegal sanctions during the Trump era.

This explains why the sanctions scheme for Venezuela always made an exception for Chevron. In addition, Chevron’s stability is based on its non-partisan position for any political option, and thus, it has maintained relations with the country and, therefore, with government authorities, strictly on the commercial level.

The US Attempted Coup in Venezuela Uses New Cyber Tools, but Cannot Break the Chavista Wall

Diplomacy on both sides
The diplomatic mobilization of the United States has not produced the expected effects in terms of the “democratic transition.” For Machado, what the Biden administration has attempted thus far has been insufficient, but reality dictates that it has moved its pieces in the Western Hemisphere and across the Atlantic.

The Lula–Petro tandem, and the countries in which it has the greatest influence, are elements with which the United States has played on the great chessboard of the Venezuelan question. Rounds of dialogue and negotiation, behind-the-scenes discussions, diplomatic pressure, and threats of sanctions are actions and measures that alternate depending on the country and the intention.

At the time of writing, Brazil and Colombia maintain stable relations with Venezuela, although they do not yet recognize President Maduro’s victory on July 28.

Allowing Lula da Silva and, to a lesser extent, Gustavo Petro to promote mediation as a tool to resolve the conflict in favor of the opposition agenda and to cloud relations between neighbors only resulted in maintaining the status quo in Venezuela’s bilateral relations with these two countries.

The only information that has managed to minimally disturb relations between Brasilia and Caracas is the press release from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 7 in which it states that Lula’s government will follow the steps of the Vienna Convention after Venezuela’s decision to reject Brazilian custody of the Argentine embassy in Venezuela, a place where part of Machado’s team has been operating in the electoral and post-electoral context with the support of Javier Milei’s government.

Mexico, for its part, has had an even-handed position. Outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador defends the Estrada Doctrine, whose principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is one of the basic tenets of Mexican foreign policy—violated by previous administrations such as that of Enrique Peña Nieto. Previously, the Mexican president had made the decision to continue with this doctrine in relation to Venezuela as soon as he took office, even though he had stable relations with President Maduro.

For this reason, the hardening of the diplomatic tone has come from other places, including the Dominican Republic, a country that Secretary Blinken visited to reinforce cooperation in various areas. Panama also plays a role, apparently minor, in this game.

The goal of the United States is to gather the largest possible number of countries in the region in order to maintain diplomatic pressure without establishing an official organization similar to the Lima Group, that is, without entailing political and diplomatic costs (and, in the long run, economic and commercial costs) in the region.

The declarative language of the leaders who have spoken out against Venezuela, including the US State Department, attempts to coerce Venezuela to respond to the interests of Edmundo González and, above all, of María Machado. She herself, in the aforementioned press conference, revealed what the diplomatic pressure strategy has been thus far:

“A mechanism of simultaneous pressure must be activated, coordinated with intelligence and creativity. If there is no pressure, there is no negotiation. It is not necessary to call people to the streets at all times. The people have already expressed themselves. Create incentives for the regime for a transition to democracy. The international community can do a lot to help us.”

The US game has been two-sided: on the one hand, governments and leaders with stable relations and political-ideological affinities with Venezuela; on the other, presidents and countries co-opted by US influence—the “international community.” This diplomatic move, to date, is shaped for the effects of media agendas and not so much for a “maximum pressure” campaign, at least as long as the Biden administration remains in power.

Balance in the process of definition
In a volatile scenario such as that of Venezuela, proposing a future situation beyond the US elections is trivial since, depending on who occupies the highest office in the White House, one or another policy will be imposed.

The fact that Machado and the Florida senators are returning to the language of “maximum pressure” says a lot about the way in which the Biden administration has dealt with the situation regarding Venezuela.

The US has preserved the status quo, quite contrary to what was declared by Machado, who assured international journalists, “We are not in a static or stopped situation: this is an ongoing process.”

In the United States, there will be presidential elections next November, the results of which will decide, among other things, foreign policy on Venezuela. The signs that if Donald Trump wins, a remastered version of “maximum pressure” will return, leading to an intensification of coercive measures, are clear. This will be even more so if the Republican senators from Florida become involved in shaping an anti-Venezuelan policy in Washington.

Venezuela is not among the candidates’ favorite topics. Kamala Harris has not yet said anything on the topic, and Trump mentions our country without the forcefulness of his past boasts that the US would take over Venezuelan oil. Trump did state that the July 28 elections “were neither free nor fair.” However, the comment only became a way of laying blame on the current Democrat vice president for Venezuela’s electoral results. It was a statement related to the US presidential electoral campaign only and not an official statement from his camp on Venezuela.

At the same time, González Urrutia’s flight confirms the fading of a “transition” that Machado still boasts of negotiating—for example, when he says, “It is not true that the regime has control of the situation.” The current political picture shows that his attempts to keep his agenda afloat are nothing more than actions without practical effects in reality.

This, without a doubt, has been so because the United States has no aggressive involvement in Venezuela. Washington now believes it has a greater incentive to continue relations with Venezuela in accordance with its energy needs and those of its European allies.

For its part, Venezuela’s instability does not suit the Biden government at a time when it is criticized for its immigration policy, fuel prices, and the political use of the Department of Energy’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the latter items upon which Venezuelan oil has a notable influence.

However, this US policy may come to an abrupt end in a few months with the possible return of Trump to the White House. The drawback of bringing back “maximum pressure” would be that it would not be compatible with the political times in Venezuela, when Machado’s “transition” could already be another infamous memory in the recent history of our country.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/KW/SL