US Sanctions Against Venezuela and Associated Political Dilemmas

By Misión Verdad  –  Dec 5, 2024

Recently, the US government has intensified its hardline position against the Venezuelan government and refused to recognize Nicolás Maduro’s re-election for a new presidential term. The US has also referred to the former opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia as “president elect” for the first time.

From this moment on, a new phase of non-recognition of the Venezuelan government seems to be taking shape in the US, with the aim of maintaining the “foundations” of the illegal sanctions that Washington has imposed on Venezuela.

For its part, the US Congress approved the “BOLIVAR Law,” a bipartisan act that outlines the path of continued siege against the Venezuelan state, its authorities, and the country’s economy as a whole.

The advent of a new Donald Trump administration from next January, combined with the accumulated elements of rising pressure, suggests that the “maximum pressure” strategy could be relaunched.

Marco Rubio, appointed by Trump to the position of Secretary of State, is considered a fervent anti-Chavista. His well-known alliances with extremist sectors of the Venezuelan opposition foreshadow a scenario of new pressures against Venezuela, at the request of these factions.

María Corina Machado, who is now the face of the hardline pro-sanctions faction, has called for additional pressure against Venezuela in order to bring about regime change.

The clichés and the renewed calls for tightening the blockade represent a flashback to 2019.

The opposition, or at least a predominant part of it—the one most heavily linked to Washington’s policy—reinforces the argument in favor of the blockade, which opens the space for a new diatribe about the characteristics and viability of coercion as a method for regime change.

Resistance to “maximum pressure 2.0”
The issue of comprehensive sanctions against the Venezuelan oil industry and, consequently, the economy as a whole —due to the profound link between the oil sector and other sectors of the economy— has frequently been addressed from many angles of public opinion.

Some prominent interpretations have emerged in recent years, especially from sectors not aligned with Chavismo, such as the employers’ guild Consecomercio.

In September 2023, its president, Gustavo Valecillos, questioned the use of these economic warfare tools and criticized their direct and indirect impact on the country’s commercial sector, noting that entrepreneurs have also been victims of these economic sanctions as their space for international relations has been restricted.

Similarly, the private industrialists’ association in Venezuela, Fedecámaras, has expressed its rejection of coercive measures, as its president, Adán Celis, has stated on various occasions.

In Fedecámaras, there is a predominantly adverse opinion towards the illegal blockade on the economy. This was reflected in a survey directed at business owners within that guild, released in January this year. The survey showed that “81% of Venezuelan private companies have been negatively affected by the sanctions.”

In the realm of public opinion and social perception, for several years various polls have been recording a high repudiation of economic sanctions, at levels exceeding 75%, even up to 85%. These data are transversal to all political sectors, a symptom of a politically heterogeneous majority opinion, indicating that this is a common sentiment.

In February, the polling firm Datanálisis recorded this majority repudiation for sanctions. Its president, Luis Vicente León, noted that more than 69% of Venezuelans condemn the tightening of sanctions on Venezuela as a mechanism of political pressure.

He explained that the idea that the intensification of measures against Venezuelan oil is a pressure mechanism to force Nicolás Maduro’s government to negotiate or hand over power “is to forget that, just a few months ago, those sanctions were there and their impact in achieving that objective was absolutely null.”

León pointed out that what those who are calling for a return to the sanctions strategy are really saying “is that they have been completely unable to develop an effective strategy to resolve the country’s political crisis, so they prefer the simplification of selling the idea that they are ‘punishing’ Maduro with sanctions that, in the end, have proven to punish the population, infrastructure, productive sectors, and the country in general infinitely more.”

Recently, the opposition platform Foro Cívico went on a tour of several European countries, where it presented allegations against the results of the July 28 elections. But it warned that the strategy of besieging Venezuela should be carried out through methods other than “maximum pressure,” given its record as a “failed” policy and the damage caused to the economy and the population.

This earned the platform criticism. It was accused of “whitewashing” Maduro, and it refuted the allegation, a situation that led to an intense debate among opponents of different currents, between those who lean towards sanctions and those who consider them counterproductive.

María Corina Machado, Magalli Meda, Leopoldo López have called Foro Cívico’s position and similar arguments a supposed “normalization strategy of the regime.”

US Intensification of Sanctions Against Venezuela is Fraught With Obstacles

Another anti-sanctions opposition figure is the economist Francisco Rodríguez, a professor at the University of Maryland, United States, head of the firm Torino Capital, and proponent of absolute dollarization in Venezuela during Henri Falcón’s 2018 campaign. Rodríguez recently published an article in the US media outlet Foreign Affairs on the political and economic infeasibility of “maximum pressure.”

He alluded to the economic and social impacts of the blockade, and added that its intensification would rather strengthen Maduro by facilitating state control and discretionary government actions over the economy.

However, the “normalization strategy” goes beyond Venezuelans. The US think tank Atlantic Council, an institution with a broad record of favoring regime change in Venezuela, published an article by David Voght and Patricia Ventura indicating the possible “effectiveness” of methods other than “maximum pressure” in Venezuela.

