Hezbollah's Secretary General, Sheikh Naim Qassem. Photo: Bilal Hussein/AP
By Maysam Rizk – Nov 6, 2024
In modern history, no party or resistance movement has been subjected to the severe blows that Hezbollah has endured in just a few weeks. Thousands of Hezbollah members have been struck, followed by the assassination of its jihadist leaders and then its Secretary-General, the martyr Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. There has been no parallel in modern history to a group like Hezbollah, which has faced an onslaught using all forms of power—both soft and hard—to attempt to eliminate the resistance, only to recover from it with such extraordinary speed. This recovery is something that everyone feels, from the enemy itself to its allies and supporters. Hezbollah reorganized itself in the midst of a major battle, facing challenges that forced it to reassess many of its past calculations and mistakes. Hezbollah has proven that it cannot be destroyed by the enemy.
July 30, 2024, was not an ordinary day in the war. It was a turning point that revealed some hidden facts. The enemy assassinated the great senior jihadist leader in the resistance, Fouad Shaker (Sayyed Mohsen). The operation left no room for ambiguity, and Hezbollah quickly recognized a mistake had been made. Between the day of the assassination and the retaliation on August 25, when “Israeli” Unit 8200 (one of the largest and most important global units specializing in electronic intelligence) was targeted, Hezbollah’s first response was to take precautionary measures, including isolating certain units. This was followed by an investigation, which uncovered a serious security breach.
September 17th was another unusual day and a new turning point. The explosion of wireless communication devices (pagers). Mobile bombs in the hands of resistance fighters. At the time of the operation, Hezbollah believed it was a signal from the “Israeli” enemy to begin the war, and it anticipated the start of a major operation that same day. However, the “Israeli” hesitation raised questions that led to a quick investigation, which produced initial findings, the most important of which were:
First: The intermediary company responsible for delivering the shipment deliberately delayed it, citing a malfunction in the devices. To compensate for this delay, they lowered the price, raising some suspicions, but this did not prompt any immediate action regarding the shipment. This was one of the errors in the purchasing process.
Second: It was revealed that the “Israeli” enemy had infiltrated the intermediary company, preparing a large quantity of devices and rigging them with explosives in a way that was difficult to detect. As for the other details of the operation and the surrounding circumstances, they are now fully known to the relevant resistance agencies, but it remains unclear when they will make a public statement about it.
What can be confirmed is that the two incidents revealed a serious and dangerous “Israeli” security breach, though its exact nature was not fully understood at the time. Meanwhile, the enemy continued to escalate its attacks as part of a strategy to target all of Hezbollah’s leaders before reaching Sayyed Nasrallah, believing that eliminating them would cripple the resistance’s military units. They assumed that any retaliation for the assassinations would be weak. Then came the major operation on September 27. However, despite the shock it caused both inside and outside the country, and even within Hezbollah, there was no sign of collapse or paralysis like the enemy had intended there to be.
The shock of the situation did not prevent Hezbollah from acting on the assumption that the enemy had a detailed understanding of all its centers and structures. Therefore, Hezbollah began implementing a new plan for repositioning its leadership. Meanwhile, military units in the south, as a precaution, began to dispose of a large quantity of the equipment in their possession. Before his martyrdom (officially announced by Hezbollah on October 23), the head of the Executive Council, Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, moved the party to a new location, where he worked on the following:
- The complete evacuation of all public headquarters and the cancellation of some of the alternative locations planned in the previous war strategy.
- The suspension of the party’s communications network after it was discovered that it had been compromised by the “Israeli” enemy.
However, the security team did not realize that the headquarters that Sayyed Safieddine himself had moved to was also identified by the enemy and eventually targeted. As a result, the decision was made to abandon all previous plans for location arrangements. Despite the severe strikes, the party took the initiative to carry out an operation aimed primarily at stabilizing the situation and adapting to a new reality. This included taking into consideration that the enemy’s aerial assaults on both civilian and military targets had damaged some of Hezbollah’s capabilities, in addition to hitting key security and military leaders.
Within just a few days, communication was restored between the core leadership and the heads of the military units, who quickly developed plans to manage the situation on the ground based on the new realities. After 15 days, a committee was formed to lead military operations, coinciding with the return of communication between the senior leadership, particularly the members of the Shura Council. They made the decision to appoint a new Secretary-General as soon as possible. At that point, Sheikh Naim Qassem had already begun taking on responsibilities for his position, alongside a collective leadership managing both the political and military aspects. Eventually, a system was put in place to activate the executive body, which would handle specific issues, particularly the matter of displaced persons.
On October 28, Hezbollah officially announced the election of Sheikh Naim Qassem as its Secretary-General. Immediately afterward, Hezbollah’s opponents, at the request of the Americans and some Arab states, launched a political campaign focusing on the idea that Hezbollah, as both a force and an organization, is fundamentally tied to Sayyed Nasrallah and that there is no substitute for him. The Americans, through their Lebanese and Arab allies, framed Qassem’s election as a forced decision, claiming he would not be able to fill Sayyed Nasrallah’s role. This narrative was reinforced in the form of a “directive” circulated by US Ambassador to Beirut, Lisa Johnson, to her political and media allies. In the directive, she stated that “the countdown to Hezbollah’s demise has begun, and preparations must be made for the post-Hezbollah era.” She instructed them to focus on three key points:
- Hezbollah no longer has any political or military leadership.
- The Iranians are now in control of Hezbollah’s political, military, and organizational leadership.
- Hezbollah has entered a state of paralysis and collapse in its organizational structure.
