Trump Administration Launches Major Attack on Venezuelan Economy

By Misión Verdad – Mar 27, 2025

The latest executive order of the Trump administration threatening to impose tariffs on buyers of Venezuelan oil is generating its first repercussions, especially on the national exchange rate system.

After the US repealed General License 41 for Chevron’s activities in Venezuela, and now with this new pressure mechanism, there has been an evident disturbance in the value of the Venezuelan national currency, bolívar, against the dollar in the black market.

By the end of March 26, the parallel, or unofficial, exchange rate closed at 102.9 bolívars per dollar, while the rate of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) is 69.0 bolívars for a dollar.

Thus, on March 26, the differential, or the exchange rate gap, reached 40%.

This breaks the predominant tendencies of equilibrium and stability from January-December 2023 and 2024, when the difference between the two exchange rates was minimal, 5-9% and 7-12%, respectively.

This new situation in the Venezuelan economy opens up a series of political and economic considerations.

Exchange rate dynamics

The parallel exchange rate has taken on new denominations in recent months. A new unofficial marker called “average” has emerged.

This intermediate indicator between the BCV exchange rate and the traditional parallel exchange rate is being applied to prices of goods and services marked in dollars in the real economy. People commonly use the “average” dollar as an alternative to the BCV and the traditional parallel exchange rate.

The parallel exchange rate, usually called “Monitor,” works as a reference value for Colombian exchange houses, applying the system adopted by the site Dólar Today years ago.

Apparently, during the last few days there has been additional demand for dollars in exchange houses and in the informal market as a whole. But the level or proportion of the increase in this new demand for US dollars among these exchange groups is unknown, since there is no transparency in their pricing parameters.

This apparent “stampede” was caused by bolívar holders who believe there will be a shortage of dollars in coming months due to economic pressure measures and financial siege implemented by the Trump administration.

It could be argued that, theoretically, there is a component of panic due to fears of a deterioration of the Venezuelan economy resulting from a sharp drop in oil activities.

The “Monitor” exchange rate creates significant disturbances in the real economy, given that the real levels of demand driving the price of the US currency are unknown. There is no clarity on how many bolívar holders are willing to pay the very high price of the parallel dollar.

Speaking of retail cash buyers—individuals buying and selling using unofficial markers—most transactions are made based on the “average” value or some other amount close to the “Monitor” dollar.

In view of this, it is highly probable that the creation of the parallel exchange rate is informed by decisions of specific actors inside and outside Venezuela.

In the last few weeks another phenomenon seems to have taken place: the surge of the parallel exchange rate prior to the payment of income tax (ISLR), which will be collected until March 31 by the National Integrated Service of Customs and Tax Administration (SENIAT).

In this scenario, encouraged by large dollar-holding commercial sectors, an exceptional placement of dollars in the unofficial systems may be generated to obtain bolívars for income tax payment.

In any case, the evolution of this monetary situation remains to be seen, and it may worsen or abate in coming months.

Trump Imposes 25% Tariffs on Venezuelan Oil Buyers in Escalation of Economic War

Real impact of the perturbations
The current exchange rate situation deepens the distortions and asymmetries existing between exchange rates, with devaluation of the national currency and inflation.

This increases pressure from suppliers on merchants, who demand payment at rates higher than the BCV reference value.

If the payment system in the suppliers’ chains is distorted through the use of the unofficial rates, it will be the consumer, first of all, who will have to pay a higher price for products, which means that Trump’s policies will directly affect the people’s purchasing power.

More importantly, a disproportionate increase in the price of goods and services will additionally translate into a drop in consumption and a corresponding loss of income for retailers, distributors, producers, and importers. Therefore, the collateral effect of Washington’s measures will have a direct impact on the Venezuelan private sector.

The US government’s measures could further curtail Venezuela’s oil activities and, therefore, the national and state income. In addition, the achievements of the recovery of the Venezuelan economy during the last few years would be affected. The damage could be widespread.

Various sectors of the economy take for granted a reedition of the “maximum pressure” and could act in a stampede, getting prepared for new scenarios, buying foreign currency even if its price is excessive.

This is a sign of uncertainty and nervousness, phenomena that in the current context seek to compromise investors’ confidence and create a scenario of recession.

Open end
The Venezuelan government and other agents of the economy must implement what they have learned in previous years and face the new context from two premises, easy to say, but difficult to materialize: to sustain the flow of oil activities and to keep boosting the exchange system with an adequate flow of foreign currency, which may come from new investments.

The former will require exceptional mechanisms to develop and strengthen blockade evasion practices, albeit at high costs.

The latter demands state monetary governance that must be replicated by business groups as a safeguard of the official exchange rate in order to avoid a disruption in the exchange rate system, which should mitigate the consequences for the economy as a whole.

The business sector understands the risks involved, considering that in recent years they have made significant investments that they would not want to lose.

Meanwhile, on the domestic political front, the far-right sector represented by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González has celebrated the US measures against the Venezuelan economy, contrary to the majority of the national public opinion.

According to Luis Vicente León, head of the polling firm Datanálisis, only 11% of the population approves of the new US actions against the Venezuelan oil sector. In January of this year, a survey conducted by the business association Fedecámaras among its affiliates showed that 81% of the business-owners opine that they are being negatively affected by the sanctions.

Although the population in general and the economic agents in Venezuela condemn foreign coercive actions, the US government aligns with the position of extremist Venezuelan political actors that want those measures, creating a false consensus of support and manufacturing a false consent before the international public opinion.

Regarding the measures from Washington, the publication of License 41B that extended Chevron’s presence in Venezuela until the end of May, together with Trump’s other announcements on isolating Venezuelan crude from other markets, suggests a clear campaign of pressure against Venezuela.

To estimate such coercion in the context of a possible behind-the-scenes negotiation would be to speculate based on the US president’s transactional and oscillating logic, but if there is one thing that White House policy has demonstrated in recent months, it is that twists and turns in its positions are constant.

Everything remains to be seen, but what is clear is that the Trump administration has dealt the first blow of “maximum pressure 2.0” against Venezuela.

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/SC/DZ