The article in question focuses more on the geopolitical-energy context, stating that for the United States, it would be more in line with its interests to extend oil licenses in Venezuela, distance the country from China, Iran, and Russia, and “maintain the regulations” that the licenses enforce regarding Venezuela’s income.

The analysis maintains the line that intensifying the blockade is counterproductive for the population, decreases support for the opposition, and reduces the maneuvering capabilities of the United States in terms of “influencing” the internal dynamics of the country.

This is not the first time this think tank has adopted this stance. In an article published in September, David L. Goldwyn, current chairman of the Energy Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council and former energy official in the administrations of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, referred to the “unintended effects” of the blockade, such as Venezuelan migration, and a “domestic economic impact” with significant repercussions.

Goldwyn noted that the United States “must learn from its past mistakes,” including the policies of Trump’s first administration towards Venezuela.

It is necessary to understand that these positions are not based solely on the particular approaches of specific analytical groups. In reality, the United States Congress itself—despite its bipartisan anti-Venezuela policy—admitted in a report published by its Research Service in January that since 2005, the United States has imposed individual and collective sanctions against Venezuelan officials and the Venezuelan economy.

The report added that, in addition to generating an economic crisis, the measures have not achieved the intended objective of regime change.

High-cost strategy
Both María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia have publicly and privately asked for increasing pressure on Venezuela through coercive measures. Alongside them, other political figures such as Juan Guaidó, Leopoldo López, and Antonio Ledezma have urged the incoming Trump administration to promote these mechanisms.

Such a strategy clearly appears costly. It lacks consensus among major sectors in Venezuela, and divides groups in the United States and internationally.

What is the political viability of a demonstrably failed approach that also faces rejection at multiple levels both inside and outside Venezuela? The possibilities of effectiveness of a new stage of “maximum pressure” lie in its instrumental purpose in the short term rather than in its long-term capabilities. That is, it would only be effective in a scenario of armed actions, possibly an invasion.

Or at least that is what the radical opponents want to make people believe by asserting that the Ya Casi Venezuela plot will achieve its objectives, or that the government will be ousted “very soon,” which is why it is necessary to increase the pressure.

Machado is rehashing the speeches from the era of Guaidó’s “interim government,” when it was said in public that Maduro’s downfall was “just hours” away due to the sanctions.

Yet, in 2024, there is a notable contradiction. If chavismo is on its way out and Edmundo González “will be sworn in on January 10 in Caracas,” as both Machado and González claim, it is incongruous for them to ask Washington for measures of attrition and long-term strategies.

This inconsistency converges in the debate that currently exists among various anti-Chavista groups, as there are those who reject the sanctions and wish to defend their political spaces in parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections in 2025, and those who do not wish to turn the page, call for more coercion, and attack any opposing element of the so-called “normalization agenda.”

Basically, the topic of sanctions, which had been partially settled with the issue of licenses by the Biden administration, has intensified, increasing the opposition’s diatribe and deepening its loss of political cohesion.

The eventual deployment aimed at intensifying the blockade will harm the opposition as a whole, it will not recognize the divisions in the debate and will harm everyone, including those who oppose it.

Machado seems to spare no effort in incurring these costs since she particularly does not have to address them as a political leader. She was not a presidential candidate, she will not be able to be one under the current conditions, she is wanted by the justice system and is on the run. So, by representing, along with Edmundo González, “the Venezuelan opposition,” they will act as “the Pied Piper of Hamelin” in a strategy that, if it does not achieve the expected results, will lead the entire opposition to a new precipice.

Machado and González, waiting for the favors of Marco Rubio and, once again, delegating to the Trump administration their chances of ousting Chavismo, are establishing a roadmap that, at least on the international front, greatly undermines the position of other opposition politicians who are active figures in Venezuelan politics.

This new stage could have consequences that dismember the organizations of opposition parties, the relationship that they have had with employer unions, and further destroy the bond between the leaders and the society which overwhelmingly rejects the blockade.

Meanwhile, Chavismo has embarked on two fronts. One of them is the Liberator Simón Bolívar Law, which establishes concrete punitive mechanisms against the typified forms of treason and support for foreign sanctions and aggressions.

Another front is the modification of the Electoral Laws, an action that includes opposition blocs in the National Assembly. These legislative initiatives propose an institutional reform that entails new standards for the legal practice of politics and eligibility for government positions. It is estimated that the new laws will close the door to those who commit serious offenses, such as soliciting, subscribing to, or supporting external aggressions.

This strategy of remodeling the terms of political participation could considerably change the ecosystem of parties, alliances, and power correlations. Chavismo has learned from previous cycles of pressure and has decided to shield the political system to isolate certain factors as a consequence of their harmful practices against the nation.

In this scenario, some opposition parties and political leaders in Venezuela will have to distance themselves and use their political organizations to resist the gravitational pull of Machado that is dragging them towards a new abyss.

 

(Misión Verdad)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

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