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In response, Hezbollah turned away from all the confusion and focused on reorganizing the leadership of its military forces. The party continued to assess the extent of the military damage and began planning to fill the gaps in both manpower and weapons. Additionally, a central task was to develop a clear political stance on the ongoing situation. This was expressed in recorded statements by Sheikh Qassem and in press conferences held by Hezbollah’s Media Relations Officer, Hajj Mohammed Afif, who also organized meetings to explain the party’s position, maintaining his role despite the security threats he faced.
Meanwhile, the gradual activation of the “Loyalty to the Resistance” parliamentary bloc allowed Hezbollah, over the course of three weeks, to restore its necessary political and non-political contacts. This was done in line with a planned strategy that identified key individuals to engage with during this period, avoiding unnecessary communication that did not align with the party’s immediate objectives.
After Sheikh Qassem assumed his position, the working bodies under his leadership became properly organized. Although the war had affected parts of the civilian infrastructure, causing disruptions in several areas that were evident in various sectors, the chain of command was reestablished from top to bottom, ensuring that no official would undertake any task without a central decision. Even the flexibility granted to field commanders based on geographic zones does not override the fact that some operations on the frontline are carried out under orders from the high command.
Anyone who knows Hezbollah well understands that one of the most important things the party has restored is its control and command structure. However, this structure has become more robust, as the challenges and blows Hezbollah faced pushed it to a new level, one marked by greater resolve, discipline, and a stricter approach to addressing mistakes. Additionally, it became evident that a new mindset was emerging in decision-making, one that eliminated room for personal interpretations or individual judgments.
What stands out when discussing Sheikh Qassem’s personality is that many aspects of his character remain unknown. Those who know him well are aware that his religious experience dates back many years before the establishment of Hezbollah. He was close to the late Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and this connection has had an influence on his perspectives. He is, however, by no means categorized as a “conservative” in religious terms. What many people do not know about Sheikh Qassem, and contrary to what some ignorant individuals have tried to spread, based on external pressures or desires, is that there was a significant shift in his political thinking after he joined the founding team of Hezbollah and declared his allegiance to the political line led by Imam Khomeini.
Another side of his personality is his administrative role. He has been responsible for executive tasks that required considerable administrative skill, in addition to the specific operational mechanisms required within a jihadist organization. While some portray him as flexible or even weak, what many don’t realize is that he is, in fact, one of the most rigid and strict figures within the party, both organizationally and administratively. This is based on his 40 years of experience in overseeing administrative work, particularly in the areas of budgeting and expenditures. Additionally, he is one of the most knowledgeable party leaders when it comes to the state’s affairs and institutions, from the parliament and government to civil projects. He also possesses extensive knowledge of the inner workings of all political forces.
The party identified significant security breaches and moved forward with a new plan of action, completely unrelated to any previous military, organizational, or administrative plans.
What many people don’t know about Sheikh Qassem, given that decisions were traditionally made by the Shura Council and expressed by the late Secretary-General, is that, both personally and within the leadership circles, he is one of the most hardline figures when it comes to dealing with external powers that support “Israel”, especially the Americans and Europeans. He is also one of the most rigid leaders within Hezbollah in his stance against internal domestic forces hostile to the resistance. He is not someone who can be easily compromised on many issues. Today, he feels a tremendous responsibility in protecting the party. While he is fully focused on the war and confrontation, his attention remains on the internal situation, closely linked to his stance on foreign interventions and the tendency of some local forces to engage with these outside influences.
Those who misread the party need to be aware that after the blows Hezbollah has endured and the challenges imposed on it, the party will rebuild itself and implement plans similar to those of the 1980’s. Hezbollah will no longer be as lenient. While the party highly values the positive behavior shown by the Lebanese people in dealing with the issue of displacement, under Sheikh Qassem’s leadership, Hezbollah distinguishes between the behavior of the general public and the actions of political forces and figures who have shifted from betting on the Israeli enemy to expressing a willingness to cooperate with the American project. These forces are positioning themselves at the heart of a political and media campaign that meets “Israel” halfway.
Washington’s threats against government officials: do not respond to Hezbollah’s requests
Political sources have noted a campaign of intimidation directed at Lebanese officials in the government, security agencies, and military by the Americans, warning them about the consequences of cooperating with Hezbollah or assisting the party on internal matters. Should this occur, it would be classified as collaboration with Hezbollah and would expose these officials to being barred from holding positions in the state or receiving any benefits. To ensure compliance with American demands, the US seeks to convince these officials by saying, “We are not asking you to declare war on Hezbollah or rise up against it. We are simply asking that you do not cooperate with it, respond to its calls, or fulfill its officials” requests.
An organized campaign against Hezbollah funded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE
Al-Akhbar has learned that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have begun funding TV channels, newspapers, websites, and journalists. The funding process will expand further in the coming weeks as part of a project to mobilize these outlets to participate in a campaign aimed at portraying Hezbollah’s days are numbered. The campaign is centered around a single slogan: “Militia weapons are a danger to the state and the people,” and calls for “disarming the militias.” This initiative is being sponsored by the US Embassy in Beirut, with the primary aim of increasing hostility toward Hezbollah and betting on its defeat in the ongoing war. In the same context, the US Embassy in Beirut has activated a media committee that directly reports to the embassy. Its goal is to spread exaggerated narratives to demoralize the public and sow discord.
(Al Akhbar) By Maysam Rizk
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/ME/DZ
Maysam Rizk
Maysam Rizk is a Lebanese journalist at Al-Akhbar newspaper. Her Twitter can handle is @MayssamRizk and her work can be found here.