By Misión Verdad – Sep 5, 2024
Edmundo González’s letter to the attorney general of Venezuela contains political elements that signal a possible change in the situation within the Venezuelan opposition and, therefore, in the general conflict scenario.
Amid a disruptive agenda of extreme polarization by the far-right opposition that does not recognize the electoral results of July 28 and wants a coup d’état disguised as “transition,” amid an international attempt to issue a Guaidó 2.0 project, and with María Corina Machado’s capacity for social traction and popular support weakened, the letter by former presidential candidate of the extreme right, Edmundo González, represents a turnaround that places new variables on the national political chessboard.
1. Recognition of institutions
In his letter, González states that he had not appeared before the Attorney General’s Office because, in his opinion, there are no grounds to support its summons, but it “does not at all stem from a disregard for the jurisdictional institutions provided for in the Constitution.”
In this way, for the first time publicly, González recognizes the Venezuelan institutions, contrary to the insurrectional semantics and absolute non-recognition of the Venezuelan State promoted by María Corina Machado consistently and with greater vigor after July 28.
Remití carta a la fiscalía general de la República en vista de los últimos acontecimientos: pic.twitter.com/KusBWXxwdi
— Edmundo González (@EdmundoGU) September 5, 2024
The publication of the letter could be understood as a first act of González’s relative independence from María Corina Machado, who, since the registration of the former ambassador’s presidential candidacy with the National Electoral Council (CNE), had projected him as a political extension of her personality and positions.
After the letter, that effect of indistinction between the two, used to the extreme during the electoral campaign, seems to diminish notably.
Evidence of González’s subordination to Machado was that he did not sign the CNE document that required candidates to recognize the official results of July 28. He subsequently put his signature on a letter, along with Machado, declaring him “president-elect” and making an open call for a military coup; only to later, in another public document, present himself solely as a presidential candidate.
In terms of political discourse, the recognition of Venezuelan state institutions contradicts María Corina Machado’s agenda and places González on a seemingly moderate path, where his fabricated stature as “president-elect” and supposed leader of the “transition” is diluted.
Venezuela’s Courts Order Arrest of Former Candidate Edmundo González
2. González distances himself from the opposition’s ‘voting records’ publication
In addition, González’s lawyer, José Antonio Haro, has stated that the former candidate “had nothing to do” with the publication of the “voting records” by the opposition on the website resultadosconvzla.com, the very reason for which he had been summoned by the Attorney General’s Office because this implies a series of crimes including usurpation of electoral powers.
The Attorney General’s Office had charged González with six crimes: publication and maintenance of resultadosconvzla.com, usurpation of functions, forgery of public document, instigation to the disobedience of laws, cybercrimes, and criminal association and conspiracy.
Yet, González did endorse the “results” issued in the website, the main source that supports Machado’s fraud narrative.
To legally disassociate himself from the maneuver devised by the leader of Vente Venezuela says a lot about the legitimacy of the “voting records,” since it suggests that the former candidate himself is not aware of his apparent and unproven electoral victory.
Knowing that all the aforementioned acts constitute imputable crimes, Edmundo González would seek to absolve himself of any legal responsibility for the disclosure of the so-called voting records. How will the “international community” respond if he relies on a flawed act to condition the United States to adopt measures of greater force against Venezuela?
3. Opting for a moderate position?
The candidacy of Edmundo González was imposed due to the negotiations within the opposition coalition Democratic Unitary Platform after the disqualification of María Corina Machado and the blocking of the attempt to register Corina Yoris as substitute.
González’s nomination was by way of delegation, and his campaign was based more on Machado’s political stature than on the candidate himself. González, by his nature and trajectory, responds to the traditional political circles of the Venezuelan opposition, represented mainly by Manuel Rosales. This sector has been in a situation of digital civil war with the Vente Venezuela bloc for several years, with a broad series of public disputes and clashes.
This traditional opposition, which perceived as a tactical defeat the period that began with the rise of Machado in the opposition primaries and concluded with the coup maneuver with the “voting records” after July 28, may be looking for a space to reconstitute itself. After more than a month of the electoral controversy, María Corina Machado has not been able to reaffirm herself as a strong leader with the capacity of collective command over the increasingly wider universe of oppositions.
To what extent does this move by González originates from the pressures of the Rosales sector, and to what extent can it open the spaces for dialogue with President Maduro? To what extent can this contribute to lowering the decibels of the confrontation in order to enable this possible scenario?
It is not a far-fetched hypothesis, taking into account that Machado’s agenda of regime change, since the publication of the letter, is not being accompanied in the public discourse by the person who supposedly defeated Chavismo politically and electorally on July 28.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/SC/DZ
Misión Verdad
Misión Verdad is a Venezuelan investigative journalism website with a socialist perspective in defense of the Bolivarian Revolution
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