Compilation image showing Joseph Aoun (Left) and Abu al-Julani (Right). Photo: The Cradle.
By Ghassan Jawad – Mar 6, 2025
As Trump works to expand Arab normalization deals with Israel, the weakened states of Syria and Lebanon are firmly in his sights. But oppressive US arm-twisting is also likely to trigger a backlash and revive resistance across multiple borders.
The US “Special Envoy to the Middle East” under US President Donald Trump, Steve Witkoff, has expressed optimism about persuading Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel, with suggestions that Syria and Lebanon could follow suit – both recently having shifted closer to the west under their new respective governments.
Speaking last week at the launch of the American Jewish Committee’s Center for a New Middle East in Washington, Witkoff stated that there is a possibility for Syria and Lebanon to normalize relations with the occupation state following the strategic setbacks faced by West Asia’s Axis of Resistance, referring to Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government in Damascus.
A renewed push for normalization
The renewed discussion on normalization between West Asian countries and the occupation state resurfaced amid shaky ceasefire agreements in Gaza and Lebanon. It was not only Trump’s return to the White House, as the architect of the so-called “Deal of the Century,” that revived this issue, but also broader regional developments following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the resulting shifts in the geopolitical balance of power, particularly in Syria and Lebanon.
The issue of normalization between Israel and Arab states has been a consistent topic for every modern US president. The phrase “peaceful settlement” of the Palestinian issue –alongside recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” and normalizing ties with Arab states – has become a standard part of every new US president’s electoral rhetoric.
It is also a cornerstone of Washington’s policy in West Asia, which is built on two pillars: Israel’s security and its military, economic, and strategic superiority; and the safeguarding of oil and resources in what is referred to as the “moderate” Arab states.
Historical resistance to US normalization efforts
During the Cold War, Washington’s efforts in the region faced resistance from Arab states that actively supported Palestinian resistance in the 1970s and 1980s – key among them countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.
Therefore, the chances of the US, Israel, and their western allies imposing their agendas remained slim because of the significant Arab governmental and public rejection of compromises and mass support for armed resistance against Israeli occupation.
This led to the emergence of an alternative regional option centered around resistance, especially in Palestine and Lebanon, following Israel’s 1982 invasion.
But by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the weakening and collapse of the Soviet Union disrupted that balance of power, further exacerbated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent divisions in the Arab world.
These shifts led to the 1991 Madrid Conference, which marked the beginning of a new phase of negotiations and peace settlements under the framework of a “two-state solution.” The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) engaged in these talks, eventually signing the 1993 Oslo Accords, followed by Jordan’s signing of the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty with Israel.
Washington’s current efforts are not detached from the reality of shifting power balances. If the outcomes of the 1967 and 1973 wars pushed Egypt toward a peace treaty with Israel, culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords, and if Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon led to the 17 May Agreement between Beirut and Tel Aviv, which was later overturned by resistance forces within two years, then why shouldn’t the post-Operation Al-Aqsa Flood era, with all its repercussions, serve as an entry point for pushing normalization onto Syria and Lebanon?
Syria: A battlefield for competing interests
But Syria remains unstable, and the new leadership in Damascus is unlikely to engage in this process before consolidating internal control and determining the country’s future amid ongoing Israeli expansion in the south. Tel Aviv may be seeking to strengthen its security and political position in Syria, but it is not the only regional or international player vested in shaping the new Syria.
Turkiye currently plays a dominant role in Syria, nurturing its ambitions for political, security, and economic influence. Any Israeli expansion in Syria under US cover and with Arab silence could clash with Turkish ambitions at any moment, potentially leading to further fragmentation in Syria.
This is particularly critical given the weak central authority of the new Syrian government and its lack of control over southern and eastern regions, as well as northeastern areas where the US-backed Kurdish militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), holds sway.
Amid this transitional phase in Syria, the concept of normalization becomes tied to several questions. What kind of Syria does the Trump administration hope to push toward peace and normalized ties with Tel Aviv?
Is it a unified, strong, centralized state? Or is it a fragmented and weakened Syria that, since 2011 and the fall of Assad, has turned into a patchwork of international and regional zones of influence, closer to guardianship and de facto occupation?
Lebanon: A political minefield for normalization
In Lebanon, this issue is approached with extreme sensitivity. Those familiar with Lebanon’s political makeup understand that such a move would mean political suicide for the government in Beirut.
In 1982 and 1983, Israel occupied most of the country, which was already embroiled in a civil war and deep divisions. The government then signed the May 17 Agreement with Israel, which quickly collapsed under pressure from Syria and Iran-aligned resistance forces within a year. In short, those tentative efforts at striking relations with Tel Aviv instead spurred armed resistance led by Hezbollah, which ultimately expelled Israel in 2000 through military force, without any direct negotiations.
The political, social, and cultural barriers to normalization are not limited to resistance movements like Hezbollah. Lebanese law, passed by Parliament, explicitly criminalizes normalization with Tel Aviv, categorizing it as a felony subject to legal prosecution. Additionally, Lebanon enforces cultural, political, and economic boycott laws against Israel.
The trajectory of normalization has undergone a dramatic shift from the last century to today. Once an Arab taboo, rapprochement with the occupation state has increasingly become a US pressure project that is inserted into every conversation Washington has in West Asia. This is despite the fact that Israel has recently violently occupied strategic swathes of Syrian and Lebanese territory.
Is normalization inevitable?
The region has undergone profound changes, raising critical strategic questions. What will be Syria’s new position with Israel, given that the latter occupies much of the former’s southern region? Where is Lebanon headed following a qualitative political shift – both in form and substance – toward American guardianship?
How will the resistance confront upcoming challenges, from governmental appointments to municipal and parliamentary elections? What financial, political, and security challenges await the resistance in its internal confrontations?
The answer to each of these questions will help forecast the trajectory of this process in Lebanon and Syria. However, what is certain is that the international and regional wave seeking to capitalize on last year’s events in the region is intense and ongoing – bolstered by a US administration that has given Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu free reign in West Asia and is preparing to transition the region into a new phase that serves its broader confrontation with China, while also working to contain both Russia and Iran.
In 2020, the so-called Deal of the Century was rendered underwhelming, in large part due to the strength of the resistance and the fears of Arab states that normalization would have repercussions on their own internal stability. Now, with the region’s defenses weakened, Washington appears ready to revive this file and turn normalization into an irreversible reality. Some of this arm-twisting will be won through military aggression, some through economic sanctions and sieges – and, as in the case of Lebanon, reconstruction of its devastated southern region may be forcibly tied to diplomatic recognition of Israel.
But while the US may be priming West Asia for a new wave of so-called Abraham Accords, it is unlikely that the region’s Axis of Resistance will ignore US–Israeli–western machinations to reshape the region’s identity and foist Israel’s presence into its entire neighborhood.
This is a defining battle. Either the region – and its states – retains its identity and maintains its international rights, or it enters a phase of fragmentation, division, and normalization.
